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Cell Manufacturer yendraYyendraYynoS QinetiQ Saft Saft Saft Saft Saft Saft Saft
Location of Owner / Facility yendraYyendraYnapaJ United Kingdom
ABSL Space Products
Boulder, CO
USA
ABSL Space Products
Boulder, CO
USA France France France France USA USA USA
POC/Name, contact information
None (used in Canon BP 927 and BP 930 
batteries - GFE)  typically cells taken from 
packs.  ABSL is one source for these cells. Rob Gitzendanner, 860-599-1100, Frank Puglia, 860-599-1100, x473 ABSL- Jeremy Neub
Tamara Max
tami.max@abslspace.com
Tamara Max
tami.max@abslspace.com
Only 
Space 
Cell
Only 
Space 
Cell
Only 
Space 
Cell
Used on
profession
nal 
batteries. 
Only 
Space 
Cell
Only 
Space 
Cell
Only 
Space 
Cell
Cell Product Line
Cell P/N 1-8PCN1-55PCN05681 QL015KA QL075KA QL0032A QL0032A QL0032A QL0045A 18650SA 18650W 18650Y 18650F li-ion ABSL 18650HC ABSL 18650HR VES140 VES100 VES180 MPS176065 VL48E VL44EL VL10E
Cell Chemistry/Components noi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iL noI-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iLnoi-iL Li-ion Li-ion Li-ion Li-ion Li-ion Li-ion Li-ion
Cathode/Anode Composition
LiCoO2/hard carbon Latest version with 
graphite
Lithiated cobalt oxide cathode with 
graphite anode
mixed metal oxide cathode with graphite 
anode LNCAO/MCMB LNCAO/MCMB Mn/graphite Mn/graphite Mn/graphite NMC/graphite spinel-NMC/graphite spinel-NMC/graphite el-NMC/graLCO/graphite
LiCoO2/hard carbon Li-Ni-Mn-Co/graphite
LiNiCoAlO
2 with 
graphite
LiNiCoAlO
2 with 
graphite
LiNiCoAlO
2 with 
graphite
LiCoO2 
with 
graphite
LiNiCoAlO
2 with 
graphite
LiNiCoAlO
2 with 
graphite
LiNiCoAlO
2 with 
graphite
Electrolyte CME:CED:CMD:CECED:CMD:CE6FPiL htiw stnevlos cinagro organic solvents organic solvents organic solvents organic solvents organic solvents organic solvents organic solvents organic solvents ganic solvenganic solvents organic solvents with LiPF6
organic
solvents 
organic
solvents 
organic
solvents 
organic
solvents 
organic
solvents 
organic
solvents 
organic
solvents 
Cell Voltage (V)
Avg Voltage 6.36.36.36.36.36.36.36.36.36.36.36.36.3 3.62 3.62 3.62 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6
Max Voltage 1.42.4 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Min Voltage 5.25.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Cell Capacity (AHr) (at what rate?)
Nameplate 010553.1 0144848.50562041.15.15.29.15.12.15.451.351.351.35751
Actual 01553.1 5.29.15.12.15.451.351.351.35751 50.14.1 38.9 26 38.9 38.9 >47 >43 >9
Rate for Capacity (C over) 5.1/C5.1/C5.1/C5.1/C9.133.915.01.071.0152.052.052.055
Cell Mass (g) 503006114 052021,1021,1051021,1008021,15.045.047434644.34877979790281083
Cell Dimensions
Cell Width or Diameter (mm) 8783181 81818181050505059.085.45 8181 53 53 53 17 54 54 32
Cell Height (mm) w/ and w/o terminals 654156 565656565010210210217.3715.88 5656 250 180 250 250 240W 240W 122W
Cell Thickness (mm) 5243 1.74.74.74.72.6583 a/na/n
Cell Type (Prismatic, Cylindrical, other) cylindrical rdnilyclacirdnilyclacirdnilyclacirdnilyclacirdnilyclleC hcuoPlleC hcuoPlleC hcuoPlleC hcuoPcitamsirPcitamsirPcitamsirPcitamsirP ical cylindrical Cylindrical Cylindrical Cylindrical Prismatic Cylindrical Cylindrical Cylindrical
Specific Energy (Wh/kg) (define rated conditions) 0315.211 691361611201702021021021841241
001031
125 Wh/kg 120 Wh/kg 170 Wh/kg 135 Wh/kg 157Wh/kg 140Wh/Kg 140Wh/Kg
Temperature for Spec Energy (deg C)
0202
20°C 20°C 20°C 20°C 20°C 20°C 20°C
Discharge Current for Spec Energy (amps)
11.051.0
C/1.5 C/1.5 C/1.5 C/1.5 C/2 C/2 C/2
Energy Density (Wh/l) (define rated conditions) 023562 455124233662434062062062143692 052623
0202
11.051.
Specific Power (w/kg) (define rated conditions) 0081053
Temperature for Spec Power Rating 0202
Coulombic Efficiency %99%99 %001%001%001%00105662LSBA
Fad Rate (% per cycle) %10.0%10.0
>80,000 cycles @ 10% 
DOD.  Extensive lifetest 
data available; contact 
ABSL for more information
>2000 cycles @ 100% DOD
0.0025 % 0.0025 % 0.002 % 0.007 %
.0025% 
LEO 
200000
0.00012% 
LEO 
50000
.0025% 
LEO 
200000
Charge Rate ( C) (recommended?) 1 0.2 LSBA5.01225.02225.05.0 81 C/3 C/3 C/3 C/3 C/3.5 LEO C/2.2 LEO C/3.5 LEO
Discharge Rate (capability?) up to 3C up to 3C up to 3C up to 3C
Cell Steady State (C) 211 CCC%001%001%001%0010116.55.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0
Cell Pulse (A) 80 dependent on time & teependent on time & dependent on time & >20C dependent on time & temp dependent on time &>2C dependent on time & tempC dependent on time & >10C dependent on time & temndent on timndent on time & temp 4 665.4 150 100 150 30 200 200 40
Max (A) 4 001008005001005003005665.42501612010101011
Operating Temperature Range 21
Min Charge (oC) 04-04-01 000000000101 02-03- 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Max Charge (oC) 060704 04040404040404040404 0606 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Min Discharge (oC) 00000 06 ot 02-02-02-02-02-02-02-02- 02-03- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max Discharge (oC) 0404040404 060606060605050505 60 60 60 40 60 60 60
Additional design features
Shut down separator seYerus toNseY seYseYseYseYseYseYseYseYseYseY seYseY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-flammable electrolyte oNoNoN oNoN No No No No No No No
PTC ononseY Yes oNseY No No No No No No No
CID Yes seYseYseYseYlaeS taeHlaeS taeHlaeS taeHlaeS taeHseYseY
seYseY
No No No
No 
Current 
breaker No No No
Cost/Cell ($)  $                                                          21.25  $                                               10,000.00  $                                               10,000.00 Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Call POC Please contact ABSL for Please contact ABSL for - - - -
Cell-design schematics Typical 18650 cell design Typical 18650 cell design
Test Data
Characterization - charge/discharge as seYseYseY Extensive data available, Extensive data available, Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Life (Number of Cycles ) 2000 005005000100010050050050050006100061 Extensive data available, >2,000 cycles at 100% DOD 80,000 35,000 going 40,000 GEO on going GEO 
DOD at quoted Number of cycles 100% %08%08%08%08%08%08%08%08%06%06 up to 90 up to 90 up to 90 20% 25% 80% 40% 80% 25% 80% 
Performance seYseYseY Extensive data available, Extensive data available, Yes Yes Yes Yes yes extrapolated yes
Safety seYseYseY Extensive data available, Extensive data available, Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Space Qualified (Y/N) seYseYseY Crush, nail, overcharge perf Crush, nail, overcharge performed  nail, overcharge perf overcharge performed overcharge overcharge performed nail, nail, seYseY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Thermal vacuum seYseYmuucav tsuj ,oN seYseY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shock seYseYseY seYseY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vibration seYseYseY 2 etal ni deifilauq eb oTseY 0 To be qualified in late 2007 be qualified in late 2007 seYseY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 etal ni deifilauq eb oTseY 0 To be qualified in late 2007 be qualified in late 2007
Flight Experience ytnelPemoSytnelP ABSL's Lot Acceptance ABSL's Lot Acceptance including 1.5 kW launched 2 LEO's Dart none Geese
Heritage - stability of source materials egatireh doog yreVegatireh dooGegatireh doog yreV Baselined for TacSat IV X-51 project (high altitud X-51 project (high altitude) 51 project (high altitudNASA D-rat program (terrestrial) All orbit types and Launch vehicle and other high heritage heritage heritage heritage heritage heritage heritage
Applications, customers REVOR SRAM5ESSIM no desuCSJ-ASAN / redrocmac nonaC ll manufacture cathode and anode materials Long life and high reliability High voltage, high power, high space cell space cell space cell and 
Recommendations Aerospace Aerospace Aerospace Aerospace Aerospace Aerospace, Military power tools power tools Laptop Laptop
Limitations
Paul Beach - 818-833-2013 - paulb@quallion.com; Vincent Visco - 818-833-2025 - vincev@quallion.comPaul Beach - 818-833-2013 - paulb@quallion.com; Vincent Visco - 818-833-2025 - vincev@quallion.com
Quallion LLC
Sylmar, CA Japan
Sanyo - Distributed by Quallion in Aerospace & Military Pack Configurations (Matrix Battery Design)
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1. Introduction 
 
Purpose 
This guideline discusses a standard approach for defining, determining, and addressing safety, 
handling, and qualification standards for lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries to help the 
implementation of the technology in aerospace applications.   Information from a variety of other 
sources relating to Li-ion batteries and their aerospace uses has been collected and included in 
this document.  The sources used are listed in the reference section at the end of this document. 
The Li-Ion chemistry is highly energetic due to its inherent high specific energy and its 
flammable electrolyte.  Due to the extreme importance of appropriate design, test, and hazard 
control of Li-ion batteries, it is recommended that all Government and industry users and 
vendors of this technology for space applications, especially involving humans, use this 
document for appropriate guidance prior to implementing the technology.  
 
Additional work is continuing to determine controls and testing needed for the safe use of Li-ion 
batteries.  In addition, continuing changes in cell chemistry that affect the safe use and handling 
of Li-ion technology are occurring that will need to be addressed. The guidelines should be 
revisited and revised in one year to incorporate any newly developed recommendations. 
 
Applications 
Li-ion batteries are rechargeable (secondary) batteries.  Secondary batteries are used as energy-
storage devices, generally connected to and charged by a prime energy source, delivering their 
energy to the load on demand.  Secondary batteries are also used in applications where they 
provide power remotely from a separate power source that they return to periodically for 
recharge.  Aerospace applications include power for satellites, astronaut suits (extravehicular 
activities), planetary and lunar rovers, and surface systems during night-time or peak power 
operations.   Payloads, launch vehicles, and portable devices, such as computers and camcorders, 
may also use secondary batteries in place of primary batteries for cost savings, to handle power 
levels beyond the capability of conventional primary batteries, or because of activation, rate 
capability, or life issues. Li-Ion batteries were more commonly used in portable electronic 
equipment in the 1990s and towards the late 90s they began acceptance for powering launch and 
satellite systems. 
 
2. Basic Chemical Information 
 
There are a wide number of chemistries used in Li-Ion batteries.  Li-Ion batteries avoid the 
reactivity, safety, and abuse sensitivity issues involved with the use of lithium metal cathodes by 
using a suitable alloy that allows intercalation of lithium ions; no metallic lithium is present in 
the cell, with normal operation.   Li-Ion batteries with liquid electrolyte are rechargeable 
batteries and have a cathode of various classes of materials that include layered LiMO2 (M = Co, 
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Ni, Mn or combinations of these or other metals, i.e. Al, Mg, etc.), olivines (LiFePO4), or spinels 
such as manganese oxides.  The anode is usually a form of carbon, namely, coke, natural and 
synthetic graphites, mesophase carbon micro beads (MCMB) or carbon fibers.  The electrolyte in 
these cells is made up of a combination of organic carbonates and a salt.  The most commonly 
used salt is LiPF6 (lithium hexafluorophosphate).  Other salts such as LiBOB (Lithium bisoxalato 
borate) or LiBF4 (lithium tetrafluoroborate) have also been used.  The charge and discharge in 
the Li-Ion cells occurs by the process of intercalation and deintercalation of lithium ions, 
respectively, as shown in the equations below.  
Positive LiMO2    
charge
discharge
 Li1-xMO2 + xLi+ + xe- 
Negative C + xLi+ + xe-   
charge
discharge  LixC 
Overall LiMO2 + C    
charge
discharge  LixC + Li1-xMO2 
 
 
The operating voltage of Li-Ion cells varies depending on the choice of material for the anode, 
cathode, and electrolyte; manufacturer’s recommendations for voltage limits should be followed.  
The capacity, life, and safety of a Li-Ion battery will also vary based on the choice of component 
materials.  A typical Li-Ion cell will operate nominally at an average voltage of 3.6 V and the 
highest specific energy obtained from a state-of-the-art cell is in excess of 150 Wh/kg.  The 
typical charging protocol for the Li-Ion cells with layered cathodes includes a constant current 
charge to a voltage of 3.9 V to 4.2 V (depending on the metal oxide cathode and manufacturer’s 
recommendations) and held at constant voltage until the current falls down to approximately 
C/50 or C/100 (this can vary according to the manufacturer).  The term, “C” signifies the charge 
or discharge rate, in Amperes, expressed as a multiple of the rated capacity in Ampere-hours 
(Ah).  Due to the unique charging characteristic of the Li-Ion cells and batteries, charging 
requires a dedicated charger that can keep the cells and batteries within their specified voltage 
limits.  This charger may be a “smart” charger in some cases.  The discharge of the cell depends 
on the load used, but the end voltage during discharge should not go below 2.5 V.  Typical end 
of discharge voltages for the batteries in different equipment has been 3.0 V/cell.  Internal 
resistance for the Li-Ion cells varies from 9 to 120 mΩ for small (1 to 3 Ah) cells to about 0.8 
mΩ for large (190 Ah) cells. 
  
Li-Ion cells typically are spiral wound or prismatic.  Under the prismatic types there are true 
prismatics, which are stacked flat plates, and others that are folded over to give a prismatic 
appearance.  A third variety that is increasingly common in the market today is the elliptic 
cylindrical type where the spiral wound stack is flattened to give a prismatic appearance.  
Typically, the commercial cells used in cellular phones are prismatic cells while those used in 
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camcorders, cameras, and PCs are cylindrical cells.  Li-Ion cells have 100% energy efficiency 
through most of their cycle life (input energy is equal to output energy).  Most commercial 
cylindrical cells are case negative, although some that have aluminum cases are case positive.   
Most of the prismatic cells above 5Ah capacity are case neutral.  The state-of-charge (SOC) and 
temperature at which the cells are stored or cycled greatly affects the irreversible capacity loss in 
the cells.  For example, one commercial cell in a period of storage for one year, exhibited less 
than 2 % loss at 0 % SOC and 0 ºC, whereas it was about 13 % loss at 100 % SOC and 40 ºC.  
The temperature and the depth of discharge to which the cells are cycled also affect the 
deliverable capacity of the cells with cycle life. 
 
Li-Ion polymer batteries are rechargeable batteries that have polymer blends in the cathode or 
anode or separator or in all three. In the polymer cells, flat, bonded electrodes are used to enable 
the fabrication of thin cells. The cells are made in flexible shapes and sizes and packaged in 
aluminized plastic pouches.  The electrochemical nature of these cells is very similar to the liquid 
li-ion cells discussed previously. These cells have a LiMO
2 
cathode (M = Co, Ni, Mn or 
combinations of these). The commonly used cathodes in li-ion polymer cells are LiMn
2
O
4 
spinel 
compounds. The anode can be any form of carbon, namely, natural and synthetic graphites, 
mesophase carbon micro beads (MCMB) or carbon fibers (li-ion polymer cells). The anode can 
also be lithium metal (lithium polymer cells). The electrolyte in these cells is made up of a 
combination of organic carbonates and a salt in a polymer matrix. The most commonly used salt 
is LiPF
6 
(lithium hexafluorophosphate). The polymers commonly used are based on 
polyacrylonitriles (PANs), PVDF based polymers (PVDF-HFP, PVDF-CTFE), polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC), etc. In some cases, an ancillary plasticizer such as dibutyl phthalate is 
incorporated into the resin, which facilitates the densification of the electrodes under low 
temperature and pressure. The plasticizer is later vaporized or removed by a suitable solvent 
extraction process.  The nominal voltage of the Li-Ion polymer cells with the cobaltate cathode is 
about 3.6 V and the energy density obtained can range from 145 to 190 Wh/kg. The Li-Ion 
polymer cells with the manganese spinel cathode have a nominal voltage of about 3.8 V and 
have energy densities in the range of 130 to 144 Wh/kg. The typical charging protocol for the 
lithium/Li-Ion polymer cells includes a constant current charge to a voltage of 4.1 V or 4.2 V 
(depending on the metal oxide cathode and manufacturer’s recommendations) and held at 
constant voltage until the current falls to approximately C/100 (this can vary according to the 
manufacturer). Similarly to the li-ion cells with liquid electrolyte, charging of li-ion polymer 
cells requires a dedicated charger due to their unique charging characteristics. This charger can 
be a “smart” charger in some cases.  The discharge of the cell depends on the load used but the 
end voltage during discharge should not go below 2.5 V. Typical end-of-discharge voltages for 
the batteries in different equipment have been 3.0 V/cell. Internal resistance for the li-ion 
polymer cells varies from 20 to 60 mΩ for small (0.5 to 15 Ah) cells and is expected to drop with 
increased capacity cells. 
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Advances in cathode and anode materials have led to the development of new Li-Ion cell 
chemistries.  Such changes also cause a change in voltage.  The Olivine cathode is one such with 
its LiFePO4 cathode. The operating voltage of the LiFePO4 type li-ion cell is 3.3 V.  Changing 
anode materials from graphite to titanate-based materials as in the Altairnano cells is another 
example where the operating voltage drops to 2.65 V.  
 
Li-Ion polymer cells are typically flat and thin. The cells are packaged in vapor-impermeable, 
flexible, multilayer polymer-aluminum bags. The polymer cells are typically made up of a 
positive electrode plate and a negative electrode plate bonded to two opposite sides of an 
ionically conductive separator. The plates can be stacked as individual plates, Z-folded, or folded 
in other ways depending on the mechanical properties of the individual component layers. A 
large capacity cell would thus have several plates stacked on each other to give the capacity 
required. Another common method of cell stacking is the “bicell” configuration where the central 
plate (typically a negative electrode) is shared by two positive plates on either side. There is a 
layer of separator between the center negative plate and the two positive plates on either side. 
Several bicells can be stacked to give a larger capacity cell.   Polymer cells typically perform 
well at low rates of charge and discharge. However, cells can be made for specific medium and 
high rate applications. Because of the higher resistance caused by the polymer materials used in 
the electrodes and separator, currently, a small quantity of liquid electrolyte is used to improve 
ionic conductivity.   The state-of-charge (SOC) and temperature at which the cells are stored or 
cycled greatly affects the irreversible capacity loss in the cells. These are similar to the liquid li-
ion cells.  
 
3. Factors affecting battery performance 
 
The performance required from the battery for a specific application should be determined and 
the relative importance of the different factors should be prioritized prior to selection of the cell 
to be used, since they interact with each other.   For example, operational factors such as 
temperature and charge/discharge rate affect other factors such as capacity, voltage, and life.  
Typically, testing is required to confirm battery performance at the specific conditions of the 
application.  General interactions of these factors are discussed here; information on the 
performance of specific cells at defined conditions can be requested from manufacturers. 
 
Capacity 
Capacity is adversely affected by high storage temperatures, high state-of-charge during storage, 
higher discharge rates, low temperature during charging, the stand time between charge and 
discharge, and operation at temperatures either lower or higher than the cell optimum 
temperature.  
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Voltage 
When a cell is discharged, its voltage while under load is lower than both the theoretical voltage, 
which is based on its chemical composition, and the open-circuit voltage, where there is no load 
on the cell.  The voltage of the cell decreases during the discharge, and the shape of the discharge 
voltage curve is affected by temperature, discharge rate, cycle life, service life, and the 
electrochemical reactions occurring within the cell.  The voltage typically is lower and decreases 
faster with increased discharge rates and longer cycle life.  The open-circuit voltage varies with 
the state-of-charge of the cell. 
 
Discharge Current Rate 
Decreased capacity, voltage, and life and increased IR losses and heating are seen with higher 
discharge current rates, along with a more rapid decrease in voltage during the discharge.  A cell 
that has been discharged at a higher current rate to a specific cutoff voltage still has additional 
capacity available above that cutoff voltage if the discharge is continued at a lower current rate.  
While the theoretical voltage and capacity can be approached with extremely low current rates, 
very long discharge periods can cause chemical deterioration that would reduce the capacity.  
Discharge rates are commonly specified as multiples of the C rate, which is the current that will 
discharge the battery to the cutoff voltage in one hour. 
 
Charge Current Rate 
Less capacity is restored and increased heating occurs when higher charge current rates are used.  
The magnitudes of the capacity decrease and heating increase are temperature dependent.  When 
a cell is charged at a higher current rate to the end-of-charge voltage, more capacity can be added 
below the cutoff voltage if the charge is continued at a lower rate.  Charge rates are also 
commonly specified as multiples of the C rate.  
 
Continuous or Intermittent Discharge 
When a battery is allowed to rest after a discharge, certain chemical and physical changes take 
place that can result in voltage recovery. Thus, the voltage of a battery that has dropped during a 
high-rate discharge will rise after a rest period.  This improvement due to the rest period is 
generally greater after discharge at higher currents and also is dependent on the end-of-discharge 
voltage, temperature, and the length of the rest period. 
 
Constant Current, Constant Load, or Constant Power Discharge 
A battery may be discharged using constant current, constant resistance, or constant power loads, 
or variable loads depending on the requirement of the application.  The discharge current varies 
for each type of discharge. The time that the battery will deliver the required capacity is 
inversely proportional to the average current.  In the constant-resistance discharge mode, the 
discharge current decreases as the battery voltage drops and the power decreases as the square of 
the battery voltage. Under this mode of discharge, to assure that the required power is available 
at the end-of-discharge voltage, the current and power during the earlier part of the discharge 
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start higher than the minimum required. The battery discharges at a high current, draining its 
ampere-hour capacity rapidly and excessively, which will result in a shorter discharge time.  In 
the constant-current mode, the current is set so that that the power output at the end-of-discharge 
voltage is equal to the minimum level required.  Thus, both current and power throughout the 
discharge are lower than for the constant-resistance mode.  The average current drain on the 
battery is lower and the discharge time is longer.  In the constant-power mode, the current is 
lowest at the beginning of the discharge and increases as the battery voltage drops in order to 
maintain a constant-power output at the level required by the equipment. The average current is 
lowest under this mode of discharge, and hence, the longest discharge time is obtained. 
 
Temperature 
The temperature at which the battery is charged and discharged has a pronounced effect on its 
capacity and voltage characteristics. This is due to the reduction in chemical activity and the 
increase in battery internal resistance at lower temperatures. Lowering of the discharge 
temperature will result in a reduction of capacity, as well as an increase in the slope of the 
discharge curve. The optimum temperature is dependent on the specific battery chemistry and 
design and can be tailored somewhat.  For most Li-ion batteries the optimum temperature is 
between 20 and 40C, although electrolytes have been developed by JPL for their rover missions 
that allow good performance at lower temperatures. At higher temperatures, chemical 
deterioration may be rapid enough during the discharge to cause a loss of capacity, the extent 
again being dependent on the battery system and temperature.  As the discharge rate is increased, 
the cell voltage decreases; the rate of voltage decrease is usually more rapid at lower 
temperatures. Similarly, the cell’s capacity falls off most rapidly with increasing discharge load 
and decreasing temperature. Discharging at high rates could cause anomalous effects as the 
battery may heat up to temperatures far above ambient, and thus show the same effects of 
operating at higher temperatures.  Some chemistries exhibit voltage delay when discharging at 
high rates and low temperatures, where the voltage starts low and slowly increases over the first 
several minutes of discharge.  Voltage delay becomes more pronounced as temperatures decrease 
and rates increase. 
 
Service Life 
The most accurate method of determining service life is to run an actual life test of the battery at 
the operational conditions and run the battery until it can no longer provide the required energy, 
which is defined as the end of life. There are also various mathematical calculations that can be 
used to approximate the performance of a given cell or battery under a particular discharge 
condition and/or to estimate the weight or size of a cell required to meet a given service 
requirement.  
 
Voltage Regulation 
The voltage regulation required by the equipment restricts the capacity obtainable from a battery. 
Allowing the lowest possible end-of-discharge voltage and the widest voltage range leads to the 
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highest available capacity. Discharging multi-cell series-connected batteries must be controlled 
to prevent safety problems that might arise from mismatched or unbalanced cells.  When 
operated in a series string, the voltage must be controlled to prevent the lowest voltage cell from 
being driven into voltage reversal possibly resulting in cell venting or rupture.  
 
A voltage regulator can be used to convert the varying output voltage of the battery into a 
constant output voltage consistent with the equipment requirements. This allows the full capacity 
of the battery to be used; the only tradeoff is that the voltage regulator has losses. 
 
Another consideration is the response of the cell or battery voltage when the discharge current is 
being changed during the discharge. A battery with lower internal resistance will have a smaller 
drop in voltage and better response to changes in load current than one with higher internal 
resistance.  
 
Charging Voltage 
The specific voltage and the voltage profile on charge depend on such factors as battery 
chemistry, charge rate, temperature, life and electrochemical changes that may have occurred in 
the cell due to aging.  Charge control is required for li-ion batteries to prevent overcharge, which 
can cause venting or rupture.  The manufacturers’ recommendations for maximum voltage 
should be followed and care should be taken to ensure that the recommendations are applied at 
the cell level.  
 
Storage Conditions and Calendar Life 
Batteries are a perishable product and deteriorate as a result of the chemical action that occurs 
during storage that results in self-discharge. The type of cell design, chemistry, temperature, 
state-of-charge, and length of storage period are factors that affect the shelf life or charge 
retention of the battery. The type of discharge following the storage period will also influence the 
shelf life of the battery. Usually the percentage charge retention following storage (comparing 
performance after and before storage) will be lower for more stringent discharge conditions.  
Since self-discharge proceeds at a lower rate at reduced temperatures, refrigerated or low-
temperature storage extends the shelf life and is recommended for some battery systems. 
Refrigerated batteries should be warmed to the optimum operational temperature suggested by 
the manufacturer before discharge to obtain maximum capacity and to avoid condensation.  Li-
ion batteries should be stored at lower states-of-charge to avoid chemical changes in the battery 
which cause decreased battery performance.  Follow the manufacturer’s guidelines for optimum 
storage conditions.  The self-discharge characteristics of a cell that has been or is being 
discharged can be different from those of a cell that has been stored without having been 
discharged.  Knowledge of the battery’s storage and discharge history is needed to predict the 
battery’s performance under these conditions. This information is usually available from the 
battery manufacturer or storage facility. 
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Cycle Life 
The number of charge/discharge cycles that have been performed by the battery affects both the 
voltage and capacity of the battery.  As a battery is cycled, lower voltages and less capacity are 
available on discharge.  These impacts are greater at more severe discharge conditions. 
 
Vibration and Shock 
Vibration and shock can cause internal shorts that can lead to venting of the electrolyte, possible 
fire, and thermal runaway.  It can also lead to fracture of the cell case, which can lead to 
electrolyte leakage.  The ability of the battery design to withstand the anticipated vibration and 
shock conditions should be evaluated by testing prior to use. 
 
Other Environments 
Other environments encountered by the battery during its life could impact its eventual 
performance.  These could include humidity, fog, fungus, fine sand, explosive atmospheres, and 
radiation.  The impacts of the various environments experienced by the battery over its life 
should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
 
4. Battery Design 
 
The design of a multi-cell battery should ensure electrical continuity, mechanical stability, and 
adequate thermal management.  The battery must provide both the capacity and current required 
within the voltage limits of the application.  The performance of the cells in a multi-cell battery 
will usually be different than the performance of the individual cells. The cells cannot be 
manufactured identically and each will encounter a somewhat different environment in the 
battery pack. The design of the multi-cell battery (such as packaging techniques, container 
material, insulation, and potting compounds) will influence the performance as it affects the 
environment and temperature of the individual cells. Obviously these battery materials add to the 
size and weight and the specific energy or energy densities of the batteries will be lower than that 
of the component cells.   A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) should be done for all 
battery designs.  All cell safety devices (such as vent disks, current interrupt devices, positive 
temperature coefficient devices, fuses, and switches, relays, and diodes) incorporated into the 
battery design must have their failure modes and reliabilities included in the overall battery 
failure and reliability analysis, since they increase the number of failure scenarios. 
 
Whenever a choice exists between different risk-levels associated with chemistry, capacity, 
complexity, charging and application, the option that presents the minimum risk while meeting 
the performance requirements of the mission should be selected. For example, battery selection 
for in-cabin applications must not be justified only on a cost and schedule basis of commonality 
with similar or identical EVA or payload application batteries. For aerospace applications, the 
hazard severity of the battery is evaluated as part of the battery design evaluation and approval.  
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Battery electrical design should minimize the risk of leakage currents from the cell terminals to 
the battery case and electrostatic discharge and should meet all EMI and compatibility 
requirements for the application.  Battery charge control is required for li-ion batteries to avoid 
the hazards associated with overcharge and should be developed along with battery design.  With 
rechargeable li-ion batteries, cycling could cause the cells in a multi-cell battery pack to become 
unbalanced and their voltage, capacity, or other characteristics could become significantly 
different. This could result in poor performance or safety problems.  The amount of acceptable 
cell state-of-charge divergence depends on the battery application.  Applications with large 
capacity margins may be able to charge and discharge to the weakest cell limits without 
requiring cell-level control.   For applications with long cycle life requirements or little capacity 
margin, it is more likely that cell-level monitoring and end-of-charge or discharge control will be 
required for reliable battery performance and safety. 
 
Batteries and battery containers must be designed to survive all environmental conditions of a 
mission or application. This includes launch/abort/landing loads, transportation, and handling 
environments.  Mounting or sealing of cells in a battery case should not interfere with cells vents 
or rupture disks. 
 
Battery designs that retain the heat dissipated by the cells can improve performance at low 
temperatures.  On the other hand, excessive buildup of heat can be injurious to the battery’s 
performance, life, and safety.  The battery thermal design needs to maintain an optimal 
temperature range for all the cells in the battery within the expected environmental conditions. 
 
Vendors of cells used in aerospace battery designs should have a formal quality control plan in 
place prior to cell production. 
 
5. Hazards and Controls 
 
The main abuse conditions that cause hazards conditions in li-ion cells are the result of 
overcharge, external and internal short circuits, overdischarge, high temperatures, and structural 
issues.   
 
Studies have shown that overcharge conditions can lead to the deposition of lithium metal that 
can create internal shorts in the cell and breakdown of electrolyte that can lead to increased 
internal pressure.  The electrolyte in the Li-Ion cells contains flammable organic solvents and 
under high voltage conditions, they decompose leading to the formation of gases (carbon 
monoxide, carbon dioxide, and other gaseous decomposition products).  This can cause over-
pressure conditions inside the cell leading to smoke and flame if the gases are not vented 
benignly.  Another major hazard that exists with certain transition metal oxide cathodes is the 
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evolution of oxygen under overvoltage conditions.  This occurs due to the instability of the 
transition metal oxide structure at high voltages that causes the release of oxygen.  The presence 
of oxygen and the flammable gases at high voltages cause excessive gas pressure inside the cells 
that can result in venting with flames. Li-Ion cells must not be charged to a voltage greater than 
that recommended by the vendor.  Li-Ion batteries require a dedicated charger or a universal 
“smart” charger that recognizes the battery chemistry. The charging scenario and charging 
equipment should be evaluated as part of the battery design evaluation and approval process. 
Final testing should treat the battery and charger as a unit or system. Many Li-Ion cells have 
built-in current interruption devices (CIDs) that help protect the cell from overcharge. 
   
Short circuits are a direct connection between the positive and negative terminals of a cell and/or 
battery. They can be generated by a failure external to a cell or by a failure internal to a cell.  
External short circuits can be caused by faulty connections between the positive and negative 
terminals of a cell and/or battery, conductive electrolyte leakage paths within a battery, broken 
and/or loose connections within a battery, or structural failures, loads experienced by the battery, 
or failures in the hardware powered by the battery. External shorts of Li-Ion cells can result in 
very high current spikes that cause high pressures inside the cell resulting in venting and 
explosions.  External shorts are prevented by a variety of methods.  Many li-ion cells have built-
in current interruption devices (CIDs) that trip due to internal pressure at currents well below the 
battery's short circuit current capability, which prevent further discharge through the external 
short and safe the battery if short circuits occur.  If this capability is not built into the cell, it 
needs to be addressed at the battery level.  Interrupters may be fuses, circuit breakers, thermal 
switches or other effective devices.  Some cells also have positive temperature coefficient (PTC) 
devices that are used to limit the high current spikes experienced by a cell/ battery under an 
external short condition.  However, when used in series strings or parallel/series designs, they 
may not give the same protection as seen in independent cells.  Both PTCs and CIDs may fail 
when exposed to high voltages due to other failures. The use of bypass diodes is recommended 
to prevent these failures.  The maximum number of cells in series without a bypass diode 
depends on the cell being used and is determined by testing. To prevent shorts between leaked 
electrolyte and the battery case, all inner surfaces of metal battery cases should either have an 
anodized finish or be coated with a non-electrically conductive, electrolyte-resistant paint.  Cell 
terminals need to be protected from contact with other conductive surfaces.  The surfaces of 
battery terminals on the outside of the battery case also need protection from accidental bridging.  
Battery terminals which pass through metal battery cases should be insulated from the case by an 
insulating collar or other effective means. The surfaces of battery terminals that extend inside the 
battery case need to be insulated with potting materials to prevent unintentional contact with 
other conductors inside the case and also to prevent bridging by electrolyte leaks.   Wires inside 
the battery case should be insulated, restrained from contact with cell terminals, protected against 
chafing and physically constrained from movement due to vibration or bumping.  Internal shorts 
are caused by metallic burrs, misalignment, separator failure, or other means of direct contact 
between the positive and negative materials inside a battery cell.  Testing the ability of the 
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battery box and connections to handle a 500 V difference without current leakage is 
recommended to detect latent shorts in the battery circuitry. 
 
Li-Ion cells under simulated internal short conditions can exhibit venting, fire, smoke, and go 
into thermal runaway.  Slight deformations of the cells under hydraulic jaw pressures of 20 to 50 
psi per minute, causing soft shorts, have resulted in electrolyte leakage and smaller rises in 
temperature (max. temp. 45C recorded).  Fast and heavy crushing (hydraulic jaw pressures of 
greater than 200 psi per minute) of the cells has resulted in venting and smoke.  Internal shorts 
must be prevented with quality-controlled assembly procedures, wherever possible; however, the 
incorporation of external cell and battery-level short circuit protection devices can stop the 
propagation of other hazards should a rare internal short occur.  Batteries for manned 
applications are screened for tolerance to internal shorts using the vibration screening method 
discussed below in section 8. 
 
From a battery perspective, high temperature occurs when the operating temperature of a battery 
or cell exceeds the upper temperature limit of the manufacturer's performance specifications.  Li-
Ion cells subjected to very high temperature conditions (about 130-190C depending on 
chemistry) can vent, smoke, and exhibit thermal runaway accompanied by fire and/or an 
expulsion of can contents through the vent holes in the cell. An additional high temperature 
concern for batteries and cells is the maximum safe touch temperature if they will be handled by 
crew.  Internal causes of high temperature leading to thermal runaway can be controlled by 
controlling shorts; by the incorporation of PTCs, which interrupt the current before a hazardous 
temperature is reached; by inclusion of a shutdown separator, which causes a meltdown of the 
middle layer of a three-layer separator at high temperatures and interrupts the electrochemical 
reactions in the cell; and by operating the cell within the load limits established by the 
manufacturer.  Heat sinks, heat shunts, and active cooling loops can also be used to remove 
excess heat from internal or external sources.  Thermal analysis or testing of the battery in 
expected surroundings should be performed to verify battery temperatures throughout anticipated 
operational conditions.  
 
Overdischarge conditions lead to the electrodeposition of copper on the cathode causing the 
formation of a short circuit condition when the cell is subsequently charged.  In most cases, 
overdischarge is benign and results in a dead cell. Voltage dispersion between cells in a string 
can occur over the operational life of the battery.  In a string configuration, the presence of a 
weak cell can cause an imbalance in voltage and also lead to an overdischarged cell.  During 
subsequent string charging with no cell-level voltage or mid-string monitoring or control, the 
unbalanced cells could result in overcharging of some cells especially if the weak cell has a soft 
short due to its overdischarged state. 
 
Structural hazards can result from mechanical, chemical, and thermal stresses that reduce the 
integrity or functional capability of cell and battery cases.  These can lead to breakage of cases, 
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seals, mounting provisions, and internal components, which can lead to internal shorts and 
unconstrained movement of the battery.  Battery designs are tested for vibration and shock 
appropriate for the expected environment.  Materials used in battery designs should not degrade 
if exposed as expected to each other.  Effects of possible thermal expansion should be accounted 
for. 
 
The main abuse conditions that cause hazardous conditions in li/li-ion polymer cells are the 
result of overcharge, internal and external shorts and high temperatures. These are very similar to 
that for the liquid li-ion cells discussed above. However, the polymer li-ion cells have an 
additional problem with electrolyte leakage under abusive conditions.  Electrolyte leakage can 
lead to short circuits, corrosion, and chemical exposure.  The main control for electrolyte leakage 
is to control abuse conditions as listed above. 
 
6. Battery Requirements 
 
CREWED SPACECRAFT 
This section is geared toward the designers of batteries to be used in crew equipment or crewed 
vehicle systems and payloads.  All batteries are designed or battery designs chosen to control 
applicable hazards and these designs must be reviewed prior to certification for flight.  Specific 
design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, 
capacity, complexity, charging and application. There are basic requirements of all battery 
designs and applications that should be followed. These mandatory requirements are listed in this 
section. 
 
Battery Requirements Summary 
The following is a summary of battery requirements for crewed missions according to NASA 
Johnson Space Center.  Refer to the Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) website at 
http://wwwsrqa.jsc.nasa.gov/pce/default.htm for the latest requirements.   Specific design and 
verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, 
complexity, charging and application. There are basic requirements of all battery designs and 
applications that must be followed.  
 
Battery Design Evaluation and Approval  
Every battery, its verification-screening program, its on-orbit usage plans, and its post-flight 
processing are evaluated and approved by the battery engineers of the applicable Power Systems 
Office or by the Payload Safety Review Panel prior to certification for flight of that battery as 
early as possible during the design phase of a battery or battery-powered application. Past 
experience has shown that if a battery evaluation does not occur until the design is nearly 
complete (or completed); changes in the design have often been required. Approval of a battery 
design for a particular hardware will not be construed as a general certification. Approval of 
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battery usage needs to be obtained for each hardware configuration. The process for obtaining 
battery design evaluation and approval from JSC is detailed in EA-CWI-033. Ideally, the battery 
design and its screening program will be completed and approved at the completion of the 
critical design review or equivalent phase of a project. The following items should be addressed: 
 the battery hazard controls are adequately addressed per JSC-20793 guidelines  
 the cell screening or battery-pack screening plan is adequate per JSC-20793 
guidelines 
 the plans for on-orbit usage and provisions for on-orbit disposal or return of unused 
cells or battery packs are adequate 
 the post-flight processing plan for battery removal and disposal is adequate 
Payload Battery Approval 
Payload battery approval is only one part of the overall payload safety approval process. Payload 
providers for the ISS should follow the "Payload Safety Review and Data Submittal 
Requirements," NSTS/ISS 13830, to submit a payload for review.  A Flight Payload 
Standardized Hazard Control Report, JSC Form 1230, will be submitted to document all hazards 
for the payload, including the battery-related hazards. Unique hazard reports may be required if 
the batteries chosen do not meet the requirements stated on the JSC Form 1230 summarized 
below. Further guidelines for payloads are found in the "Safety Policy and Requirements for 
Payloads Using the Space Transportation System," NSTS 1700.7, and “Safety Policy and 
Requirements for Payloads Using the International Space Station,” NSTA 1700.7 Addendum.   
All payload batteries that utilize series and parallel combinations need a unique hazard report and 
all payload cells need to pass specified acceptance-screening tests.  
 
Overview of the Payload Safety Review Process 
The Payload Organization (PO) will ultimately be responsible for providing the proper test data 
and manufacturers information/certification which supports the choice of a particular battery 
chemistry according to current versions of NSTS/ISS 1700.7, NSTS/ISS 1700.7 ISS Addendum, 
and NSTS/ISS 13830. Prior to battery selection, the PO should contact the Payload Safety 
Review Panel and request information on prior flights of candidate battery chemistries used in 
payloads with similar energy storage requirements. If the batteries being considered have a prior 
safety history, less testing may be required, or the limits of required testing may be adjusted 
according to known weaknesses. The PSRP determines the type and quantity of data to be 
supplied. The PSRP will also recommend suitable batteries if requested by the PO. The PO may 
also request that a JSC battery engineer conduct the various screening tests required to ascertain 
battery safety status. This is subject to the availability of the JSC battery engineer, appropriate 
testing facilities, and project funding. The PO may also request a safety Technical Interchange 
Meeting (TIM) prior to a formal Phase 0/1 Safety Review, to discuss the payload energy storage 
requirements, and which battery chemistries are being considered. The PO should be prepared to 
discuss their battery test program, qualification philosophy, proposed packaging of the batteries, 
and series/parallel configuration if more than one battery string is being considered. The PSRP 
may assign a JSC battery engineer, a JSC payload safety engineer, or battery specialist to consult 
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with the PO. The PSRP reserves the right to request additional data or testing depending on the 
battery selection. The battery safety approval process for all payloads is dictated by the PSRP or 
its duly designated representative. This process should be entered into as early in the payload 
design process as possible (once energy requirements have been determined), so that the PSRP 
and the PO can agree upon a process specific to the potential battery chemistry and the specific 
power needs of the payload. An acceptable battery design includes controls for potential battery 
hazards. Battery design considerations must be given to the structural integrity of the cell and 
battery housings, the possibility of gas generation, pressure, and/or electrolyte leakage, the 
prevention of short circuits and circulating currents, the possibility for high battery temperatures, 
over-discharging; and assurance of proper charging techniques.  The designer should refer to the 
details given in this document regarding each hazard, its sources, and its controls. The battery 
evaluation will assess the battery hazard controls. Depending on the battery chemistry, capacity, 
complexity, charging and application, certain hazard controls discussed previously may be 
imposed upon the specific battery as unique design requirements.  
 
Fault Tolerance  
The fault tolerance of the battery will be evaluated as part of the battery design evaluation and 
approval. For the purposes of fault tolerance discussions, NPR 8705.2 defines “catastrophic 
hazard” as a hazard that can result in the potential for: a disabling or fatal personnel injury or loss 
of the space vehicle and ground facilities or loss of vehicle. Permissible non-catastrophic failure 
modes for various batteries have been identified and can be properly controlled by the battery 
design. To summarize, NPR 8705.2 requires that all batteries will be two-fault tolerant to 
catastrophic failure. The two-fault tolerance requirement, where a battery survives any two 
credible failure modes without inducing any catastrophic hazards and any single failure without 
inducing critical hazards, is also a sound engineering approach to crewed space flight battery 
applications. Historically, this requirement is derived from NSTS 1700.7 and its corresponding 
ISS Addendum. These documents reinforce the two-fault tolerance requirement as a sound 
engineering approach to manned space flight battery applications. Within this requirement, 
permissible failure levels for batteries have been established and must be incorporated in the 
battery design requirements.  The hazard reduction precedence will be evaluated as part of the 
battery design evaluation, approval and Battery Office certification. Batteries and their systems 
must be inherently safe through the selection of appropriate design features or the use of 
appropriate safety devices, as fail operational/fail safe combinations to eliminate the hazard 
potential. 
 
Since lithium-based cells/batteries have a high specific energy and hazard potential, they are 
required to be at least two-fault tolerant to any catastrophic failure unless a more stringent 
requirement is dictated by the previous sections. Most lithium based cell electrolytes present 
corrosive, toxic, or flammability hazards. With appropriate lot-verification testing, tolerance of 
lithium cells to certain types of abuse may count as a hazard control, dependant on cell design, 
capacity, complexity, charging and application. A cell failure is counted as one of the failures. 
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Critical Equipment  
Critical equipment includes equipment whose functional failure can result in loss of the vehicle, 
harm to personnel, or inability to achieve primary mission operational objectives. The 
permissible failure levels are defined in terms of one and two successive failure modes.  
A. A critical equipment battery must survive any single credible failure mode without causing 
damage to equipment.  
B. A critical equipment battery must survive any single credible failure mode without requiring 
contingency procedures.  
C. A critical equipment battery must survive any single credible failure mode without requiring 
emergency procedures.  
D. A critical equipment battery must survive a subsequent second failure without causing 
personnel injury.  
E. A critical equipment battery must survive a subsequent second failure without causing loss of 
vehicle.  
F. A critical equipment battery must survive a subsequent second failure without causing loss of 
ground facilities. 
 
GFE/ CFE/Payload/Crew Equipment Batteries (Non-Critical)  
Most non-critical equipment include calculators, cameras, multimeters, tape recorders, and others 
are already certified for flight and are listed for waivers to detailed testing. These are of the 
button cell type in most cases.  
 
Although there are virtually no requirements specific to batteries, the permissible failure level is 
classified as a "soft" failure. That is, any failure is permissible, so long as no credible failure can 
propagate outside the equipment or to a piece of critical equipment. Analysis of this non-
propagation should be documented and appended to the appropriate safety data package. 
 
Hazard Controls 
A battery design includes controls for potential battery hazards. Battery design considerations 
must be given to the structural integrity of the cell and battery housings; the possibility of gas 
generation, pressure, and/or electrolyte leakage; the prevention of short circuits and circulating 
currents; the possibility for high battery temperatures; over-discharging; and assurance of proper 
charging techniques. The battery evaluation will assess the battery hazard controls. 
 
Li-Ion batteries must be charged with a dedicated charger or a universal “smart” charger that 
recognizes the battery chemistry. The charger should be evaluated under normal operating 
conditions to understand its characteristics and verify its safety. The batteries must undergo 
engineering evaluation to discern the characteristics of the system. The battery must be two-
failure tolerant and hence should have at least two levels of safety for any given hazardous 
condition.  The batteries should have protection against overcharge and overdischarge conditions 
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and protection against over-current (fuse) and/or over-temperature (thermal fuse).  Commercial 
cylindrical 18650 cells have three levels of protection. These are the PTC (Positive Temperature 
Coefficient), CID (Current Interrupt Device), and the shutdown separator. The PTC is activated 
in the case of external short/over-current and over-temperature conditions. The CID is activated 
when the cells build up excessive pressure that usually occurs when the cells are overcharged to 
voltages close to or above 5V. The shutdown separator is activated when the cells reach a certain 
temperature that causes a meltdown of the middle polyethylene-layer of the three-layer separator. 
This usually occurs at about 130ºC. The cells also have a vent that is rated to vent above 150 psi 
but this is not a level of protection as the cells go into a thermal runaway condition with venting.  
Large cells consist of the shut-down separator, vents, and a fusible link to the electrode as levels 
of protection. The shut-down separator is activated when the cells reach temperatures of close to 
130ºC.  The fusible link melts at specific currents, which then inhibits any hazardous occurrences 
during an external short condition. The vent typically operates above 150 psi and the vent can 
sometimes be a level of protection to a catastrophic hazard but the cells typically do not perform 
after venting. 
 
For Li-Ion batteries of the COTS type with up to 10 V and up to 60 Wh, data should be provided 
to show one-fault tolerance. The second level of control should be obtained from existing test 
data or manufacturer’s data. Batteries and charger should be acquired from the same lot and the 
battery safety circuitry and charger circuitry information should be provided. All flight batteries 
undergo acceptance testing that includes visual inspection and testing for open circuit voltage, 
closed circuit voltage, vibration to flight requirement levels or higher (see section on short circuit 
hazards) and vacuum leak check with functional charge/discharge cycles performed before and 
after each test.  
 
Engineering and qualification of Li-Ion batteries and cells, lot certification, acceptance testing 
and screening of flight batteries is performed on all batteries that  are not already approved, and 
the EP-WI-015 can be used as the guiding document. Lot testing should be performed on at least 
3% cells of every new lot of cells and batteries procured for the same application.  
  
The Li-Ion batteries should undergo performance and abuse tests on the battery and cell level to 
establish an engineering evaluation database. The performance tests must include physical 
characterization (dimensions and weight), electrochemical characterization (OCV, CCV, 
capacity checks), rate capability (capacities at different charge/discharge rates and different 
temperatures), and vacuum leak checks. The abuse tests must consist of overcharge, 
overdischarge, external short, internal short/crush, heat-to-vent, vibration, drop, and vent and 
burst pressure determination. The main features that need to be understood about the battery are 
the fuse rating, the operational characteristics (voltage) of the overcharge and overdischarge 
protection switches and the nature of the protective circuitry. On the cell-level, the levels of 
safety incorporated into the cell, if any, need to be understood and characterized (for example, 
PTCs, CIDs, shut-down separator, etc.).  
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The qualification of the battery should include testing the batteries to environmental and 
vibration levels that are higher than the mission requirements. (See the discussion on Short 
Circuit Hazards). The flight acceptance testing involves verification of battery performance by 
charge/discharge cycling, vacuum leak checks and vibration. The number of flight missions that 
the batteries will be used for, along with the location of the battery in the Orbiter should 
determine the period and level of vibration. The vibration spectrum used to screen the batteries 
from the occurrence of internal shorts should be higher than what is obtained from the 
calculation of mission requirements.   Thermal analysis should be done for the expected 
load/charge profile. 
 
Crew Touch temperature requirements 
Hardware which will be touched by crewmembers must have surface temperatures not exceeding 
45 °C for continuous contact, should have warning labels for surface temperatures between 45 
and 50 °C and should have protective measures above 50 °C. If a battery or cell will be touched 
by a crewmember, the battery must incorporate additional protection to prevent the battery 
and/or cell temperature from exceeding this 45°C limit. If the battery or cell will not be directly 
touched but is located near a surface that will be touched, temperature controls must be 
incorporated to prevent excessive battery or cell heat from transferring to the touchable surface.  
 
Flight Cell and Battery Pack Qualification, Lot and Flight Acceptance Testing  
Qualification, lot and flight acceptance tests are used to verify the effectiveness of redundant 
hazard controls for catastrophic failures.   The overall flight cell and battery pack testing 
requirements follow.  
A. The hardware provider performs qualification testing as defined per the approved 
qualification and acceptance test plan for the hardware project.  
B. The hardware provider performs acceptance tests on loose cells and/or battery packs before 
the cells and packs are installed in the battery-powered flight hardware.  
C. The hardware provider performs lot testing as defined per the approved lot test plan for any 
new lot of batteries purchased for the hardware project.  
D. The applicable NASA Power Systems Office approves all proposed acceptance and 
qualification test procedures.  
E. Test plans include analysis and/or verification of battery safety circuitry.  
Detailed requirements for acceptance testing and qualification testing are given in the following 
subsections. Details of the overall battery process are provided in EA-CWI-033. 
 
Flight Cell and Pack Verification Acceptance Testing 
Acceptance tests are performed on loose cells and battery packs before the cells and packs are 
installed in the battery-powered flight hardware. The proposed acceptance-test procedure is 
approved by the PSRP as part of the battery evaluation. Acceptance testing for Li-ion and Li-
polymer cells and batteries include visual inspection, vacuum/leak check, dimensions and weight 
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measurement, open circuit voltage and closed circuit voltage checks, cycle testing, vibration, and 
thermal cycling. The cell and battery pack acceptance test plan will be evaluated as part of the 
battery design evaluation and approval.  Offgassing/out-gassing tests may be required for 
materials compatibility. Any cell displaying any evidence of electrolyte leakage fails these 
screening tests. Data from the cell and battery pack screening should be recorded and included as 
part of the hardware data package. Users should verify that all cells and batteries intended for 
flight use are within the designated shelf life based on the cell manufacture date as specified in 
the Limited Life Items database which is located at 
http://wwwsrqa.jsc.nasa.gov/gfe/CDS/qryCDS.asp. Button cells of 300 mAh capacity or less that 
have a solder joint to a circuit board or component are exempt from cell acceptance test 
requirements; however, UL test data are needed for the specific coin cell and a visual check for 
leakage and a functional test of the hardware s required.  Acceptance tests are also be carried out 
on all battery circuit components used in the assembly of a multicell battery.  This includes 
diodes, smart chips, resistors, thermistors, polyswitches, thermostats, mechanical and solid-state 
switches, and fuses. Fuses need to be checked for continuity. After completion of the cell and 
battery pack acceptance testing, the flight cells or batteries are installed in the hardware and the 
equipment tested and prepared for flight per the hardware provider’s requirements. Alternatively, 
the user may decide to store cells/batteries separately from the hardware to avoid inadvertent or 
parasitic power depletion. The hardware should be maintained at ambient or chilled storage 
conditions from the time of bag and tag until flight as specified by the battery 
manufacturer/hardware provider. 
 
Flight Cell and Battery Pack Qualification Testing 
The qualification testing is conducted at the cell level and battery-level (i.e. on the stand-alone 
battery) as well as at the integrated, top-level assembly (i.e. with the cells or battery pack 
installed in the top-level assembly). Determination of the qualification and certification test plan 
is achieved via inputs from the battery evaluation process, the intended application, and the 
program (i.e. Shuttle or Station) requirements. Typical testing includes functional checkout 
(operational, cycle), environmental (i.e. vibration, thermal, thermal vacuum), electromagnetic 
compatibility, power quality, or others as deemed appropriate for the specific hardware and 
application. The vibration spectrum varies depending on the cell chemistry and tolerance of the 
cell to internal shorts. The information for vibration testing is provided the section on short 
circuit hazards below. The safety tests that are required to prove two-fault tolerance to 
catastrophic hazard are performed as part of a qualification test program and repeated for each 
newly purchased lot of the same battery. The flight cell and battery packs that form the flight lot 
can go into the flight acceptance testing after the qualification test has been successfully 
completed. 
 
Planetary Protection and Cleanliness 
For planetary and lunar missions, general cleanliness and contamination control requirements 
need to be addressed during the manufacturing and assembly of flight batteries.  In addition, as a 
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part of planetary or lunar spacecraft, the battery is subject to NASA Planetary Protection 
requirements, and special precautions will be taken during final assembly to limit the numbers of 
trapped microbes in the assembly. 
 
UNMANNED SPACECRAFT 
Acceptance and Qualification Testing 
Acceptance testing will include cell and battery capacity tests at several temperatures and C-
rates, battery charge retention tests, battery impedance, and battery isolation tests.  For 
qualification, the batteries and cells must meet the voltage requirements at the current during 
testing without variation in operating levels and deliver the required currents and capacities 
above the minimum voltage after having been subjected to the following environments: random 
vibration, shock, thermal vacuum, thermal cycle, mission profile, launch pressure decay. 
 
Planetary Protection and Cleanliness 
General Cleanliness and Contamination Control requirements need to be addressed during the 
manufacturing and assembly of flight batteries.  In addition, as a part of planetary spacecraft, the 
battery is subject to NASA Planetary Protection requirements, and special precautions will be 
taken during final assembly to limit the numbers of trapped microbes in the assembly. 
 
An inspection of the battery is performed to show that it is free from all visible contamination 
such as fingerprints, particles, corrosion products, metal chips, scale, oil, grease, preservatives, 
adhesives, and any foreign material.  Visual inspection is performed without magnification and 
with vision not worse than 20/30 and under a white light having an intensity 100 foot candles 
minimum at a distance of 6 to 18 inches.  Wipe tests, water break tests, ultraviolet inspection, 
special lights and mirrors are considered aids to visual inspection.  During final assembly, the 
battery components are thoroughly cleaned with iso-propl alcohol (IPA).  Battery components 
and cleaning materials will only be handled with gloves.  Gloves will be wiped with IPA 
frequently while being worn.  Cell to cell and cell to case junctions are sealed with JPL approved 
material (Kapton tape, etc.)   The battery exterior will be thoroughly cleaned with IPA 
immediately prior to packaging for shipment.  The packaging material in contact with the battery 
is sterile or thoroughly cleaned with IPA prior to use. 
 
Safety 
The contractor submits a Project Safety plan in addition to a Safety and Health plan.  The 
contractor may submit existing safety plans tailored to conform to specific project requirements, 
if available.  The contractor will need to assure the safety of personnel and hardware throughout 
all phases of battery development, fabrication, assembly, testing, handling and storage.  All 
precautionary measures to prevent the inadvertent venting of an individual cell or assembled 
combination of cells need to be identified and implemented.  Potentially hazardous conditions as 
well as hazardous procedures should be identified in a manner easily observed by personnel.  
The following additional considerations need to be addressed in the contractor’s safety plan: 
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Electrical Safety 
 Individual cells should be capable of surviving a short circuit current with a vent 
opening to release products.  
 Current and temperature monitoring should be utilized to preclude the inadvertent 
venting of cells.   
 Flight Battery cases should be designed to an ultimate safety factor of 3:1 with 
respect to the worst case pressure buildup for normal operations.   
 
Voltage Limits  
 No cell should be allowed to discharge below the minimum voltage limits 
recommended by the manufacturer during discharge or charge above the maximum 
voltage limits recommended by the manufacturer during charge. 
 
General Safety Requirements:  The contractor should include the following in their safety plan or 
as part of a procedure 
 Type of Personal Protective equipment (PPE) that will be utilized during the 
assembly, handling and testing of the batteries.  
 How the cells and batteries will be thermally monitored and thermally controlled 
during storage and shipping. 
 Humidity measurement and control during assembly and storage. 
 ESD monitoring and protective measure that will be employed. 
 Type of fire suppression system utilized in those areas where batteries will be 
assembled and stored 
Shipping and Transportation: Shipping of Lithium cells and batteries are addressed in DOT 49 
CFR 173.185, which addresses specific requirements regarding items containing Lithium. 
 
RANGE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM 
BATTERIES 
 
This section refers specifically to requirements for flight termination system batteries in launch 
vehicles.  NASA has launch facilities in California and Florida.  NASA launch programs must 
conform to the requirements set forth by Air Force range safety and NASA range safety. 
 
The overall range safety document that describes the agency’s range safety policy is NPR 8715.5 
“Range Safety Program”.   
 Requirements for batteries used in a flight termination system are specified in Section 
3.3.1 “Flight Termination System (FTS)” of NPR 8715.5. 
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Heritage Flight Vehicles (e.g. Shuttle, Atlas, and Delta) 
 
Battery range safety requirements relating to flight termination systems are covered in 
AFSPC91-710 Range Safety User Requirements Manual, Volume 4-Airborne Flight Safety 
System Design, Test, and Documentation Requirements, July 1, 2004.  However, this document 
fails to address lithium battery end-items.  Guidance relating to lithium-battery design 
requirements is addressed in EWR 127-1 “Range Safety Requirements.  Battery design 
requirements are specified in Section 3.14.3.3 “Flight Hardware Batteries” of EWR 127-1.  
 
 Requirements for battery end item data are specified in Section 3.14.5.1 “EGSE and 
Flight Hardware Battery Design Data” of EWR 127-1.  
 Requirements for battery test are specified in Section 3.14.4 “Test Requirements for 
Lithium Batteries” of EWR 127-1.  
 
Specific guidance related to Li-ion systems is addressed in Attachment 1 to the Department of 
the Air Force 30th Space Wing Memorandum Dated May 2005. “Joint 45 SW/SE and 30 SW/SE 
Interim Policy regarding EWR 127-1 Requirements for System Safety for Flight and Aerospace 
Ground Equipment Lithium-Ion Batteries.” 
 
New Flight Vehicles (e.g. Ares) 
 
Battery requirements are specified in Section 3.16 “Batteries” of RCC 319-07 “Flight 
Termination Systems Commonality Standard”. 
 
Batteries test and analysis requirements are specified in Sections 4.1 through 4.15 and Section 
4.26 of RCC 319-07. 
 
Battery prelaunch test and launch requirements are specified in Section 5.1 “FTS Component, 
Subsystem, and System Prelaunch Test and Launch Requirements” of RCC 319-07. 
 
Batteries preflight processing and testing are specified in Section 5.2.3 “Batteries” of RCC 319-
07. 
 
Batteries prelaunch system level tests are specified in Section 5.3.4 “Non-Secure FTR System, 
Automatic Destruct and Fail-Safe”; Section 5.3.5 “Secure High-Alphabet Command Terminate 
System”; and Section 5.3.6 “Autonomous FTS End-to-End Testing” of RCC 319-07. 
 
Range Safety requests for special battery testing are specified in Section 5.5 “Special Tests” of 
RCC 319-07. 
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Post flight analyses of batteries are specified in Section 5.6 “Post Mission Data Analysis” of 
RCC 319-07. 
 
Batteries Flight Termination System Analysis requirements are specified in Section 7.1 
“General”; Section 7.2 “System Reliability”; Section 7.3 “Single Point Failure”; Section 7.4 
“Fractricide”; Section 7.5 “Bent Pin”; Section 7.7 “Sneak Circuit”; Section 7.9 “Battery 
Capacity”; Section 7.10 “Component Maximum Predicted Environment”; Section 7.11 “Failure 
Analysis”; Section 7.12 “Qualification By Similarity Analysis”; Section 7.14 “RF Radiation 
Analysis”; Section 7.17 “Automatic Destruct System Timing Analysis”; and Section 7.19 “In-
Flight FTS Analysis” of RCC 319-07. 
 
Documentation requirements are specified in Chapter 8 “Documentation” of RCC 319-07. 
 
In addition to the general requirements of RCC 319-07, which apply to all flight termination 
system batteries, Li-Ion batteries have additional requirements as outlined in the memo 
Department of the Air Force 30th Space Wing Memorandum Dated 4 May 2005, which outlines 
additional requirements for charging/discharging, high pressure protection, voltage potential, 
materials, first operational use, storage, and transportation. 
7. Cell/battery handling and procedures 
 
Handling 
The following are requirements for safe handling of lithium batteries: 
Use of secondary lithium batteries and test procedures must be approved by the Safety Office 
before doing any work with lithium batteries.  Assembly procedures must include, where 
appropriate, mandatory inspection points and step-by-step assembly instructions or drawings. 
Keep lithium cells under strict charge and discharge control at all times. Never put them on 
conductive surfaces made of metal, unless they have the appropriate conduction protection  
Assemble, process, and handle lithium cells and battery packs with caution: 
 Protect batteries during assembly from shorting against foreign objects using plastic 
bags or the original carton. 
 Use spot welding, not soldering, to attach leads directly to a cell. Only qualified and 
certified personnel may do spot welding on lithium batteries. 
 Return lithium cells and batteries to a controlled storage area in plastic or original 
containers when the assembly or fabrication process is interrupted or stopped for any 
reason other than normal shift changes. 
 Make sure each lithium cell and battery has a warning label indicating that lithium is 
present. 
Store lithium cells indoors at room temperature or lower in a dedicated, dry, well-ventilated 
location. 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
28 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
Never short-circuit lithium cells or discharge them at currents higher than the manufacturer’s 
maximum rating. 
Never overheat or burn lithium cells or expose them to temperatures higher than tests and 
certification allow. 
Never over (force) discharge lithium cells. 
Never open, puncture, or otherwise mutilate a lithium cell. 
 
Emergency Procedures 
Exposure to Electrolyte 
If electrolyte gets in the eyes, flush thoroughly and continuously with water only for a minimum 
of 15 minutes while rolling the eyes and lifting the eyelids. Don’t put any neutralizing solution in 
the eyes. Get medical attention immediately; Effective flushing of the eyes may require 
additional assistance. Call 911. 
Skin Exposure to Electrolyte 
If electrolyte gets on the skin or clothing, flush the affected area with copious amounts of water, 
and get medical attention immediately. Call 911. 
Cells Leaking, Venting, or Increasing in Temperature 
If it has been determined that there was abnormal use or that cells are leaking, venting, or 
increasing in temperature: 
 Clear the area of personnel and have qualified and properly equipped personnel 
remove the batteries to a safe area. 
 If possible, disconnect the cell(s) electrically from associated equipment after the 
cells have stabilized. 
 Contact the Safety Office/first responders. 
Cells Rupturing 
If a rupture occurs, evacuate the area and call 911. Response personnel must use air breathing 
equipment (such as air packs or air face masks and separate K-bottle of breathing air), rubber 
gloves, and chemical apron. 
Lithium/Cell Fires 
If a small fire occurs (special considerations for lithium cells): 
 Call 911. 
 Use a graphite powder or a Lith-X (Class D) extinguisher to extinguish burning 
lithium. 
 Don’t use water, sand, carbon tetrachloride, carbon dioxide, halon, or soda acid 
extinguishers in lithium and most cell fires. 
 For most battery fires, evacuate the area and use these extinguishers only on nearby 
materials to prevent the fire from spreading. 
 
On-orbit usage in crewed vehicles 
The hardware provider of the battery-powered application will assess the on-orbit usage and 
disposal of cells and battery packs.   The applicable NASA Power Systems Office must review 
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and approve all on-orbit charging parameters, charger circuit schematics and charger usage for 
rechargeable battery systems.  Procedures for on-orbit battery handling, storage, replacement and 
disposal should be well documented.  Details regarding the on-orbit usage considerations are 
provided in EA-CWI-033.   For payloads, the hardware provider should establish on-orbit 
processes and operational constraints for hardware inspection and checkout that is required prior 
to usage of the equipment on-orbit. Hardware should be stowed on-orbit in ambient stowage 
conditions in the “off” condition (i.e., no drain on the batteries). If the cells or battery pack are 
designed for on-orbit replacement when cells are depleted, the crew is to be trained to remove, 
visually inspect, tape, and bag the depleted cells and packs and place them in dry trash. Fresh 
cells or battery packs should be inspected prior to installation into the hardware. If any leakage, 
discoloration, or anomaly is noticed on the cells or pack, the crew should tape, bag, tag, and 
place the discrepant cells in non-generic trash. If there is no leakage, rechargeable cells or packs 
should be processed for charging. When on-orbit operations are completed, the crew should 
verify the hardware has been turned off and return the unit to its on-orbit storage location. For 
on-orbit recharging, charging parameters and charger usage is reviewed with the Payload Safety 
Review Panel. The on-orbit usage of the cells and battery packs in the battery-powered 
application will be evaluated as part of the battery design evaluation and safety approval process. 
 
Post-Flight Battery Cell and Pack Removal on Crewed Spacecraft 
A post-flight performance evaluation of the hardware must be conducted when hardware is 
returned post-flight.  After battery-powered hardware has been flown, the cells and battery packs 
are removed from the equipment. It is recommended that a post-flight ground-based performance 
evaluation of the hardware be conducted prior to removing the cells and battery packs.  Coin 
cells that provide memory storage for hardware should not be removed unless performance 
degradation has been noted or unless signs of damage or corrosion are noted. All other cells and 
battery packs need to be removed from the equipment. Primary cells and battery packs will be 
removed, visually inspected, taped, and bagged. The removed cells and packs will be discarded 
or downgraded to Class III for training or other uses. Secondary cells and battery packs will be 
removed, visually inspected, taped, and bagged. If reflight is planned, the removed secondary 
cells and packs will be processed for recharging and restored to flight readiness.  Once the cells 
and battery packs have been removed from the hardware, the batteries and hardware from which 
they were removed should be appropriately tagged with identification and disposal information. 
The text on the tag will state that the cells (or battery pack) are not to be installed before post-
flight testing. The usage of this tag does not require a discrepancy report. After post-flight 
ground testing has been completed, an additional tag (or updated tag) should be attached 
indicating that the batteries have been checked and are suitable or unsuitable for reuse.  The 
battery compartment and contacts will be inspected for any evidence of leakage or corrosion. 
The hardware will need to be stored (minus the cells and battery pack) in storage conditions as 
specified by the hardware provider. Fresh cells or battery packs will be installed (if required by 
the PSRP) the next time the hardware is processed for flight.  The post-flight processing plan 
will be evaluated as part of the battery design evaluation and approval process. 
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Storage 
Approved battery storage locations are need for storage of the batteries (when not installed in 
GSE or flight hardware). 
 
Transportation 
The Department of Transportation has requirements that pertain to any transportation of lithium-
ion batteries. When batteries are not incorporated into flight hardware, the following restrictions 
apply: 
(1) Transported on publicly-accessed roadways, they shall not exceed 50% of rated charge. 
(2) When lithium content exceeds 8.0 grams per battery, transportation packaging of individual 
batteries shall have caution labels in accordance with CFR 173.185. 
 
Disposal Procedures 
Disposal of all batteries and related materials is handled through the appropriate Safety Office. 
 
8. Testing 
Once a battery is chosen for a payload/application, it needs to be tested. This section provides an 
outline/template for preparing a comprehensive test plan. A summary checklist of things to 
consider when developing a test plan is also provided. 
 
Purpose of a Test Plan 
A comprehensive test plan for any project lists the necessary tests and test programs, from 
component development through final flight acceptance. It provides test sequence logic and test 
descriptions from material, part, and component to subsystem and experiment level testing. 
These tests are needed to 
 Demonstrate the integrity of components or subsystems. 
 Qualify parts not previously space qualified. 
 Verify and ensure compliance with experiment performance requirements and prove 
flight acceptability. 
 Show compliance with the appropriate project’s environmental and safety 
requirements such as NSTS/ISS 1700.7 and Addendum. 
 Ensure adequacy of support equipment for testing and servicing the experiment. 
 Characterize all experimental parameters required in data processing and analyses. 
 Provide sufficient experiment familiarization to the Payload Safety Organization that 
commitment to flight can be recommended. 
Testing is a major cost and schedule driver, which is why it is important to spend the time 
initially to prepare a good test plan before testing begins. Test planning between prime 
contractors, subcontractors, and the government should start at program initiation to ensure a 
successful test program. 
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Test Plan Outline 
The following is an outline of sections necessary for a comprehensive test plan for battery 
systems/subsystems. A good test plan can be easily altered to produce a good test report of the 
findings and conclusions when testing/analysis is complete. 
Introduction/Purpose: Provide general information, a brief description of the tests and supporting 
equipment, and the reason(s) for the tests. 
Applicable Documents: Provide a list of all documents and standards that apply. 
Hardware/Apparatus Description and Diagram: The hardware should be described and illustrated 
in detail and include the following: 
 facility physical description 
 functional description 
 instrumentation description 
 electrical schematics 
 data flow diagram 
 test article description 
Software Tools: Describe the software tools used, including any code specifically developed, and 
standard software packages used. 
Test Procedures, Reports, and Logbooks: Provide a list of procedures, reports, and logbooks. 
Logbooks are used to trace each step and location in the test, especially when a cell or battery is 
relocated. 
 
Test Requirements: Describe the requirements and criteria for the test. For example, include any 
environmental or clean room requirements. For complicated tests, it is recommended that a 
verification matrix be prepared to preclude duplication of the verification process. 
Test Readiness: Verify the test readiness of the component for testing. The following need to be 
identified and described: 
 resources/capabilities 
 test preparation 
 control of inspection, measurement, and test equipment 
 test conductor qualification/certification 
 security restrictions (if any) 
 safety precautions/personnel restrictions 
 test article disposal/marking 
 
Prototype Testing (if applicable): Describe how the component will be tested at the multi-cell 
level for prototype testing. 
Integration/System/Subsystem Testing (if applicable): Describe how the component will be 
integrated into a system and the testing specifically related to integration. 
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Qualification and Acceptance Testing: Describe in detail the intended application and the 
program (e.g., space shuttle or space station) requirements. Typical testing may include 
functional checkout (operational, cycle), environmental (i.e., vibration, thermal, thermal 
vacuum), electromagnetic compatibility, power quality, or others as deemed appropriate for the 
specific hardware and application.  
The qualification of the battery involves testing the batteries to environmental and vibration 
levels that are at least two times higher than the mission requirements. The flight acceptance 
testing involves verification of battery performance by charge/discharge cycling, vacuum leak 
checks and vibration. The number of flight missions that the batteries will be used for, along with 
the location of the battery will determine the period and level of vibration. The vibration 
spectrum used to screen the batteries from the occurrence of internal shorts will be slightly 
higher than what is obtained from the calculation of mission requirements. In some cases, the 
qualification and certification testing will be conducted at a battery-level (i.e., on the stand-alone 
battery), as well as at an integrated level with the top-level assembly (i.e., with the cells or 
battery pack installed in the top-level assembly). For other cases, the qualification and 
certification testing will be conducted only at the top-level assembly. 
Flight System Performance/Characterization Testing: Describe in detail the performance and 
characterization testing that is being performed. This includes physical characterization 
(dimensions and weight), electrochemical characterization (OCV, CCV, capacity checks), rate 
capability (capacities at different charge/discharge rates and different temperatures), and vacuum 
leak checks. Abuse tests consist of overcharge, overdischarge, external short, internal 
short/crush, heat-to-vent, vibration, drop, and vent and burst pressure determination. The main 
features that need to be understood about the battery are the fuse rating, the operational 
characteristics (voltage) of the overcharge and overdischarge protection switches and the nature 
of the protective circuitry. On the cell-level, the levels of safety incorporated into the cell need to 
be understood and characterized, for example, the Positive Temperature Coefficients (PTCs), 
Current Interrupt Devices (CIDs), the shutdown separator, etc. 
Flight System Engineering Verification/Acceptance Testing: Describe the acceptance tests 
performed on loose cells and battery packs before the cells and packs are installed in the battery 
powered flight hardware. 
Test Procedures: Provide detailed descriptions of the processes and procedures of how the testing 
will be run and the exact sequence of any tests. Accept/reject criteria must be included for all 
measurements taken, as well as the tolerances for these criteria. The procedures section must be 
written so that it is understandable by a qualified test operator or technician who is not familiar 
with the project. Safety precautions are integrated into the appropriate sequence in the procedure 
to identify any special hazards and their controls. A typical outline for this section is: 
 Test Objective - overall objective for the test 
 Support Hardware - other system components needed for performing the test(s) (must 
be calibrated, if applicable) 
 Test Hardware - nomenclature, part number, serial number, and description of 
hardware being tested 
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 Support Instrumentation - meters, scopes, etc. (all calibrated, with certifications) 
 Procedure Instrument Calibration: Describe any instrument calibration requirements, 
for example, the amp/hour watt/hour integrator and power supplies. 
 
Data and Analyses and Test Results/Conclusions: Record and describe any anomalies and /or 
any test stoppages. Identify trends and provide any calculations/equations used to derive results 
and conclusions. 
Pre-Launch Checkout Tests: Describe any pre-launch checkout tests that need to be performed, 
such as power-on, basic functions, calibrations, etc. 
 
Test Plan Checklist 
The following is a summary checklist of things to consider in development of the test plan:  
Principal risk areas/measures of effectiveness 
Characteristics of the test plan: 
 Identifies all developmental tests at system and subsystem levels. 
 Identifies prime, subcontractor, supplier, and government tests. 
 Identifies qualification by similarity of subsystems and assemblies. 
 
Define how testing is optimized: 
 Define test requirements verification matrix to preclude duplication of the verification 
process. 
 Review design analysis results to determine where verification testing is needed. 
 Ensure that testing is done at the appropriate component level. 
 Acceptance testing is not done unless enough parts are available for a complete 
configuration. 
 
Ensure that test schedules allow time for redesign and retest. 
Provide contingency resources for unforeseen test problems. 
Use proven testing techniques, especially when accelerated testing is planned. 
Ensure that design changes are verified during reliability development testing. 
 
TESTS 
The following sections list typical testing requirements. 
 
Qualification Testing should demonstrate that the design, manufacturing process, and acceptance 
program produce battery hardware that meets specific requirements with adequate margin and 
validate the planned acceptance program including test techniques, procedures, equipment, 
instrumentation, and software.  Each type of battery, module, or cell design that is to be 
acceptance tested will also have a corresponding qualification test.  A qualification test specimen 
should be exposed to all applicable environmental tests in the order of the qualification test plan. 
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Test Hardware is produced from the same drawings, materials, process, and level of personnel 
competency as used for flight hardware. Ideally, the test article would be selected from a group 
of production items. 
 
Environmental tests stress the hardware beyond the maximum conditions it will see. Should not 
exceed design safety margins or cause unrealistic modes of failure. The qualification test 
conditions should include those of all possible missions. 
 
Tests performed should include Inspection, Specification Performance, Leakage, Shock, 
Vibration or Acoustic, Acceleration, Thermal Cycle, Thermal Vacuum, Climatic, Proof Pressure, 
Electromagnetic Compatibility, Life, Burst Pressure, Static Load, and Safety and should follow 
MIL-STD 1540E. 
 
Life qualification tests should confirm battery and battery module life expectancy.  Confirmation 
of battery life expectancy is based upon battery life testing or a combination of analyses and 
confirmation of the life expectancy of battery materials and components, such as module, cell, 
electrical bypass devices, heaters, strain gauges, temperature sensors, or thermal switches.  
Confirmation of battery module life expectancy is based upon module life testing or a 
combination of analyses and confirmation of life expectancy of module materials and 
components, such as cell, electrical bypass devices, heaters, strain gauges, temperature sensors, 
or thermal switches.  Confirmation of life expectancy of battery components is based on life 
testing.  Life testing of battery, module, or cell for service life expectancy confirmation is under 
a set of conditions that envelop the conditions preceding launch, mission battery loads, charge 
control methods, and conditions and temperatures.  Test equipment and fixtures should maintain 
flight-like thermal and mechanical configuration such as simulating flight-like temperature 
variations and external compression.  Test duration should include margin to demonstrate the 
required battery reliability and confidence level from the number of test samples.  For spacecraft 
applications, a battery, module, or cell life test used to confirm life expectancy can be a real-time 
life test where the real-time data is from on-orbit or real-time ground tests where the time, 
current, and temperature profiles of discharge and charge exactly match those of the mission.  
The data should envelope flight-level cell matching criteria and incorporate flight-like charge 
control methods.  Data from real-time tests should include electrical performance data and data 
from destructive physical analysis of tested cells.  Alternatively, for spacecraft applications, a 
battery, module, or cell life test used to confirm service life expectancy can be a set of time-
accelerated tests that envelopes the mission loads, charge control methods, and conditions and 
temperatures. The acceleration factor can have different values for storage, cycling or at different 
operational modes.  The acceleration factor is confirmed by real-time life test data where the 
time, current, and temperature profiles of discharge and charge exactly match those of the 
mission.  Real-time data includes on-orbit data or data from real-time ground tests that envelope 
flight-level cell matching criteria and incorporate flight-like charge control methods.  Data from 
real-time and accelerated tests should include electrical performance data and data from 
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destructive physical analysis of tested cells.  The acceleration factor is based on a sound analysis 
of data and should not be greater than two.  Real-time and accelerated life test durations include 
margin to demonstrate the required reliability and confidence level from the number of test 
samples and failure rate characteristics.  
 
Selection of a new cell design without real-time data demonstrating mission life increases risk to 
the spacecraft program. The following are ways to minimize program risk: 
Pursuit of a dual-path approach with a more established design or technology 
Battery sizing with the new technology will need to be designed with a greater EOL energy 
margin. A rationale for determining this factor should be provided and final approval will be 
made by the procurement authority.  Results from destructive physical analysis of the cells on 
real-time life tests is used to evaluate degradation modes prior to launch.  Time-accelerated test 
data can facilitate risk assessment as a method to define possible failure mechanisms and trends. 
Results from destructive physical analysis should be provided.  The decision to include a new 
technology or design for a mission before there is sufficient data to conclusively verify mission 
life may be made, with the exception that ground testing will continue until mission life margin 
is demonstrated. 
 
The real-time life test sample size needs to provide a minimum of 90% confidence level at 88% 
reliability (or 20 cells) without failure. Other sample sizes can be used.  If the sample size, N, is 
not 20, the actual test duration without failure should be multiplied by a factor K for mission life 
expectancy. The reliability and confidence level will need to remain at 90%/88% for a test with 
N samples without failure for duration KT.  If the failure probability function is not known, the 
use of a Weibull function is suggested to establish test durations. The beta shape parameter 
should be estimated from failure data of the most comparable cells and operational type 
conditions. As more data are accumulated, a failure probability function can be refined.  
 
Storage, and cycle test history should be available for each individual life test sample down to 
the cell level.  Cell level (module level and battery level, as applicable) acceptance test data will 
be defined at minimum individual cell capacity to minimum useable voltages, charge retention, 
and impedance at defined conditions.  Beginning of test mission capacity and voltage profile 
measurements will be defined that define total available capacity at mission operating conditions 
to minimum useable voltage at the cell level, module level, and battery level, as applicable.  End 
of test mission performance measurements will be compared with “Cell level…” and “Beginning 
of test…” at the cell level, module level, and battery level, as applicable.  Periodic energy 
measurements can be performed during the life test to facilitate performance trending. If energy 
measurements are performed, capability for on-orbit reconditioning need to be available, unless 
life test data and statistical analysis is provided, conclusively demonstrating that mission life and 
reliability requirements can be met without it. 
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The life test cells are built to an approved set of manufacturing control documents, which defines 
the qualified cell design.   The procuring authority has the right to review manufacturing control 
documents to confirm that the flight lot cell design is identical to that of the life test cell.  
 
Safety testing validates battery-level safety against all known failure modes.  Battery-level safety 
is validated by test to the following conditions, at minimum: overcharge, overdischarge, over 
temperature, over pressurization, internal cell  short, and external cell short.  If a battery-level 
safety analysis is performed, cell, module, or battery-level development testing should be 
provided that simulates battery mechanical and thermal design, and evaluates the potential of one 
cell failure propagating to another cell or piece part within the battery. 
 
For NASA Glenn Research Center Payloads: 
Qualification Tests 
These tests are typically performed only on flight qualification units and require quality 
assurance personnel certification/witness signoff and formal configuration control: 
 Physical and electrochemical characteristics: Dimensions, weight, OCV, CCV, 
capacity checks 
 Environmental test: 
o Charge and discharge at temperatures that are 20°F above and below actual 
temperatures seen during operation. For example, batteries used for IVA (intra-
vehicular activity) (in-cabin) will be tested at 50 and 90°F. Storage locations of 
the battery during flight are an important factor. 
o Vacuum exposure: Six hours at 0.1 psi. Requires specific rates of depress and 
repress; weight and functional checks to be performed. 
o Vibration: Fully charged battery packs are vibrated using the qualification 
spectrum for 15 minutes in each of the x, y, and z axes.  
 
Frequency Level 
20-80 Hz +3 dB/octave 
80-350 Hz XXX g2/Hz (dependent on chemistry and stowage) 
350-2000 Hz -3 dB/octave 
 OCV checks in between each axis of vibration and functional check after the 
vibration to determine when/if cell/battery failures occurred during or after 
completion of this test. 
 
Flight Acceptance Tests 
Batteries are required to undergo physical and electrochemical characterization with pass/fail 
criteria. Quality assurance signoff and formal configuration management is also required for 
flight acceptance tests. 
 Vacuum leak check as described earlier with pass/fail criteria for post functional 
checkout and weight change. 
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 Vibration test: Fully charged battery packs vibrated in each of the x, y, and z axes 
using flight acceptance test spectrum. For Li-ion, only voltage monitoring is 
performed. OCV is checked between each change in axis of vibration. 
 
Frequency Level 
20-80 Hz +3 dB/octave 
80-350 Hz X g2/Hz – (depends on chemistry and location stowage) 
350-2000 Hz -3 dB/octave 
Functional checks are performed after the vibration. 
 
For JPL planetary applications: 
Acceptance tests 
Capacity at 20°C 
The battery will be charged to battery end-of-charge voltage at C/5 or until 1st cell reaches 
maximum cell voltage then tapered until the current reaches the C/50 rate.  Discharge at C/5 to 
battery end-of-discharge voltage. 
Capacity at –20oC 
The battery will be charged to end-of-charge voltage at C/10 or until 1st cell reaches maximum 
cell voltage then tapered until the current reaches the C/50 rate.  Discharge at C/5 to end-of-
discharge voltage.  
Capacity at 0oC 
The battery will be charged to end-of-charge voltage at C/5 or until 1st cell maximum cell voltage 
then tapered until the current reaches the C/50 rate.  Discharge at C/5 to end-of-discharge 
voltage. 
Capacity at 30°C 
The battery will be charged to end-of-charge voltage at C/5 or until 1st cell reaches maximum 
cell voltage then tapered until the current reaches the C/50 rate.  Discharge at C/5 to end-of-
discharge voltage. 
Battery Charge Retention at 20°C (pre and post environ. Testing). 
All batteries have the following requirements and conditions as defined at a test temperature of 
20°C: Charge at C/10 to end-of-charge voltage or maximum cell voltage/ 1st  Cell; open circuit 
stand for 72 hrs; Discharge at C/5 to end-of-discharge voltage; Requirement:  No more than 35-
mV/ cell loss in from 2nd to 72nd hour on open circuit. 
Battery Impedance 
The Impedance of each battery will be determined at 100 and 50%, state of charge at –20, 0, and 
20oC using a pulse technique, then calculating the V/I values.  The impedance of all batteries 
needs to be less than 100 Milliohms at 20oC. 
Battery Isolation 
The cell cases are electrically insulated from each other, heat sinks, and from the battery housing.  
The DC resistance between cells and all support hardware, heat sinks, battery base plate, etc. is 
greater than 10 mega ohms when tested at a voltage of 50 Vdc.  Isolation resistance between the 
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battery wiring and the battery housing is greater than 100 K ohms when measured with a 
Simpson Meter or equivalent.  
 
Qualification Tests 
Random Vibration 
The battery should be designed to withstand the vibration levels shown in the following table.  
The qualification battery is tested at acceptance levels for 1 minute per axis followed by 
qualification levels at 2 minutes per axis.   The remaining flight and spare units are then tested at 
flight acceptance levels of 1 minute per axis.  The vibration test levels is applied to the battery at 
the mounting points in each of the three mutually orthogonal axes. Random vibration levels 
(derived from acoustic and launch vehicle transient vibration spectra) are defined at the rover-
mounted equipment interface given in the following table and again graphically in the figure 
below. The battery is powered-on during vibration testing, if required to operate during launch.  
However, for improved anomaly perception, powered on vibration is strongly encouraged for all 
units regardless of operational requirements during launch.  
 
Random Vibration at Rover/Equipment Interface 
 
Frequency (Hz) Acceptance level (g2/Hz) Qual. Level (g2/Hz) 
20-80 + 6db per octave + 6 db per octave 
80 – 450 0.04 0.08 
450-2000 -6 Db per octave - 6 Db/ octave 
Overall 5.5 grms 7.8 grms 
 
Shock (Pyro-shock) 
The Li-Ion rechargeable battery on the Rover, considered in Zone 2, should be designed to 
operate after being subjected to two (2) pyro-shocks in each of three orthogonal axes at the levels 
shown below in the following table. 
 
Pyro-shock levels 
 
Frequency (Hz) Qual, Peak SRS Response   
( Q=10) 
100 20 g 
100-1600 + 10 dB per Octave 
1600-10,000 2000 g 
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Structural Loads Landing Loads 
The batteries are designed to withstand a quasi-static limit landing load of 40g.  Test margin of 
landing load is 1.2.  
 
1
10
100
1 10 100
Preliminary Physical Mass Acceleration Curve for
MER S/C Launched on D elta-II 7925/STA R48B
Mass (kg) 
PENG  06-Aug-00 
o Use for appendage mass  up to 500 kg only
o Use for appendage frequency  less  than 80 H z
o Apply in wors t single dir ec tion (not necessari ly
   al igned with coor dinate dir ec tions)
o Add static 2.2g in thrus t direc tion
o In addition, des ign to a s tatic  load case
   (no MAC ; based on ~1,000 kg S/C):
   - Ax ial acceleration 7.5 g (Compress ion)
   - Spin r ate 80 RPM
   - Angular  acceleration 11 r ad/sec^2
 
Acceleration and Limit Design Loads 
 
Flight Hardware Factors of Safety (FS)  
Structural analysis of flight hardware will use the following yield and ultimate factors o safety 
consistent with the item’s structural test option (See the following table). 
 
Structural Analysis Factors of Safetya,b,c,d 
 
 Tested Structure Non-Tested Structure 
Yield 1.25 1.60 
Ultimate 2.00 
 
Thermal Vacuum Requirements (For batteries) 
a. Pressure – The pressure is be reduced from atmospheric to 10-5 Torr or less. 
b. Temperature – The component temperature range to be used in thermal vacuum testing is 
defined in the following table. The temperature is stabilized at each specified temperature prior 
to initialization of electrical testing. Eight thermal cycles are required of which only the first and 
last cycles need to be under vacuum and require electrical testing. 
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Qualification Temperatures 
 
During Cruise -30 to 40oC 
Charge on Mars -10oC to 40oC 
Discharge on Mars -30 to 40oC 
 
Thermal Cycle Requirements 
Each battery in the battery unit will be tested and monitored. The temperature range to be used in 
thermal cycle testing is –20 and +40C. The temperature is stabilized at each specified 
temperature prior to initialization of electrical testing.   Eight thermal cycles are performed on 
the Qualification battery.  On the final cycle the capacity tests shown in the following table are 
repeated.  The capacities need to meet the BOL battery capacity requirements as described in the 
requirements except for the required capacity at 40oC, which would be the same as 20oC.   
 
Thermal Vacuum Test Conditions 
 
 Description 
 20°C 
 
Charge at 0.8 A to 32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A.  Discharge at 0.8 
A to cutoff voltage of 24V or first cell to 3.0V.  Recharge to 
32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A.  
   0°C 
 
Discharge at 0.8 A to cutoff voltage of 24V or first cell to 3.0V 
Charge at 0.8 A to 32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A  
-20°C 
 
Discharge at 0.8 A to cutoff voltage of  24V or first cell to 3.0V 
Charge at 0.8A to 32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A 
-30°C Discharge at 0.8 A to cutoff voltage of  24V or first cell to 3.0V 
+40C Charge at 0.8A to 32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A 
Discharge at 0.8 A to cutoff voltage of  24V or first cell to 3.0V 
Charge at 0.8A to 32.8V(a)  then taper to 0.32A 
20oC Discharge at 0.8 A to cutoff voltage of  24V or first cell to 3.0V 
Charge at 0.8 A to 32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A .Repeat discharge 
at 4A and 8A. Charge at 0.8 A to 32.8V(a) then taper to 0.32A 
Thermal Cycle  Repeat Thermal cycle 8 times without electrical testing  
8th Cycle  Repeat all electrical measurements as performed for Thermal/Vac 
on Cycle 1 
Note: Charge switches to taper at 32.8 V or when first cell reaches 4.15V 
 
Profile Test 
Testing will be performed to the specific mission profile. 
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Launch Pressure Decay 
The battery should be designed for payload fairing venting as shown in the following figure at a 
pressure decay rate of 33 Torr/sec and shown by analysis.  
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CELL SCREENING TESTS 
This section provides a summary of the screening tests that can be performed to match cells for 
use in a battery system. Cell matching must be performed regardless of the battery chemistry 
chosen or the qualification/acceptance testing to be performed. 
 
Automated Testing Equipment for Single Cells 
Automation of battery testing is advantageous when time is of the essence. Automated cycling of 
cells can be accomplished by using the cell operating voltage lower and upper limits. The 
maximum allowable voltage according to the battery manufacturer is used for the end of charge 
voltage cutoff. The manufacturer’s suggested minimum voltage should be used as the end of 
discharge cutoff. Once a cell has been activated and burned in (if required), the cell should not be 
discharged below the minimum cutoff voltage or charged above the maximum cutoff voltage.  A 
constant current, constant voltage power supply is used to both charge and discharge the test cell. 
Discharging can also be accomplished through a resistive load. Depending on the type of cell 
being tested, it may also be desirable to perform cycles where the charging and discharging are 
periodically stopped for a measurement of open circuit voltage. This can be useful in 
characterizing the amount of state-of-charge/discharge hysteresis that is occurring. Usually this is 
minimal, but if hysteresis is present, 50 percent state-of-charge (SOC) and 50 percent depth-of-
discharge (DOD) are not occurring at exactly the same point. 
 
Coulombic Efficiency Determination 
An amp-hour integrator is used to measure the constant current charge and constant current 
discharge capacity of the cell(s). The ratio of the discharge capacity to the charge capacity gives 
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the efficiency for a particular cycle. Factors that affect coulombic efficiency include excess gas 
evolution (usually hydrogen), development of a short circuit between anode and cathode, 
separator fouling or perforation, and irreversible chemical reactions. Cycles like these are 
required to be able to determine state-of-charge and depth-of-discharge. If a large number of 
cycles are performed, such as in a life test, a determination of useful life can be made. 
 
Polarization Testing 
The electrochemical activity of a cell should be determined periodically by measuring its 
voltage-current relationship. These tests are performed by applying the required current (5 or 6 
different current settings within the capabilities of the cell used should be chosen) in charge 
mode for about 20 seconds and then in discharge mode for about 20 seconds. (Note: Exceeding 
the rated current carrying capability of a given cell can lead to permanent damage even for short 
term exposures such as this. Choose test current density values carefully). In this way, the cell 
state-of-charge should remain approximately the same at the end of the test as it was at the 
beginning of the test. This test should be done at 25, 50, and 75 percent SOC. The degree of 
linearity of the plotted data (voltage as a function of current density) indicates whether the 
electrode is exhibiting kinetic or concentration polarization effects. Kinetic effects and poor mass 
transport properties are evidenced by non-linearities at low and high current densities. The 
internal resistance of the cell can be calculated by determining the slope of the discharge curves 
at each of the states-of-charge. Cell resistance can also be measured with an impedance bridge at 
1000 Hz. This measurement generally is in good agreement with the resistance calculated from 
the slope of the voltage-current relationship. 
 
Open Circuit Decay Test 
This simple test involves stopping during charge and/or discharge cycles at specific intervals 
(usually based on SOC), and observing the rate of decay for a fixed time interval. Usually 25, 50, 
and 75 percent SOC are chosen for convenience. Cells with steeper decay rates should be 
eliminated from consideration. 
 
Tailoring Screening Tests 
Screening tests can be tailored to individual cell types. A series of combination cycles can be run 
which would allow the engineer to graphically observe deviations in cell behavior. For example, 
1.5 Ampere hour Lithium ion cells can be cycled in the following way for screening purposes.  
By analyzing the plotted data, performance differences can be easily seen. Begin with a C rate 
charge at anything from C/1 to C/10 to a maximum of 4.2V. Then switch the cell to open circuit 
(or wait state) for a short period of time (usually for several minutes; the same wait time should 
be used for all cells of the same type). At the end of the wait state, observe and note the voltage 
decay, and then do the following special discharge: 
Discharge at C/1 for 1 minute, then without hesitation, switch to a C/10 discharge down to 2.4 
volts. All graphical data should be plotted using the same scale values. The resulting voltage vs. 
time curve should be an upward sloping charge curve with the expected peaks, followed by a self 
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discharge dip or notch, attached to a steep downward curve that abruptly turns upward caused by 
the reduction in the discharge rate. The difference between the C/1 discharge and the upturn 
resulting from the abrupt decrease in discharge rate allows the internal resistance of the cell to be 
determined. Finally, after the initial rise, the discharge curve decreases back down into a more 
typical slope. Continue to test the cells in question for about 50 cycles. After about 50 of these 
special cycles, analyze the data to pick out cells that can be assembled into a string of cells. 
 
THERMAL TESTS 
Cells and batteries should be tested in an environment that is as close to the intended application 
as possible. Thermal environment in particular is a factor that significantly affects how a battery 
will perform. Most cells function more efficiently at warmer temperatures rather than cold. 
Depending on the cell type, batteries may require active thermal management (circulating 
coolant), passive thermal management (insulation or heat sink), or a special location (waste heat 
conducted from nearby electronics). Frequently, more cells are required in a battery that will be 
operating in a low temperature environment. Consult the manufacturer of the cells to determine 
known behavior at low and high temperatures. If the manufacturer has not performed testing at 
the temperature of interest, thermal screening tests will be needed for the temperature range in 
question.  
 
COTS MULTI-CELL BATTERY TEST PROGRAM 
NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) has a stringent test program for testing new Commercial-
Off-the-Shelf (COTS) batteries (string of COTS cells).  There are three major parts of the test 
program: (1) engineering/certification test; (2) qualification test of batteries; and (3) flight 
acceptance test. The engineering certification test requires testing individual cells and the battery 
for performance and abuse. The qualification test includes environmental testing. JSC can 
perform this test program for projects if requested. In addition, JSC may already have gathered 
considerable test data for the type of battery/cells being considered by the project. A request for 
this type of historical data may allow a project to dispense with some of the testing outlined 
below.  
 
Engineering/Certification Tests 
Engineering/certifications tests are performed primarily to eliminate those batteries with 
workmanship problems, and to gain familiarity with the behavior of the battery as an assembly of 
a string of individual cells. 
 
Battery Level Performance Testing 
The following are key battery level performance tests: 
 Open Circuit Voltage (OCV) measurement of “as obtained” batteries 
 Constant Capacity Voltage (CCV) - load equivalent to 1.5 C current for 100 ms pulse 
 Functional performance of battery by performing in-situ testing or by mission 
simulation; some cells perform differently in a battery system than as individual cells 
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 Thermal environment – performance of batteries at 20°F above and below flight 
operational environment 
 Vacuum leak check – to check for leakage and tolerance for up to six hours of 
exposure to vacuum environment 
 Leak check on 100% of flight batteries - qualification/certification test is 
performed on engineering and qualification hardware. 
 Vibration – batteries and cells are vibrated to determine vibration tolerance to 
launch and descent. Test vibration is very much dependant on launch and landing 
environments, number of missions, and cell chemistry. 
 Used as a screening method for workmanship standards. 
 Used as a screening method for internal shorts in some lithium primary and all Li-
Ion cells/batteries. 
 Typical vibration spectrum for qualification is at least five times higher than that 
for flight acceptance and at longer than flight durations. Acceptance vibration is 
performed on 100% of flight batteries to screen for internal shorts and/or 
workmanship defects. 
 
Abuse Tests 
The following are key battery level abuse tests for battery screening and matching: 
 Overcharge 
o Typical failures: charger failure; protective circuit board failure 
o Cell level: 3C rate fast charge, over-voltage (to 5.0 V for Li-ion); overcharge to 
12.0 V for 50 minutes (UL test) 
o Battery level: verify protective feature for overcharge/over-voltage 
 Overdischarge test 
o Typical failures: low-voltage cutoff (in equipment) failure; protective circuit 
board failure 
o Cell level: fast discharge at 3 C rate; discharge into reversal 
o Battery level: Characterize low voltage cutoff switch setting; verify logic in 
circuitry to determine if individual cell voltage or total battery voltage opens the 
safety MOSFET switch 
 External short circuit test 
o Typical failures: inadvertent shorting across terminals; hard-blow/thermal fuse 
failure; protective “smart” circuit board failure; multi-switch failure 
o Cell and battery level: external hard short is deliberately imposed on the battery 
under carefully controlled conditions 
 Internal short circuit test (crush) 
o Presence of impurities (metal burrs, particles, dust) that can be dislodged due to 
vibration (manufacturing defect) are common causes of short circuits 
o Simulated internal short using a crush method.  
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 High temperature and heat-to-vent 
o Temperature tolerance on cells and determination of thermal runaway 
temperatures 
o Requires cells be well instrumented with thermal measuring devices 
 Drop/Shock test 
o Simulates problems encountered during ground handling and transportation – 
inadvertent drops 
 Vent and burst pressure test 
o Vent/burst pressure ratio ≥ 2.5 
 Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) with electrolyte analysis 
o For toxicology assessment and report (independent materials usage and 
toxicological memos required) 
 
VIBRATION TESTING AND TOLERANCE TO INTERNAL SHORTS 
Since the absence of internal shorts cannot be proven with confidence, a screening method has 
been developed at NASA-JSC-EP5 for the removal of cells/batteries with this type of defects. 
The cells/batteries are tested to prove tolerance (no venting, fire or explosion) to internal shorts 
using simulated methods. If such tolerance is not observed, batteries and cells are screened with 
a level of vibration that is higher than workmanship levels (see above paragraphs on testing 
batteries that are intolerant to internal shorts). The vibration spectrum may also be determined by 
the hardware provider in conjunction with the Power Systems Office battery evaluator.  
 
Qualification Vibration Testing (QVT) for Batteries Tolerant to Internal Shorts  
The purpose of the qualification vibration test for those batteries that are tolerant to internal 
shorts is to demonstrate the ability of the component to withstand the stresses and accumulated 
fatigue damage resulting from the maximum random vibration environment. The test duration in 
each of the three orthogonal axes is equivalent to either the total acceptance vibration test time 
the battery will experience or five minutes, whichever is greater. The test levels and spectrum are 
shown in the following figure and table. 
 
Test condition tolerances are applied to the nominal values defined in the following figure and 
table. A maximum allowable tolerance of +/-1.5 dB is applied to the Power Spectral Density 
values. Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this document will conducted in 
accordance with the applicable requirement.  
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Figure Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries and Cells Tolerant to Internal Shorts  
 
 
Table Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries and Cells Tolerant to Internal Shorts  
 
Qualification Vibration Testing (QVT) for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts  
The purpose of the qualification vibration test for those batteries that are “intolerant” or “not 
tolerant” to internal shorts is to demonstrate the ability of the component to withstand the 
stresses and accumulated fatigue damage resulting from the maximum random vibration 
environment and to identify any potential internal short hazard. The test duration in each of the 
three orthogonal axes are equivalent to either the total acceptance vibration test time the battery 
will experience or five minutes, whichever is greater. The test levels and spectrum are shown in 
the following figure and table and are applicable only to batteries being launched in the 
following locations: Shuttle middeck, MPLM, Progress and Soyuz. The only exception is that 
batteries cannot be launched in the Progress/Soyuz descent module under any circumstances.  
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Test condition tolerances are be applied to the nominal values defined in the following figure and 
table. A maximum allowable tolerance of +/-1.5 dB is applied to the Power Spectral Density 
values. Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this document will be conducted in 
accordance with the applicable requirement. 
 
 
Figure Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts  
 
 
Table Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts  
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Appendix A: Definitions 
Battery 
A Battery is an assembly of battery cells or modules electrically connected (usually in series) to 
provide the desired voltage and current capability.  Generally, the cells are physically integrated 
into either a single assembly (or battery) or into several separate assemblies (or modules).  A 
battery may also include one or more attachments, such as electrical bypass devices, charge 
control electronics, heaters, temperature sensors, thermal switches, and thermal control elements. 
 
Calendar Life 
The calendar life of a cell or battery is the maximum allowed period of use of the cell or battery 
as defined from the date of manufacture of the oldest cell in the battery. 
 
Capacity 
Battery Capacity is measured in units of Ampere-hours (for Ah capacity) or Watt-hours (for Wh 
capacity).  Battery capacity is equal to the integral of the discharge current, where Id is a positive 
value.  The limits of integration are from start of discharge to either the minimum power 
subsystem battery voltage limit, or when the first cell reaches the lower cell voltage limit, or 
when a defined time duration is reached.  This is a point-in-time capacity value that is measured 
at a defined charge voltage-current profile, discharge load profile, and temperature profile. 
 
Battery capacity (Ah) = Iddt 
Battery capacity (WH) = IdVddt 
 
Cell (or Battery Cell) 
A cell is a single-unit device within one cell case that transforms chemical energy into electrical 
energy at characteristic voltages when discharged.  Battery cells can be connected (usually in 
series) to form a battery.  Battery cells can be connected in series or parallel to form a module; in 
such cases, the modules are connected (usually in series) to form a battery.  
 
Cell Activation 
The addition of electrolyte to a battery cell constitutes cell activation and starts the clock on cell, 
module, and battery service life.  It is used to define the start of battery shelf life.  Li-ion cells are 
activated at the manufacturing facility during cell production.   Following activation, Li-Ion cells 
typically undergo several charge/discharge cycles to condition the surface of the electrodes and 
stabilize capacity.  
 
Cell Design 
A cell design is built to one set of manufacturing control documents that define material 
composition, dimensions, quantity, process, and process controls for each component in the cell.  
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A change in cell design is considered a different cell design that requires a separate qualification.  
A change in cell design includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
- Positive electrode composition, raw material (including binder), loading density, foil, 
dimension, or process change 
- Negative electrode composition, raw material (including binder), loading density, foil, 
dimension, or process change 
- Electrolyte composition 
- Separator composition or dimension 
- Cell stack dimension or composition 
- Cell case size 
- Change in cell or raw material manufacturing location 
- Terminal seal 
 
Cell Lot 
A cell lot is a continuous, uninterrupted production run of cells, which consists of a anode, 
cathode, electrolyte material, and separator, from the same raw material sublots with no change 
in processes or drawings.  Li-Ion cells produced in a single lot should be procured, stored, 
delivered, and tested together to maintain single lot definition. 
 
Charge/Discharge Current C/n (or C-rate) 
The constant charge or discharge current for a battery is defined as C/n, or C-rate.  C is the cell-
level rated (or nameplate) capacity in Ampere-hours (per vendor’s criteria), and n is any value 
for elapsed time measure in hours.  For example, a discharge current of C/2 for a 20 A-h rated 
cell is a discharge current of 10 A. 
 
Cold Storage 
Cold storage, for batteries that are not in use, is long-term storage where the temperature and 
humidity environments are controlled, and temperature is below ambient temperature. 
 
Cycle Life 
The number of discharge/charge cycles performed by the battery. 
 
Depth of Discharge (DOD) 
The ratio of the number of Ampere-hours removed from a battery for a defined charge voltage-
current profile, discharge load profile, and temperature profile to the battery rated (or nameplate) 
capacity E(Ah), times 100.  For a Li-Ion battery, the DOD must be specified at a state-of-charge 
operation or a voltage that relates to state-of-charge operation. 
 
Battery Depth-of-Dishcharge (%) = [E(Ah) removed/ E(Ah) rated]*100 
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Note: For batteries that are subcharged, i.e., not recharged to full energy, DOD is the percentage 
of energy expended in a discharge from the subcharged point.  For example, a battery that is 
subcharged to 70% SOC and then cycled down to 40% SOC is considered to have cycled over 
30% of its energy, and the DOD is 30%. 
 
Energy 
Launch, transfer orbit, and on-orbit battery energy and energy reserve requirements are flowed 
down from the Electrical Power Subsystem specification for the entire mission life.  Battery 
energy is equal to the integral of the product of discharge current and voltage, where Id, a 
positive value, is the discharge current, and Vd, a positive value, is the discharge voltage.  The 
limits of integration are from start of discharge to either the minimum power subsystem battery 
voltage limit, or when the first cell reaches the lower cell voltage limit, or when a defined time 
duration is reached.  This is a point-in-time energy value that is measured at a defined charge 
voltage-current profile, discharge load profile, and temperature profile.  Battery discharge can be 
accomplished with constant current discharge; however, constant power discharge is the 
preferred method if it more closely simulates spacecraft power.  This is also sometimes called 
Watt-hour capacity. 
 
Battery Energy (Wh) = IdVddt 
 
Energy Reserve 
Total amount of usable energy in Watt-hours remaining in a battery, which has been discharged 
to the maximum allowed DOD under normal operating conditions to either the minimum power 
subsystem battery voltage limit, or when the first cell reaches the lower cell voltage limit. 
 
Note: Energy reserve provides enough energy to ensure positive energy balance during the 
maximum sun-outage time when a loss of attitude control occurs coincident with the end of the 
longest eclipse.  Energy reserve may also be used for other rare, deep discharges such as 
relocation with electric propulsion, or those that may occur in transfer orbit. 
 
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure 
The maximum pressure that pressurized hardware is expected to experience during its service 
life, in association with its applicable operating environments. 
 
Module (or Battery Module) 
A battery module is an assembly of series- or parallel-connected battery cells that are connected 
(usually in series) to form a battery. 
 
Procurement Authority 
The agency responsible for the procurement of the spacecraft. 
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Rated or Nameplate Capacity 
The rated or nameplate battery capacity is measured in units of Ampere-hours or Watt-hours.  
The rated battery capacity is provided by the battery or cell vendor and is typically less than the 
actual capacity.  Manufacturers usually provide excess capacity over the rated value to 
compensate for variability within the manufacturing lot and capacity losses expected over the life 
of the battery. 
 
Service Life 
The service life of a battery, battery module, or battery cell starts at cell activation and continues 
through all subsequent fabrication, acceptance testing, handling, storage, transportation, testing 
preceding launch, launch, and mission operation. 
 
Shelf Life Limit 
Shelf life limit for a battery, module, or cell is the maximum allowed time from cell activation to 
launch.  This includes any time in cold storage. 
 
State of Charge 
The ratio of the number of Ah or Wh present in a battery for a defined charge voltage-current 
profile, discharge load profile, and temperature profile to the rated energy E(Ah or Wh) of the 
battery, times 100. 
 
Battery State-of-Charge (%) = [E(Ah or Wh) present/E(Ah or Wh) rated]*100 
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Appendix C.  Pre PAIR Acceptance Report 
 
The information contained in this Appendix was prepared for NASA under 
contract number NNJ07HD23P. 
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Appendix D.  PAIR Leak Rate Report 
 
Work performed under contract number NNJ08HA51P  
for NASA JSC. 
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Appendix F.  Aerospace Applications of Pouch Cells 
 
Task II : Recommendations for Aerospace Applications of Pouch 
Cells 
Problem Description, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment 
 
Problem description: 
Pouch cell designs, with either liquid or gel polymer or true polymer electrolytes, offer 
enhanced specific energy and energy densities compared to conventional designs with metallic 
cell cases.  Also they have  better form factor and packing efficiency and thus are an attractive 
option for short-life missions. There is, however one shortcoming of these design, i.e., their 
inability to maintain hermiticity of the cell through its lifetime.  This is especially the case with 
electrolytes have low boiling point and high vapor pressure, which cause the pouch to open.   For 
example, the Alliant Li-gel polymer pouch cells developed for the 2001 Mars Lander application 
exhibited impressive specific energies of ~ 150 Wh/kg (Fig.1).  They also displayed good low 
temperature performance capability as shown by the discharge curves at -20oC in Fig. 2.  
However, these cells sustained rapid capacity fade during cycling at ambient temperature after 
300 cycles, (Fig. 3).  This failure is accompanied by unusually high charge to discharge capacity 
ratio is unusually high suggesting a significant pressure build from the parasitic electrolyte 
oxidation.   
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It is anticipated that exposures to high temperature operations or hard vacuum would 
accelerate such degradation and aggravate the problem of pouch integrity.  The objective of this 
sub-task was to evaluate performance limitations of pouch cell designs in general in space 
environments, specifically thermal and vacuum environments. 
 
Proposed solution and risk assessment:  
A systematic study has been undertaken to determine the viability of using pouch Li-ion 
and Li-ion polymer batteries under conditions relevant to space applications, specifically hard 
vacuum and thermal cycling. The approach adopted here was to evaluate lithium-ion pouch cells, 
with different electrolytes and from different manufacturers for their ability to maintain 
hermiticity.  Furthermore, adequate screening methods were developed to identify the proper test 
methodology. 
 
The test articles utilized in this study are listed in Table 1.  These include i) 4.3 Ah pouch 
cells made by Quallion with their baseline electrolyte, two variations of low temperature 
electrolytes and two variations of JPL low temperature electrolyte, ii) SKC cells with their gel 
polymer electrolyte, iii) Compact Power cells containing their gel polymer electrolyte as well a 
few of JPL low temperature electrolytes as plasticizers and iv) LTC Li-ion cells.   These cells 
were subjected to a thorough characterization testing, which included determining the capacities 
as a function of charge and discharge rates at different temperatures as well as determining the 
DC impedance of some of these as a function of state of charge and temperature.  In addition, the 
LTC and Compact power cells have been well tested under 100% DOD and partial DOD cycling.  
These characterization tests were aimed at providing the baseline data prior to the thermal 
cycling and vacuum.  Some of these cells were subjected to high temperature cycling, as a means 
of accelerating the failure that would occur over longer cycles at ambient temperature.  In 
addition, the rest of the cells are being exposed to thermal vacuum cycling in the non-operating 
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mode.  Upon on completion of the thermal vac cycles, the cells will be once aging subjected to a 
detailed characterization to quantify their effects on the performance. 
 
 
 
Data Analysis 
Characterization data 
SKC Polymer Cells 
As part of formation (which may have already been done by the manufacturer, seven 
SKC gel polymer electrolytes cells have been discharged initially at 20oC and -20oC at a nominal 
discharge rate of C/5.  Also, in the last discharge cycle, the cell impedances were measured by 
DC current interrupt method.  Table 2 summarizes the discharge data and the impedance values 
at 100%, 75% and 50% SOC.   The specific energies are impressive with over 160 Wh/kg, as 
may be expected from the pouch cell designs.  Further, the impedance (of ~25 mOhms) is 
comparable to cells with liquid electrolyte even with a gel polymer electrolyte.  Subsequent to 
this formation cycling at 25oC, the cells have been conditioned also at 0 and -20oC.  Tables 3 and 
4 provide the summaries of these characterization data at these temperatures. As may be seen 
from these data, the average specific energy at 0oC is ~ 155 Wh/kg (about 98% of the room 
temperature value) and the average value of DC impedance is around 68 mOhms (about 2.5 
times that of room temperature impedance). 
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The corresponding values at -20oC are ~ 125 Wh/kg (about 85% of the room temperature 
value) and 210 mOhms (about 9 times that of room temperature value), respectively.  Following 
the formation cycling, the cells have been further characterized for their rate capability from 
C/10 to 1.5C at different temperatures, i.e., 25, 0, -10, -20 and -30oC. Figs 4 and 5 show the rate 
capability of these cells at 25oC and 10oC, -10oC and -20oC, respectively. 
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Fig. 4: Rate capability of SKC polymer cells at 25oC and 10oC  
 
Fig. 5: Rate capability of SKC polymer cells at -10oC and -20oC  
 
As may be seen from the above figure, the cells have good rate capability combined with 
a good low temperature performance, down to -20oC 
 
Quallion Pouch Cells 
 
As mentioned above, ten Quallion pouch cells of ~ 4 Ah were available for this study 
with three different electrolytes, with one being the baseline electrolyte and other two being low 
temperature electrolytes.  These cells with three different electrolytes would enable us to 
understand the extent of i nternal pressure build up that would breach the integrity of the cell.  
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the discharge capacities and impedance of these cells at 25oC, 0oC and -
20oC, respectively.   
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Table 5: Values of Discharge capacity, energy and  impedance of 
Quallion Pouch cells with different electrolytes at C/5 at 25oC
 
 
Table 6: Values of Discharge capacity, energy and  impedance 
of Quallion pouch cells with different electrolytes at C/5 at 0oC
Table 7: Values of Discharge capacity, energy and  
impedance of Quallion pouch cells at C/5 at -20oC
 
 
Once again, the specific energies are impressive in the range of 200 Wh/kg, while the 
impedances are about 30 mOhms, comparable to the SKC polymer cells.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, the higher specific energies may have been achieved with lower anode to 
cathode capacity ratios.  These cells have been assessed for their performance at various low 
temperatures at different discharge rates.  Figs. 6, 7, 8 and 9 illustrate the relative abilities of 
these cells to operate at low temperatures of -20, -30, -40 and -50oC, respectively.   
Fig. 6: performance of Quallion pouch cells with different electrolytes at C/2 and -20oC  
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Fig. 7: performance of Quallion pouch cells with different electrolytes at C/2 and -30oC  
Fig. 8: performance of Quallion pouch cells with different electrolytes at C/2 and -40oC  
 
Fig. 9: Performance of Quallion pouch cells with different electrolytes at C/2 and -50oC  
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As may be seen from the above figures, the two JPL electrolytes tested here provide good 
low temperature performance, even at a high discharge rate of C/2.  The realized capacities to a 
cut off voltage of 2.0 V are on around 70%, 60%, 40% and 25% of the room temperature values 
at -20oC, -30oC, -40oC and -50oC, respectively.  The baseline electrolyte performed as well as the 
JPL electrolytes down to -40oC.  However, at -50oC, the baseline electrolyte fared poorly 
compared to JPL electrolytes. 
 
Figure 10 provides a summary of performance with these electrolytes at different low 
temperatures. 
 
Fig. 10: Comparison of Low temperature performance of Quallion pouch cells with different liquid 
electrolytes.  
 
It is evident from the figure that the performance of the Quallion baseline electrolyte 
(composition unknown) is fairly good, almost similar to JPL -3 (all-carbonate) formulation, but 
at -50oC, the baseline electrolyte is non-operational.  The JPL-5 electrolyte, which is an ester 
blend, performed the best at low temperatures, with comparable performance at room 
temperature. 
 
LTC Pouch Li-ion cells 
 
The pouch Li-ion cells being used for these studies are at least three years old and contain 
MCMB anode and LiNi0.8Co0.2O2 cathode with a conventional liquid electrolytes.  These are 
pseudo-prismatic cells of 1.35 Ah encased in plastic pouches and were procured under the 
ESMD-ECP program on advanced Li-ion batteries, developed by  a team comprising JPL, T/J 
Technologies and LTC technologies.   
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As shown in table 8, the cells have an average specific energy of ~ 140 Wh/kg and a DC 
impedance of 75 mOhms.  Interestingly, the cells exhibited high cell-to-cell variation mostly in 
impedance. 
 
Table 8: Performance characteristics at 25oC after formation cycles
 
 
During 100% DOD cycling, the cells showed good cycling characteristics over 100 
cycles, as shown in Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 11: Cycling of LTC cells at 100% DOD at 25oC.  
 
The cells lose about 2.5% capacity over 100 cycles, when charged to 4.0 V, but this 
increases to ~ 3% when the charge voltage limit has been increased to 4.2 V.  During cycling at 
low temperature, -20oC, the cells displayed decent cycle life (Fig. 12).  The cells exhibit a 
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specific energy of 100 Wh/kg, when charged to 4.2 V, which decreases to ~ 80 Wh/kg when 
charged to 4.1 V. 
Fig. 12: Cycling of LTC cells at 100% DOD at -20oC.  
 
During LEO cycling at 30% Depth of Discharge, also, the cells exhibited good cycle life 
(Fig. 13) when charged to 3.95 V or 4.1 V.  Over 600 cycles, the cells lost some capacity (almost 
10%). 
Fig. 13: LEO Cycling of LTC cells at 30% DOD at 25oC, with charge voltages of 3.95 and 4.1 V  
 
Compact Power Li-ion gel polymer Pouch cells 
 
As mentioned above, these cells contain spinel manganese oxide, LiMn204 as cathode and 
a gel polymer electrolyte, with a conventional liquid electrolyte as plasticizer.  These have a 
capacity of ~ 7 Ah and are at least four years old.  In fact, they have been well tested during this 
period, as shown in Fig. 14. 
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The cells display impressive cycling characteristics, both under deep discharge (100% 
DOD) cycling (almost 5000 cycles to > 50% capacity)  as partial-DOD cycling as in LEO regime 
(about 29000 cycles at 30% DOD).  The long cycle life of these cells implies that the pressure 
developed within the cell, even when charged to 4.1 V is low enough to be contained within the 
pouch, or ii) the pouch sealing is adequately strong.   Furthermore, these pouch cells showed 
impressive low temperature performance even at -60oC, when the liquid electrolyte (plasticizer) 
was replaced with various JPL electrolytes (Fig. 15).  In any case, this is encouraging and 
pointing to a likely tolerance to hard vacuum environment as well. 
 
 
 
High Temperature Cycling 
 
In order accelerate the failure of the polymer cells upon cycling, the cells were cycled at 
60oC, using the same charge voltage (4.1 v, with a taper).  Figure 16 shows the performance of 
Quallion cells with baseline and low temperature electrolyte, LTC cell and SKC cell.   
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
116 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
 
 
Interestingly, both Quallion cells failed early, with the low temperature electrolyte failing 
right away, while the baseline electrolyte cell surviving barely 20-30 cycles.  The LTC cell lost 
the entire capacity within 50 cells.  The SKC cell, on the hand, showed good resilience, showing 
about 50% capacity after 200 cycles.   This amount of fade may be expected even in a 
conventional metal-contained Li-ion cell.  The cell hasn’t exhibited any rupture which is very 
encouraging.   Among these cells, the cells that failed have unusually high charge to discharge 
capacity ratios, which suggests that there was considerable amount of electrolyte oxidation, 
probably internal pressure build up as well.  Further results are being analyzed.  The differences 
observed here among these four cells may be attributed to the following factors: 
 Nature of electrolyte, especially solvent, which undergoes oxidative degradation 
during high temperature cycling. 
 Amount of electrolyte (normalized to the volume of the cell), which could be higher 
for the Quallion cells, based on higher energy densities. 
 Type of cathode material: Quallion cells, we believe, continued NMC (0.33:0.33:0.33 
Ni, Mn and Co) cathodes, while SKC cells contain lithiated cobalt oxide 
 Type of electrolyte (either gel or liquid) and finally the 
 Pouch seal design 
 
It is difficult to attribute the observed trend to any single factor and further studies are 
required to gain an understanding on the relative impact of these parameters. 
 
Thermal Vacuum Cycling 
 
Thermal vacuum cycling studies have been initiated on the representative cells from these 
sets.  The thermal cycling is being performed under non-operating conditions.  Following the 
completion of thermal cycling, the cells will be subjected to a detailed characterization testing, 
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the results of which will be compared with the baseline to assess the resilience of these cells 
under hard vacuum and thermal cycling. 
 
Findings, Observations, and Recommendations 
 
Pouch cell configuration provides several advantages over conventional Li-ion cells, i.e., with 
metallic containers, in terms of specific energy, energy density and packing efficiency.  Some of 
the prototype cells of different types have shown impressive specific energies of 160-200 Wh/kg, 
at least 20% improvement over their counterparts.   One limitation pertaining to a widespread use 
of pouch cells in aerospace applications is the lack adequate robustness in the hemiticity and 
integrity of the cells, especially upon electrical and thermal cycling and possibly under hard 
vacuum environments. This characteristic is a function of electrolyte, type of cathode material 
(which dictates the charge voltage and hence the extent of electrolyte oxidation) and the pooch 
seal design.  Furthermore, this failure is accelerated at high temperatures, for example, cycling at 
60oC, showed clear demarcations among various cells tested.  Interestingly, SKC gel polymer 
showed the greatest resilience to the high temperature cycling and may be expected to exhibit 
similar tolerance to vacuum also.  It is recommended that the selected prototype cells be tested in 
the anticipated thermal and vacuum environments before hand, before putting them for use.  As a 
diagnostic, the cells may be subjected to an accelerated cycling test at a high temperature, after 
establishing a correlation between such acceleration and the expected cycle life at room 
temperature. Such a correlation may be established by performing accelerated cycling tests at 
various temperatures, e.g., 25oC, 40, 45, 50 and 55oC, and analyzing the data to get the Arrhenius 
factors and activation energies for the capacity fade and life-limiting processes. 
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Appendix G.  Li-Ion Cell PTC Device Withstanding Thresholds 
 
 
 
E. Darcy, F. Davies, J. Jeevarajan, G. Varela and P. Patel 
NASA-Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX, USA 
and 
B. Strangways and T. Nelson 
Symmetry Resources, Inc., Arab, AL, USA (NASA Contract number NNJ07HG03P) 
 
Abstract 
Through iterative testing, we assessed the performance characteristics and safety limitations of 
the resettable, positive thermal coefficient (PTC) current limiting device of 4 commercial 18650 
cell designs. Specifically, we determined the withstanding voltage/power thresholds at which the 
cell would emit odor, visibly leak, become irreversibly damaged, and/or fail catastrophically. 
Significant differences in voltage level thresholds exist between the 4 cell designs. For example, 
at 45.2V (11S) of total series voltage, the heat generated during the PTC device trip transition 
and during less than 2 minutes of holding the trip state of the Sony HC cell design causes its 
insulating crimp seal to melt and cause a cell internal short. In contrast at 61.6V (15S), the PTC 
device of the Panasonic cell design suffered only benign irreversible electrical damage without 
emitting odors or signs of leakage. The PTC device performance of each cell design was 
significantly different. However, when tripped, all 4 PTC device designs acted uniformly as a 
thermal regulator generating between 3.2W and 3.5W of resistive heat while in the trip state. 
This is independent of the in-rush current/power that caused its transition into the trip state. This 
heat must be properly dissipated in densely-packed, large battery designs to allow the cell and its 
PTC device to safely perform. High voltage external short conditions can contribute to electrical 
overstress of the PTC device leading to catastrophic failures, but so can densely-packed, low 
voltage conditions.  
 
Objectives 
The objectives were to characterize the performance of the current limiting positive thermal 
coefficient (PTC) device in commercial 18650 Li-ion cell designs and determine the external 
short voltage withstanding thresholds at which it will emit odor, visibility leak, sustain 
irreversible electrical damage, and/or fail catastrophically. The ultimate purpose of this effort is 
establish test methods for establishing external short abuse tolerance of cell designs to ensure 
safe large capacity and/or high voltage battery designs.  
 
Introduction 
The battery design concept utilizing small commercial cells to achieve large capacity batteries 
has proven to be very successful, safe, and cost-effective. This is in a large part because of the 
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very tight performance uniformity, safety, and low-cost of the commercial cells selected. 
Unfortunately, the safety features of commercial 18650 Li-ion cells have been proven ineffective 
when assembled into certain high voltage and/or high capacity battery module assemblies. 
Specifically, the cell’s over-current, resettable, polymeric switch (aka, PTC device) can ignite 
when subjected to high voltage short conditions.  
 
From 2001 to 2004, NASA pursued a Space Shuttle upgrade requiring a very high voltage 
(360V) and large energy (28 kWh) lithium ion battery design to power its Auxiliary Power Unit. 
Several subscale test battery modules from 35V to 100V were assembled and intentionally 
exposed to external shorts to demonstrate the catastrophic hazard. Adding a diode in parallel 
with every 6 cells in series showed promise in tests with 180V battery assemblies. However, 
more work is required to fully prove its effectiveness. 
 
In 2004, a low voltage (2S), large capacity (66P) battery module suffered a catastrophic thermal 
runaway when inadvertently exposed to an external short while inside a commercial cargo 
carrying Boeing 747, within 30 minutes of take-off. The cells were at 50% state-of-charge at the 
time of the incident. Nevertheless, the highly nested and densely packed battery module design 
most likely prevented the cell PTCs from preventing catastrophic fire. 
 
The cell PTC device is located in the top header of the crimped-seal header assembly of the 
18650 cell design. It is held in place and isolated from the negative polarity of the can by the 
crimp seal as shown in Fig. 1. The PTC device consists of two metal coated sides sandwiching a 
matrix of a crystalline polyethylene polymer composite containing dispersed conductive 
particles, usually carbon black.  The resistance of the PTC device increases with temperature 
(Positive Temperature Coefficient, PTC).  The device has a resistance that increases sharply with 
temperature as shown in Fig. 2.  When a short is applied to a cell, the elevated currents cause the 
device to self-heat and move to a high resistance state in which most of the cell voltage is across 
the device, but the current is significantly reduced.  As long as the short is maintained, the PTC 
device produces enough heat to keep itself in this state (lower current being offset by greater 
voltage drop across device) as shown in Fig. 3.  
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Figure 1. CAD representation of the top header assembly of the Sony 18650 HC cell. The PTC 
devices is the green annulus disc sandwich between the red top cover and the white current 
interrupt device (CID). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Typical PTC device resistance’s dependence on temperature. 
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Figure 3. Typical current and voltage transient profiles of cell with a PTC device exposed to a 
short circuit. In-rush maximum current is 34A. Trip transition takes over 2 seconds to achieve a 
steady state hold current or nearly 1A. 
 
Method 
Four currently available commercial 18650 lithium ion cell designs were evaluated; 
a) Sony US18650S (also known as 18650HC) rated at 1.5Ah 
b) E-one Moli Energy, ICR-18650J rated at 2.4Ah 
c) Sanyo Energy, UR18650F rated at 2.2Ah 
d) Panasonic, CGR-18650C rated at 2.15 Ah 
These cells under test were provided to Symmetry Resources, Inc., where the testing was 
conducted [1]. In addition, over 30 units of a commercial 18650 high rate cell design (without a 
PTC) were provided. 
 
First, the following protocol was followed to accept the cells from each design; 
a) perform serialization,  
b) visual,  
c) mass (5 mg),  
d) dimensions,  
e) OCV (1 mV),  
f) CCV (1 mV) to calculate DC internal resistance,  
g) 1 kHz AC impedance (10 mohms),  
h) and measure PTC hold current resistance to  2 mohms at room temperature on 5 
randomly chosen cells from each cell design. 
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The external short tests were conducted with n high power 18650 cells in series, charged to 
4.1V/cell, to drive the required voltage through the cell under test, resulting in n+1 cells in series. 
Using high power cells without PTCs provides a relevant power source for the cell under test and 
obviates issues with sluggish power supplies. The cell under test was charged to 4.2V to a 
limiting taper current of 50 mA. The resistance of short circuit loop of the test was adjusted for 
each test condition to achieve an approximate 16A in-rush current with each cell design as 
shown in Fig. 4. Throughout each test, cell voltage, current, and two cell skin temperatures (near 
top and bottom of cell) were recorded at 1 Hz minimum. During the PTC trip transition, cell 
voltage and current was recorded at 1 MHz sampling rate. Each test was allowed to continue 
with cell in tripped state until 60 minutes after maximum temperature had been achieved. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Electrical schematic of test set-up 
 
The cell under test was visually inspected during the trip test and the strength of any odors 
coming from the cells was noted. Then the cell was allowed to rest overnight before performing 
another visual inspection, mass measurement, measuring its AC impedance at 1 kHz measured 
along with its remaining discharge capacity with its DC resistance.  
 
After all the cell tests were completed with all 4 cell designs, the cells that were tested at the 
thresholds were disassembled to remove the cell header assembly for further analysis and 
impedance tests. In addition, unused samples from each cell design were disassembled to obtain 
mass breakdowns of all separable components and cell axial and radial potted cross cuts were 
achieved to allow dimensional measurements of key features of each cell design.  
 
Results 
The pre-test acceptance results are summarized in Table 1. Note that the Panasonic design has 
lower internal resistance, AC impedance, and lower virgin PTC resistance. Of the four designs, 
it’s achieves the highest specific energy. The Moli, Panasonic, and Sanyo designs all achieved 
more than 180 Wh/kg at C/2 to 3.2V at room temperature. The Sony cell achieves 130 Wh/kg 
when discharged at C/10 to 2.5V at room temperature. 
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Table 1. Pre-test Acceptance Measurements 
Cell Design 
OCV 
(V) 
CCV 
(V) 
DC Re 
(mΩ) 
AC Imp 
(mΩ) 
PTC 
Virgin 
Re (mΩ) Mass (g) 
              
Sony US18650S 3.838 3.590 124.0 64.7 22.4 40.641 
Moli ICR-18650J 3.806 3.580 113.2 60.7 21.9 47.284 
Sanyo UR18650F 3.788 3.585 101.8 55.0 19.1 45.359 
Panasonic CGR-18650C 3.778 3.582 98.0 46.6 13.4 43.261 
 
Table 2. Cell Mass Breakdown 
Component Moli Mass 
(g) 
Panasonic 
Mass (g) 
Sanyo Mass (g) Sony 
HC (g) 
Cell 47.109 43.319 45.343 40.467 
Positive Insulator 0.044 0.0350 0.036 0.034 
PVC Sleeve 0.456 0.325 0.603 0.305 
Bare cell 46.609 42.960 44.709 40.128 
Electrolyte (by extraction wt. 
loss) (4 cells, respectively) 
1.58, 1.14, 
1.5, 0.71 
1.988, 2.110, 
1.364 
1.740, 1.836, 0.949 1.859 
Seal & Positive cover ass’y 
(Seal, button, PTC, CID, 
collector, insulator, & contact 
plate (only Pan)) 
1.313 1.221 1.225 1.293 
Seal 0.162 0.093 0.158 0.173 
Button 0.759 0.476 0.479 0.639 
PTC 0.093 0.099 0.111 0.104 
CID 0.189 0.069 0.075 0.218 
Collector 0.110 0.052 0.054 0.120 
  0.072  0.037 
  0.349 0.334  
Positive insulator (internal) 0.053 0.145 0.052 0.068 
Negative insulator (internal) 0.054 0.132 0.059 0.082 
Jelly roll 36.553 35.273 36.141 28.006 
Positive [Al] Electrode (*) 18.567 18.498 17.834 16.058 
Negative [Cu] Electrode (*) 12.029 12.451 10.372 9.352 
Separator, 2 piece 1.562 1.649 1.933 1.547 
Roll Pin insert 1.991 0.788 0.626 NA 
*Note that electrode material flaked off during Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA), separator 
mass contains portions of electrode materials and electrode mass does not reconcile to jelly roll 
mass 
 
The mass breakdown of all the separable components in each cell design is presented in Table 2. 
Note that the roll pin insert of the Moli cell is almost 2g and nearly 5% of cell mass and that the 
Sony cell does not have one. 
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Photographs of the Sony, Moli, Sanyo, and Panasonic cell DPA are presented in Appendix A. 
The cross cuts of the top header assemblies reveal very significant design differences. The Sanyo 
and the Panasonic designs have their PTC device and CID insulated with a crimp connection 
separately insulated from the can crimp seal. As Figures 5A thru 5D show, the 
 
          
 
          
 
Figures 5A-D. Axial  cross cuts of the head assembly showing the double insulator crimp designs 
of the Panasonic (left top) and the Sanyo (left bottom) and the single insulator crimp designs of 
the Moli (top right) and Sony (bottom right). 
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In the majority of the cells under test, the resistance of the test circuit, including the cells was 
adjusted to yield an in-rush current of ~16A. As the PTC started its trip transition, the time to trip 
was measured, the power dissipated in the tripped PTC was calculated, and, at equilibrium, the 
top and bottom skin temperatures of the cell were recorded. All these values are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Cell PTC performance parameters with 16A in-rush current 
Cell Design 
Time to 
trip 
Calc PTC 
W Top Temp 
Bottom 
Temp 
  sec mΩ degC degC 
Sony US18650S 4.6 3.21 75.3 61.0 
Moli ICR-18650J 12.0 3.38 73.5 62.5 
Sanyo UR18650F 11.5 3.27 71.9 60.5 
Panasonic CGR-18650C 27.2 3.34 74.0 61.8 
 
It’s very interesting how uniformly the PTC device regulates the power dissipated in the tripped 
state within all these cell designs despite their differences in virgin resistances and time to trip. 
This explains the uniformity in the cell temperatures at thermal equilibrium. 
 
The complete PTC withstanding voltage test data sets are the Appendix B. The number of high 
power cells in series was set by iteration in order to determine the maximum number of cells in 
series would ensure no or very slight odors and no irreversible PTC device damage. Damage was 
defined as post trip resistance that was > 3 times that of its virgin (never tripped) resistance. Note 
the manufacturer datasheets on the PTC device specifies that post trip resistance of undamaged 
devices are always < 2 times that of virgin resistance of the same device. A summary is 
presented as follows with n representing the number time the test was repeated with similar 
results to support the stated findings;  
 
• Moli results 
– 7S is maximum series count to prevent PTC damage and leakage (n=3) 
– 4S is maximum series count to prevent slight odor from seal (n=3) 
• Sanyo results 
– 3S is maximum series count to prevent PTC damage (n=3) 
– 8S is maximum series count to prevent odor from seal (n=3) 
• Sony results 
– 3S is maximum series count to prevent PTC electrical damage (n=3) 
– 10S is maximum series count to prevent smoking the PTC (n=1) 
– at 11S, seal damage led to an internal short (n=1) 
– at 12S, rapid, severe electrical damage to PTC without seal damage (n=1) 
– Its PTC has the slowest tripping transition 
• Panasonic results 
– 7S yields no odor, no leakage, but slight electrical damage (n=3) 
– 11S and 15S yields no odor, no leakage, but some electrical damage (n=1) 
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Note that electrolyte in the Moli cells is very pungent and much more readily detected by human 
smell than the other cell electrolytes. The Sanyo and Sony cells must be tripped at low voltages < 
4S to not suffer electrical damage to the PTC device, while the Moli and Panasonic are more 
tolerant (>7S). The Panasonic is the lone standout for which were not able to make it leak or emit 
any odors, even after high voltage (55.9V) was applied across the cell and its PTC device during 
the 15S test. A close up of the Panasonic header (Fig 6.) clearly shows how the CID collector 
plate has a thick perimeter edge that is crimped with an insulator to insulate the CID collector 
from the CID vent disc and seat it with the PTC device and top button. This subassembly is 
crimped together inside the main crimp seal with the cell can. On Fig. 7, the separable 
components of the Panasonic header assembly are shown. The crimp plate with the thick 
perimeter edge that is crimped exists in the Sanyo cell design, but not in the Moli and Sony 
designs. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Close-up of cross-cut of Panasonic Header Assembly. 
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Figure 7. Panasonic Header Assembly components after DPA. 
 
With 11 cells in series (including the cell under test), the Sony cell PTC device showed nominal 
trip performance and held for 1.37 minutes before failing nearly catastrophically. The resultant 
heat dissipated in the header assembly caused the crimp seal isolation to fail, resulting in a cell 
internal short.  
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Figure 8. Li-Ion Cell PTC Withstanding Voltage Test. Sony US18650S (Hard Carbon); Cell 
#71P020; Initial 3 minutes of test. Charged @0.7A to 4.2VV, 4.2V to 0.05A 10S COTS 
18650HR string in series, 2.29 ohm circuit resistance.  
 
As shown in Fig. 8, the PTC device trips nominally with 16A of in-rush current, but the 
approximate -40V across it during and after trip transition cause more heat then the crimp seal 
could tolerate. Cell voltage jumped to near zero and the external circuit resumed pumping 16A 
through the cell when the PTC device failed in a closed circuit conditions. Then within 12 
seconds, the external short circuit was manually opened prior to evacuating the area for safety 
reasons, and cell skin temperatures rose to a peak of 163.9 °C on the top and 121.9 °C at the 
bottom within 60 seconds. Thereafter, the cell ran out of juice and temperatures subsided. The 
cell lost 102 mg of mass as a result of the seal failure shown in Figs 9 & 10 after DPA. 
 
A  video recording was made of the Sony cell test with 11S. After the PTC device trips and holds 
for over a minute, a small thin stream of smoke emerges followed by a larger puff when the PTC 
device fails closed circuit. 
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Figures 9 & 10. Sony cell and cell header assembly after 11S short circuit test which internally 
shorted. Note the thermally damage crimp seal (black/blue) and positive tab insulator (green). 
 
-90.0
-80.0
-70.0
-60.0
-50.0
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
95.210 95.215 95.220 95.225 95.230 95.235 95.240 95.245 95.250 95.255 95.260
Time (seconds)
C
el
l V
ol
ta
ge
 (V
)
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
C
ur
re
nt
 (A
)
Cell Volt Current
PTC Tripped 
and Normal
PTC Failed 
Closed Circuit
 
Figure 11. The voltage and current transitions from a nominally tripped Sony PTC device to a 
closed circuit condition during its failure with 12 cells in series (12S). 
 
At 12S, the transition of failure of the PTC to hold its trip state and failed closed circuit occurred 
with 40 ms as shown in Fig. 11. One quick dark puff of smoke from the cell header was detected 
in the video recording of the event.  
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Note: Snapshots from the video. 
 
It’s interesting that at 12S, the additional power dissipated through the PTC device is sufficient 
to instantly smoke it into a low resistance (shorted) condition, but without sufficient energy 
dissipation to cause the crimp seal to fail catastrophically as happened in the 11S test.  
 
Overall, the Panasonic cell design demonstrated superior seal under the abusive short circuit 
conditions performed herein. Even under 15S conditions, the cell did not emit odor or leak 
electrolyte. It’s possible that the double crimped design plays a significant role. 
 
Conclusions 
 The cell PTC device has voltage/power limitations that vary with cell design, which when 
exceeded can lead to catastrophic cell failures.  
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 When held in the tripped state the cell PTC device generates 3.2 to 3.5W of heat 
regardless of the in-rush current and voltage applied to trip it.  
 The thresholds for odor emittance and slight leakage must be determined with in-situ 
visual observation of the cell under test.  
 Our test method developed herein was successful at determining the design limitations of 
a cell PTC device. 
 
Recommendations 
 Due to the hazardous consequences of an overwhelmed cell PTC device, it’s therefore 
very important to characterize its performance and determine its voltage/power 
withstanding thresholds. 
 The power (3.2 to 3.5W) of heat generated in a tripped cell PTC device must be properly 
dissipated to prevent its hazardous failure in a multi-cell battery configuration. The 
thermal dissipation paths for this heat must be analyzed within the battery design and 
validated to ensure preservation of the cell PTC device’s safety feature.  
 Careful selection of bypass diode design is needed to mitigate that limitation as per the 
guidelines provided by Davies [2]. 
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Moli ICR-18650J Design 
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Sanyo UR18650F Design 
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Panasonic CGR-18650C Design 
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PTC Device Test Data Spreadsheets 
PTC Voltage Withstanding PTC Voltage Withstanding
Sony US18650S (Hard Carbon) Sony US18650S (Hard Carbon)
Tested with Commercial 18650HR String in Series with Test Cell Tested with Commercial 18650HR String in Series with Test Cell
External Circuit Resistance Set to Create Approx. 16-17A inrush current External Circuit Resistance Set to Create Approx. 16-17A inrush current
Test Cell Charged at 0.7A to 4.2V, 4.2V to 0.05A Test Cell Charged at 0.7A to 4.2V, 4.2V to 0.05A
Calculated Eff Internal Resistance (mohm) from OCV/CCV
HR Strg Series Ext. Circuit Recorder Inrush Trip 10sec Avg Trip Pwr Post-Trip Stabilized Avgs Observations, Post-Test Discharge AC Impedance (mohm) Post-test Header only measurements
Cell ID # Cell Count Resist (ohms) File # Current (A) Time (s) Calc PTC Pwr (W) Cell V Current (A) Calc PTC Pwr (W) Top Temp ( C) Bottom Temp ( C) Electrolyte detect OCV CCV Calc. Re OCV CCV Calc. Re Delta Cap. (A-h) Pre-Test Post-test Delta Pre-Test Post-Test Delta AC Imp. (mohm) DC resist (mohm)
71P001 9 2.07 0003 16.49 4.5 19.41 -36.16 0.079 3.18 72.8 58.3 no odor 3.836 3.592 122.4 4.093 3.754 169.7 47.2 1.163 66.2 118.5 52.3 40.732 40.730 -0.002
71P002 11 2.51 0007 16.36 4.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A PTC smoked, no odor, DPA to test seal 3.837 3.592 122.8 4.137 3.908 114.6 -8.2 1.270 66.5 65.9 -0.6 40.786 40.779 -0.007 31.2 31.0
71P003 7 1.64 0013 16.58 4.6 16.28 -28.00 0.100 3.21 74.5 60.9 no odor 3.838 3.593 123.0 4.091 3.788 151.7 28.6 1.146 65.9 104.1 38.2 40.635 40.632 -0.003 53.7 53.8
71P004 8 1.87 0016 16.48 4.8 20.80 -32.06 0.089 3.22 75.5 60.8 no odor 3.840 3.596 122.0 4.089 3.756 166.7 44.6 1.144 63.1 116.1 53.0 40.736 40.729 -0.007 58.1 57.9
71P005 8 1.87 0018 16.56 4.4 20.03 -32.06 0.088 3.18 75.2 60.6 no odor 3.837 3.585 125.9 4.096 3.743 176.7 50.7 1.147 65.8 124.1 58.3 40.667 40.659 -0.008
71P006 8 1.87 0020 16.55 4.3 19.64 -32.07 0.089 3.22 76.4 61.1 no odor, DPA to assess electrical damage 3.837 3.589 124.1 4.091 3.742 174.7 50.6 1.158 64.3 124.5 60.2 40.690 40.686 -0.004 open open
71P007 9 2.07 0023 16.49 4.9 21.89 -36.14 0.081 3.26 75.2 61.2 no odor 3.837 3.589 124.3 4.076 3.733 171.7 47.4 1.097 64.0 119.0 55.0 40.620 40.613 -0.007
71P008 9 2.07 0025 16.49 4.4 19.14 -36.15 0.079 3.18 75.0 61.3 no odor 3.838 3.590 124.0 4.101 3.767 167.2 43.1 1.161 64.8 116.5 51.7 40.550 40.545 -0.005
71P009 7 1.65 0027 16.59 4.4 20.29 -27.97 0.100 3.21 75.1 61.0 no odor 3.838 3.589 124.8 4.085 3.771 157.2 32.4 1.131 65.1 107.2 42.1 40.655 40.650 -0.005 53.1 53.2
71P010 7 1.65 0030 16.57 4.6 19.44 -27.98 0.099 3.18 74.8 61.3 no odor, DPA to assess electrical damage 3.837 3.588 124.8 4.086 3.638 224.2 99.4 1.102 64.7 162.7 98.0 40.626 40.618 -0.008 59.4 59.4
71P011 4 1.01 0036 16.93 3.9 19.31 -15.69 0.163 3.22 76.9 61.2 no odor 3.837 3.587 125.1 4.038 3.726 156.2 31.1 1.024 65.1 107.4 42.3 40.609 40.605 -0.004
71P012 4 1.01 0038 16.90 4.4 18.49 -15.67 0.165 3.26 74.9 61.1 no odor 3.836 3.592 122.3 4.038 3.719 159.7 37.3 1.023 62.2 110.9 48.7 40.658 40.654 -0.004
71P013 4 1.01 0040 17.00 4.4 18.99 -15.69 0.161 3.18 77.1 63.0 no odor 3.837 3.590 123.8 4.046 3.731 157.7 33.9 1.039 64.3 108.8 44.5 40.579 40.577 -0.002
71P014 3 0.81 0046 16.27 5.2 17.90 -11.619 0.202 3.17 74.8 60.4 no odor 3.837 3.590 123.9 4.020 3.723 148.6 24.8 0.979 63.9 99.6 35.7 40.635 40.632 -0.003
71P015 3 0.81 0049 16.30 4.6 18.13 -11.609 0.205 3.22 74.4 61.3 no odor 3.838 3.587 125.5 4.011 3.697 157.2 31.7 0.944 65.5 108.4 42.9 40.585 40.582 -0.003
71P016 3 0.81 0050 16.14 4.9 17.78 -11.591 0.206 3.23 77.6 61.6 no odor 3.836 3.587 124.5 4.012 3.695 158.7 34.2 0.951 64.6 109.9 45.3 40.600 40.598 -0.002
71P017 4 1.03 0052 16.35 4.9 18.54 N/A N/A N/A 50.6 max 29.9 max 10sec tripped hold, no odor 3.838 3.591 123.7 4.170 3.847 161.7 37.9 1.297 64.7 112.9 48.2 40.688 40.686 -0.002
71P018* 0 0.051 0059 33.94 0.63 12.21 0.0457 0.878 3.51 81.1 64.2 no odor 3.840 3.594 123.0 3.900 3.602 149.1 26.1 N/A 63.6 97.0 33.4 40.654 40.652 -0.002
71P019 4 0.49 0061 32.75 0.52 20.20 -15.80 0.166 3.30 77.6 62.9 sleeve & washer thermal damage, no odor 3.839 3.594 122.6 4.039 3.636 201.7 79.1 0.987 63.0 779.4 716.4 40.676 40.671 -0.005 62.7 62.8
71P020 10 2.29 0064 16.36 5.0 19.75 163.9 max 121.9 max PTC held for 1.37min, failed, cell shorted 3.838 3.592 123.0 0.000 N/jA N/A N/A N/A 64.5 13.3 -51.2 40.681 40.579 -0.102 40.2 40.3
71P021 2 0.28 0069 32.01 0.48 17.54 -7.855 0.265 3.16 76.2 62.0 no odor 3.837 3.587 125.2 3.983 3.657 163.2 38.0 0.867 65.7 114.1 48.4 40.632 40.628 -0.004
71P022 4 0.49 0082 32.33 0.43 21.10 -15.82 0.160 3.19 75.9 63.3 no odor 3.838 3.590 124.1 4.046 3.724 161.2 37.1 1.035 64.6 112.7 48.1 40.635 40.630 -0.005
71P023 3.838 3.587 125.3 65.4 40.650
71P024 3.838 3.586 126.0 66.1 40.594
71P025 3.837 3.588 124.8 64.4 40.535
71P026 3.838 3.587 125.6 66.0 40.552
71P027 3.837 3.589 123.8 63.7 40.680
71P028 3.837 3.590 123.7 68.2 40.602
71P029 3.837 3.591 123.0 63.5 40.592
71P030 3.838 3.595 121.5 62.7 40.705
Post-Test Mass (g)Pre-Test
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Appendix H.  Current Interrupt Device (CID) Arcing in Li-Ion Cells 
 
 
E. Darcy, F. Davies, J. Jeevarajan, G. Varela and P. Patel 
NASA-Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX, USA 
and 
B. Strangways and T. Nelson 
Symmetry Resources, Inc., Arab, AL, USA (NASA Contract number NNJ07HG03P) 
 
Abstract 
Through iterative testing, we assessed the performance characteristics and determined the 
susceptibility to arcing of the current interrupt device (CID) of 3 commercial 18650 cell designs 
under high voltage conditions. This effort tests if at a certain high voltage threshold, an 
overcharge condition of a series cell string has the risk that the first cell CID to activate may arc 
and ignite the flammable electrolyte vapors in the cell.  
 
Objectives 
The objective were to characterize the performance of the CID in 3 commercial 18650 Li-ion 
cell designs and determine the series voltage thresholds at which arcing becomes a safety 
concern. A secondary purpose of this effort is establish test methods for establishing the 
overcharge protection limits tolerance of cell designs to help ensure safe high voltage battery 
designs.  
 
Introduction 
Rechargeable 18650 Lithium Ion cells are being pursued as the building blocks for several high 
voltage, high capacity aerospace batteries.  Even though these batteries don’t solely rely on the 
cell’s CID for overcharge protection to prevent a catastrophic failure, we want to know under 
what conditions is the feature a valid control in high voltage batteries.  The CID functions by 
severing an electrical connection within the cell due to an over-pressurization of the cell during 
an overcharge condition.  Cell designs with the CID feature contain an additive that generates 
gas pressure when driven into overcharge. At a certain pressure, the CID expands and interrupts 
all external current flow to the cell. This is an irreversible feature that permanently open circuits 
the cell.  
 
If higher pressures develop internally for other reasons, the cell rupture vent located on the CID 
plate will relieve cell pressure irreversibly.  See Figure 1 for details on a generic header 
assembly.  
 
The safety concern investigated herein is at what voltage threshold does arcing become a concern 
during CID activation. Several previous overcharge tests of multi cell battery assemblies have 
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indicated that conditions can exists where the CID will partially open and reseat itself before 
irreversibly activating. Can this “switch bounce” behavior produce a dangerous arcing condition? 
 
 
 
Method 
Three currently available commercial 18650 lithium ion cell designs were evaluated; 
e) Sony US18650S (also known as 18650HC) rated at 1.5Ah 
f) E-one Moli Energy, ICR-18650J rated at 2.4Ah 
g) Sony US18650VT, a 1Ah, high rate cell design without a PTC device 
These cells under test were provided to Symmetry Resources, Inc., where the testing was 
conducted.  
 
The high rate cell capacity performance was evaluated at various rates (from C rate to 18C) at 
ambient conditions. Charging was at 1A to 4.1V followed with a 50mA taper termination. The 
cell was allowed to rest 10 minutes before discharging at the various rates with several 10A, 10s 
pulse to allow an internal resistance calculation. See Figure 2 for the voltage profiles and Figure 
3 for the corresponding internal resistance profile.  
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A destructive physical analysis (DPA) of each cell design was conducted to assess cell 
construction feature differences and to measure the mass of each separable component of each 
design. Radial and axial cross cut examinations of each cell were obtained to allow dimensional 
measurements of design features. These were obtained by puncturing a hole in the cell, 
centrifuging as much of the electrolyte out as possible, back filling with an epoxy, mounting it in 
that epoxy, axially and radially cutting it, and polishing the cut as necessary.  
 
Commercial 18650VT Li-Ion Cell; Test Cell #71P102
Discharge Voltage Profiles at 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 15, and 18C discharge rates
Charge @1.0A to 4.1V, 4.1V to 0.05A
Rest 10 min., Discharge @1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 15, and 18A to 2.8V
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Figure 2. Discharge rate profiles for the Sony high rate cell at ambient conditions. 
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Commercial 18650VT Li-Ion Cell; Test Cell #71P102
Effective Internal Resistance Determinations
Charge @1.0A to 4.1V, 4.1V to 0.05A
Rest 10 min., Discharge @1.0A with 5.0A X 30sec plus 10A X 10sec steps
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Figure 3. Internal resistance vs discharge time for the Sony high rate cell. 
 
Two sets of CID overcharge tests were conducted, one with live cells and one with only the cell 
header assemblies. The live cell CID tests were conducted with the cell in connected in series 
with a power supply for achieving the desired compliance voltage (12 to 55V in this effort). We 
looked for electrical evidence of arcing during the test and physical evidence after the test. These 
tests were conduction at NASA-JSC. 
 
The cell header CID test was done by Symmetry Resources using cell headers extracted from the 
disassembly of live cells.  To be useful, the header had to be removed with at least 3 cm of can 
wall left and enough internal positive tab to make an electrical connection. A custom fixture was 
designed, fabricated, assembled, and utilized to seal the header to a gas pressure source using 
carbon dioxide. Special attention was paid to design of the gas supply feed to allow a slow and 
gradual pressure rise as we expect during moderate rate overcharge inside a cell. If the large step 
changes in the rise of the supplied gas pressure occurred, it could prevent any CID bounce 
behavior. 
 
Once attached to the custom fixture, the cell headers were leak tested at a pressure well below 
CID activation pressure. Then, several headers for each cell design were pressurized to 
determine CID activation pressure. The cell header was load with a few drops of electrolyte (1M 
LiPF6 in EC/DMC), evacuated to remove ambient air, and then backfilled with carbon dioxide to 
a pressure 10% lower than CID activation pressure. A current equivalent to C/2 was driven 
through the CID of the header assembly with a set compliance voltage (55V maximum). Carbon 
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dioxide pressure was slowly (~1 psi/min) and gently increased. Current and voltage drop were 
recorded at a 1 MHz frequency minimum during the CID activation.  
 
In initial test runs were done at 55V, with subsequent runs moving to 110V if no evidence of 
arcing was found, or 25V if evidence was found. We looked for electrical evidence of arcing 
during the test and physical evidence after the test. One more voltage step at 40V or 80V was 
planned. 
  
 
Results 
The pre-test acceptance results are summarized in Table 1. Note that the Panasonic design has 
lower internal resistance, AC impedance, and lower virgin PTC resistance. 
 
Table 1. Pre-test Acceptance Measurements 
Cell Design 
OCV 
(V) 
CCV 
(V) 
DC Re 
(mΩ) 
AC Imp 
(mΩ) 
PTC 
Virgin 
Re (mΩ) Mass (g) 
              
Sony US18650S 3.838 3.590 124.0 64.7 22.4 40.641 
Moli ICR-18650J 3.806 3.580 113.2 60.7 21.9 47.284 
Sony US18650VT   46  N/A 45.359 
 
The high rate cell’s internal resistance varied from 46 to 50 mohms. 
 
The cell design mass breakdowns from the DPAs are tabulated in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2. Cell Mass Breakdown 
Component Sony 
HC (g) 
COTS 
VT (g) 
Moli 
J (g) 
Cell 40.467 41.045 47.109 
Positive Insulator 0.034 0.036 0.044 
PVC Sleeve 0.305 0.279 0.456 
Bare cell 40.128 40.730 46.609 
Electrolyte (by extraction wt. loss)  1.859 0.813 1.58, 
1.14, 1.5, 
0.71 
Seal & Positive cover assembly 1.293 1.551 1.313 
Seal 0.173 0.169 0.162 
Button 0.639 1.014 0.759 
PTC 0.104 NA 0.093 
CID 0.218 0.215 0.189 
Collector  0.120 0.116 0.110 
Collector insulator 0.037 0.037 N/A 
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Positive roll insulator (internal) 0.068 0.068 0.053 
Negative roll insulator (internal) 0.082 0.083 0.054 
Jelly roll 28.006 29.162 36.553 
Positive [Al] Electrode  16.058 12.111 18.567 
Negative [Cu] Electrode 9.352 13.445 12.029 
Separator, 2 piece  1.547 2.032 1.562 
Outside Wrap Tape 0.103 1.204 0.055 
Roll Pin insert NA NA 1.991 
*Note that electrode material flaked off during DPA, separator mass contains portions of 
electrode materials and electrode mass does not reconcile to jelly roll mass 
 
 
The mass breakdown of all the separable components in each cell design is presented in Table 2. 
Note that the roll pin insert of the Moli is almost 2g and nearly 5% of cell mass.  
 
The cross-cuts provide excellent insight into the construction of each cell header (Figs 4, 5,  
and 6). 
 
 
    Figure 4. Sony HC cell        Figure 5 Sony HR cell (no PTC) 
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                         Figure 6. Moli Cell                               Figure 7. Moli CID and collector 
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Figure 8. Model of Sony HC cell header assembly 
 
 
 
Figures 9 & 10. Underside of Sony HC cell header assembly (left) and CID, tag mounting disk, 
and CID ring (right). 
 
Crimped Can 
Gasket Seal 
PTC ring 
+ Top Cover 
CID Button CID ring -polymer 
+ Tag mounting disk  
Scored Disk Vent 
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Figures 11 & 12. Underside of Sony HR cell header assembly (left) and seal, button, CID, CID 
ring, and tag mounting disk (right). 
 
The live cell overcharge test with the Moli cell at 12V and 55V offer an interesting comparison 
the physical evidence for arcing as show in Figs 13 & 14.  
 
     
 
Figure 13 & 14. Tag mounting disk of Moli cell overcharged at 55V (left), while same part and 
CID from cell never overcharged (right) 
 
The cell header test only arcing test yielded unquestionable physical evidence of arcing at 55V 
using Moli assemblies. See Figures 15 and 16. 
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Fig 15 & 16. Tag mounting disk (left) and CID (right) with carbonized evidence of arcing. 
 
The Sony HC cell did not show any evidence of arcing until tested at 110V. In Figs 17 & 18, the 
physical evidence is located in the CID button and the adjacent collector plate. The electrical 
evidence (Fig 19) is also very clear as it took over 500 ms for the CID to fully open with no more 
arcing.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. CID button of the Sony HC showing clear evidence of arcing. 
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Figure 18. The opposing collector plate of the CID of the Sony cell tested at 110V. 
 
Sony US18650S (HC) CID Trip Profile
CID Trip Point Voltage and Current Detail
2A current through CID w/110V supply limit; Sample 85E39
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Figure 19. Sony HC cell header current and voltage profiles during CID activation at 2A with 
110V of compliance voltage from power supply. The arcing transition last 506 ms. 
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Conclusions 
 CID arcing can occur upon activation in high voltage conditions 
o Results are not consistently repeatable 
 Evidence for arcing noticed in only 2 of 6 Moli cells at 55V 
 Evidence for arcing noticed in only 1 of 3 Sony HC cells at 110V 
o Arcing occurred at different voltages with different designs 
 Moli ICR-18650J showed evidence at 55V but not at 37V 
 Sony 18650HC showed evidence at 110V but not at 81.5V 
 COTS high rate 18650 showed no conclusive signs of arcing even at 110V 
 Confirmation runs by overcharging a Moli cell with P/S limit set at 55V 
o CID did not ignite and cause thermal runaway 
o Electrical transition of voltage and current occurred at 22V (like during header 
test) 
o However, transition afterwards was much slower 
o No clear evidence of arcing found upon DPA 
o Does free electrolyte act to suppress arcing? 
 
Recommendations 
 CID arcing can be controlled with these cell designs by ensuring charger power supply 
voltage headroom is less than 55V when charging series strings 
o Headroom = Max power supply voltage limit – Max battery voltage just prior to 
first CID opening 
o This will limit the voltage applied to the first CID activating and can easily be 
implemented 
Recommend all new cell designs to be verified for arcing limits 
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Appendix I.  Current Interrupt Device (CID) Arcing effects in Li-
Ion cells 
 
P Patel, F. Davies, J. Jeevarajan, G. Varela, E. Darcy, G. Dorsey, and H.-T. Chu 
NASA-Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX, USA 
 
A. Test Purpose 
 
A possible source of ignition inside a cell is the CID.  During CID activation, a spark could be 
induced due to arcing.  The main questions this test will attempt to answer is if CID activation 
could induce arcing, whether the arcing can cause a large enough spark to ignite a flame, and 
whether the atmosphere where the CID activation occurs is conducive to fueling that flame. 
 
B. Test Plan  
 
Two methods of testing were performed: One is the CID Live Cell Test and the other is the CID 
Header Test.  Both tests involve using three cell types: Moli (2.4Ah), Sony Hard Carbon(1.5Ah), 
and the COTS high rate(1.0 Ah).  This report will provide the test and analysis for the CID Live 
Cell Test only. 
The CID Live Cell Test involved overcharging a live 18650 cell until the CID activated.  
This test was performed with various voltage limits ranging from 18V to 110V to determine an 
approximate range where arcing occurred.  The test started at the middle of the spectrum with 
charging at 55V with a C/2 rate and stepped to a higher voltage if arcing was not observed or to a 
lower voltage if possible arcing was observed (See Table 1). The current and voltage curves are 
monitored throughout the duration of the test at a 1 Hz sampling rate.  When the CID activated, 
data was collected at a MHz rate to capture the minor fluctuations during activation.  The cells 
were then taken for Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) and high magnification imaging to 
look for physical signs of arcing.   
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
162 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
 
 
 
C. Results  
 
For the CID Live cell test, instead of the expected smooth current drop when the CID activates 
(Figure 1), we see irregular voltage and current curves while charging at 55V (Figure 2, 3 and 4).  
The DPA of these cells show discoloration on the bottom portion of the CID (Figures 5 – 9).  
However, there is no conclusive evidence of arcing. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Moli Live Cell CID activation (12V - 1.2A charge) 
No
YesNo 
110V @ C/2 
40V @ C/2 18V @ C/2 
25V @ C/2 
55V @ C/2
Yes = Arcing 
occurred
Yes
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Moli 18650J Overcharge CID Trip Profile
Cell charged at 1.2A to 4.2V, 4.2V to 50mA prior to test
Charged cell overcharged at 2.0A with 55V limit; Cell 85E16
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Figure 2:  Moli Live Cell CID activation (55V - 1.2A charge) 
 
-10                  0                   10                 20   30   
Time (sec)
10
20
40
30
0
60
50
Moli 55V Voltage Profile
Vo
lta
ge
 (V
)
Vo
lta
ge
 (V
)
 
Figure 3.  Voltage Profile for the Moli Live Cell CID Activation Test with a voltage of 55 V. 
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Moli 55V Current Profile
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Figure 4.  Current Profile for CID Test at 55 V for the Moli Cell. 
 
 
                                 
Figure 5:  Bottom portion of CID (55V)         Figure 6:  Bottom portion of CID (12V) 
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Figure 7:  Bottom portion of CID Enlarged (55V)          Figure 8: Close up of contact 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Bottom portion of CID Enlarged (12V)   
 
The CID discs were then analyzed for the chemical composition of the discoloration found on 
them by using Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy 
(EDS).  Two specific areas of the disc that were studied were the inner and the outer sections of 
the disc.  The micrographs were compared to the composition of a CID disc that was fresh and 
not subjected to any test.  The SEM and EDS images are provided in Figures 10 to 12 for the 
discolored CID sections as well as a fresh CID.  Traces of phosphorous were identified in the 
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inner areas of the discolored discs and in addition to this, traces of chlorine were also identified 
in the outer areas of the discs.  The cell seals were then analyzed used the same technique and it 
was determined that the seals had large traces of chlorine.  Figure 13 gives the SEM and EDS for 
the cell seals. 
 
Figure 10.  SEM and EDS of CID Disc from a fresh cell. 
 
In summary, although CID arcing is expected when the CID opens (under pressure) in the 
presence of high voltages, it may not be as marked, due to the dampening of this event by the 
electrolyte vapors and liquid that wet it during the process.  When the pressure inside the cells 
increases and pushes the CID disc, some hot electrolyte liquid and vapors may also splash onto 
the CID discs.  Although this may dampen the arcing effect, it may cause other catastrophic 
hazards to occur in a string or bank configuration due to the heat build up in the cell and due to 
the heat transfer occurring through the tabs in the string or bank.  Cell seal softening was also 
observed and confirmed by elemental analysis.  Hence, although there was no confirmed arcing 
for the full-cell samples tested for the Moli cells, exposure of the CID to high voltages during its 
opening can cause catastrophic hazards.   
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Figure 11.  SEM and EDS spectrum for the Composition of the Discoloration found on the 
inner portion of the CID disc. 
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Figure 12.  SEM and EDS spectrum for the Composition of the Discoloration found on the 
outer portion of the CID disc. 
 
Figure 13.  SEM and EDS spectrum for the Seal material found in the Moli 18650 cell 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
169 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
 
Appendix J.  Series String and Parallel Bank External Short and 
Overcharge Test Report 
 
 
J. Jeevarajan, F. Davies, P. Patel, G. Varela and E. Darcy 
NASA-Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX, USA 
 
R. Shah, C. Keen, C. Weitzel (Mobile Power Solutions; NASA Contract number NNJ07HD23P) 
W. Tracinski (Applied Power International; NASA Contract number NNJ06HD28P) 
Background 
The PTC has voltage limitations and when activated under high voltage conditions, can 
spontaneously ignite.  Under overcharge conditions, at voltages above 4.5 V, electrochemical 
decomposition of the organic electrolyte occurs producing large quantities of carbon monoxide 
that gets converted to carbon dioxide with continued voltage increase. In the 18650 cell design, 
an internally located Current Interrupt Device (CID), which opens under pressure and is typically 
non-resettable, causes the cell to remain open (unusable) after activation. Observations of the 
CID not being protective in high voltage cell strings led to testing of the single, four cell and 
fourteen cell series strings under overcharge conditions (Ref. 6 and 7). The CID activated in all 
single cells above 5.0 V, although the time it took for the CID activation varied from cell to cell.  
In the four cell string, the string becomes inactive after the CID in one cell activates resulting in 
a high resistance in the string. In the fourteen cell string, a close analysis of the oscilloscope data 
as well as the high speed data, indicated that the first CID activation was incomplete.  In this test, 
a current spike of 2.5A was observed that then lowered to about 1.6A and oscillated between 1.6 
and 1.5 A for a period of about 35 seconds, after which it fell to 0 A. During this period, a 
second cell spiked to about 24 V and fell to about 8 V.  For the next 200 seconds, the voltages of 
at least two cells increased, but remained below 10 V, even though the current to the cell string 
was at 0 A. Soon after this, thermal runaway resulted.  Some of the details of the test data are 
provided here to bring out the fact that communication between the cells, was observed, although 
the high resistance at the total string did not allow any charging currents. A closer look at the cell 
voltages indicated that at least three cells dropped in voltage below 0 V, indicating PTC failures. 
The probable causes of increased vapor pressure of the hot flammable electrolytes, the presence 
of oxygen released from the cathode at high voltages, and the presence of the PTC ignition 
source resulted in the cells venting, disassembly, violent reactions and thermal runaway. Another 
possibility is the creation of sharp edges during the opening of the CID that could cause the 
incidence of an arc in the presence of hot flammable gases.  
 
Tests 
Although the results of the short circuit test were not unexpected, the results of the overcharge 
test were and this led to further study of these cylindrical cells and their internal safety 
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components.  Although cells from different manufacturers, such as Sony, Moli, Panasonic and 
Sanyo were purchased, this particular set of tests was carried out on the Sony 18650 hard carbon 
cells only.  Overcharge and external short tests were performed on single cells and on different 
lengths of strings and banks. 
 
External short and overcharge tests on cells in series or parallel configurations: 
The test was performed with Sony 18650 cells of 1.5 Ah capacity.  The cells were at first 
removed from Canon camcorder batteries.  However, initial tests indicated that the cells had been 
compromised during the removal from the packs and the results were more catastrophic in 
nature.  After these observations, fresh single cells that had been purchased directly from a 
battery company were used for the tests.  Cells were tested as single cells, bank of four cells and 
bank of 16 cells.  For these combinations, the limits were varied to determine the tolerance as 
well as the limitations of the protective devices.  All string and bank configurations had cells 
arranged in a single row (fence-post) type and laid flat as shown in the figures.  Changes were 
made during the test program to get the best results possible from the test program.   
 
A summary of the results is provided in the Table 1, below.  The test samples were cells removed 
from a Canon camcorder battery pack of known heritage and fresh cells.  All the 16P tests were 
carried out with fresh cells.  Of the 4P tests only the 12 V, 6A that did not experience a thermal 
runaway was performed with the fresh cells.  The external shorts on the series strings were all 
carried out on cells extracted from the Canon battery packs. 
 
Table 1.  Summary of overcharge and external short tests carried out on Different Module 
Configurations with Different Voltage and Current Limits 
 
Description Volts Amps 
Load 
(Ohms) Notes 
Single cell overcharge, 2X 12 1.5  CID operates; Canon / fresh 
4P overcharge, 48V, 6A 48 6  Thermal runaway; Canon 
4P overcharge, 12V, 6A 12 6  CID operates; fresh 
4P overcharge, 12V, 6A 12 6  Thermal runaway / Canon 
4P overcharge, 12V, 4A 12 4  CID operates / Canon 
16P overcharge, 48V, 24A 48 24  Thermal runaway / fresh 
16P overcharge, 12V, 24A 12 24  Thermal runaway / fresh 
16P overcharge, 12V, 12A 12 12  CID operates /fresh 
16 P external short    2 No thermal runaway /Canon 
Single Cell external shorts    No failures; PTC trips / Canon 
4S External short   50 No failures; PTC trips / Canon  
14S External short   50 PTC fails; venting and sparks/Canon 
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4S Overcharge 48 1.5  No failure; CID activates / Canon 
14S Overcharge 84 1.5  Thermal runaway / Canon 
 
Results and Observations 
In all cases, the single cell overcharge and external short tests had expected results with CID 
opening and PTC activation occurring without any catastrophic failures. 
 
The 4P overcharge test with 6A current (equivalent to 1C rate per cell) and 48 V limit, had the 
following results (Figure 1).  The current on Cell #4 dropped to approximately 200 mA at about 
1 hour into the overcharge condition.  Two minutes after this occurred, the CIDs tripped on cell 
1, cell 2 and cell 3 sequentially.  At this point, cell #4 was carrying all the current (6A) and 
explosive venting with flame and thermal runaway occurred.  The cell can showed splitting 
(Figure 2).  The maximum temperature recorded on this cell was only 51 °C just before the 
venting occurred.   
N2-360-B-4A-43, 4P Battery, 48V, 6A Overcharge, 26Oct07
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Figure 1.  Overcharge test on 4P bank of Sony Li-Ion cells using 6A current with a 48 V 
limit. 
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Figure 2:  Cell #4 after the 4P overcharge test with 6A and 48 V limit. 
 
Figure 3 provides a chart for the results observed during the overcharge of the Sony li-ion cells 
(removed from the Canon battery packs) in a 4P configuration were subjected to the 6A, 12 V 
limit.  At ~45 minutes into the charge, cells 1 and 2 went to a low current leaving 3 and 4 to 
carry more current; at ~48 minutes, cells 3 and 4 returned to carrying high current, and all 4 cells 
evened out at ~49.5 minutes; at 54 minutes cell 3 appeared to activate its CID followed by the 
other 3 cells over the next minute; at 54:52, cell 3 jumped from 109°C to 120°C in less than 1 
second with runaway to >500°C; each of the other 3 cells vented flame as well, probably due to 
thermal propagation of the initial event.  When the test was repeated with fresh Sony li-ion cells 
obtained from a cell vendor, all cells had their CIDs activated as expected.  Figure 4 gives the 
results obtained. 
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Figure 3.  Overcharge test on 4P bank of Sony Li-ion cells (from Canon pack) with 6A and 
12 V limit.  A photo of the broken pyrex dish is shown on the right. 
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N2-360-B-4A4-69, 4P Battery, 12V, 6A Overcharge, 01Nov07
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Figure 4.  Overcharge test on 4P bank of Sony Li-ion cells (fresh cells) with 6A and 12 V 
limit. 
 
The 4P overcharge test with 6 A and 12 V was repeated on the Sony cells from the Canon packs 
and the same catastrophic results were obtained. Cells from the batch were analyzed and found to 
have been compromised (ac impedance was much higher compared to fresh cells).  Hence 
further investigation was carried out to measure PTC resistances and ac impedance of the cell.  
The cell voltage and ac impedance and PTC resistances are given below: 
 
Cell 1:  OCV: 4.062V, AC imped.: 80.7mohm AC, PTC resistance: 30.9mohm  
Cell 2:  OCV: 4.051V, AC imped.: 67.2mohm AC, PTC resistance: 21.2mohm  
Cell 3:  OCV: 4.033V, AC imped.: 86.2mohm AC, PTC resistance: 26.7mohm  
 
The fresh Sony 18650S cells had an average AC impedance of 64.7mohm with a range of 62.2 to 
68.2mohm.  The PTC resistance was 22.4mohm average with a range of 21.1 to 24.1mohm.  
Cells 1 and 3 above, seem to have been adversely affected during or after pack disassembly.  The 
elevated PTC resistances are consistent with recovered values on a tripped PTC. 
A second set of Canon batteries were opened up with more care and the ac impedances and PTC 
resistances of the four cells were measured.  The values were more in the range for fresh cells as 
provided below: 
 
OCV:  3.511, 3.512, 3.500, 3.500 volts 
AC Imp.:  88.8, 88.3, 89.1, 91.0 milliohms 
PTC resistance:  24.4, 24.0, 25.1, 24.9 milliohms. 
This data indicated that the cells from the Canon packs that underwent the 4P test with 12 V and 
6A limits had been compromised while they were being removed from the packs. 
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The last set of tests on the 4P bank was an overcharge with 4A and a 12 V limit.  This test also 
activated the CIDs without any catastrophic failures.  Figure 5 gives a plot of the current, voltage 
and temperature for this test.  It was observed that the current going into one cell drops to a low 
value (possible PTC activation) while the others accept more current.  Cell 1 has its CID 
activated first and then cell 2, followed by that for cell 4 and finally the CID for cell 3 activates 
shutting off current going in to bank.  It was observed that the current is constantly being shared 
and balanced by the cells.  The test was repeated under the same conditions and the same results 
were observed.   
 
N2-360-B-4A3-65, 4P Battery, 12V, 4A Overcharge, 31Oct07
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Figure 5.  Overcharge test on a 4P bank of cells at 4A with a 12 V limit. 
 
The next set of tests was carried out on 16 parallel cells.  The first test with this configuration 
was an overcharge test with 24A and a 48 V limit.  It was observed (as shown in Figure 6a) that 
the CIDs activated in succession for about half the number of cells.  At this point, the 
temperatures on several of the cells show steady increase and then there is a sudden thermal 
runaway as the last few CIDs try to open at the same time.           
It was observed that cell 3 was at 84 °C when its CID activated but it reached about 106 °C 
within about 3 minutes and went into a thermal runaway (Figure 6 b).  Even after the current fell 
to 0 A, the cell temperatures continued to rise until thermal runaway occurred.  The thermal 
runaway could have been caused by the ignition of a high-resistance PTC (activated due to high 
temperature) that was exposed to the high voltage (48V limit on power supply).  Although 13 of 
the 16 cells were intact, most of them did not have good cell voltages as seen in Table 2. 
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N2-360-B-4B-45, 16P Battery, 48V, 24A Overcharge, 02Nov07
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                 (a)            (b) 
Figure 6:  Overcharge Test on a 16P configuration with a current of 24A and a voltage 
limit of 48 V. 
 
Table 2.  Cell Voltages and AC impedance for the Cells Subjected to a Charge current of 24 
A and a voltage of 48 V. 
 
Post Test OCV (V) Post Test 1kHz ACZ (Ohm)
N2-360-B-4B-45
N2-360-B-4B-46
N2-360-B-4B-47
N2-360-B-4B-48 0 0.00514
N2-360-B-4B-49 2.3043 753
N2-360-B-4B-50 1.5927 1294
N2-360-B-4B-51 1.9744 2186
N2-360-B-4B-52 0.3707 1166
N2-360-B-4B-53 0.5037 641
N2-360-B-4B-54 0.3444 1798
N2-360-B-4B-55 1.1678 667
N2-360-B-4B-56 0.3407 3654
N2-360-B-4B-57 0.3454 2387
N2-360-B-4B-58 1.0635 13952
N2-360-B-4B-59 0.9018 17433
N2-360-B-4B-60 0.9345 17533  
 
The next test was an overcharge test carried out on a 16P configuration with a 24 A charge 
current and 12 V as the voltage limit.  This test also resulted in catastrophic thermal runaway that 
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was worse than the above test.  The CIDs tripped in succession (Figure 7) and two minutes after 
the last cell had its CID tripped, one cell in the middle of the bank (cell 8) vented sparks and 
flame.  This was immediately followed by venting and burning of the cells on either side (cells 7, 
9, 10 and 11) of it.  After this, all the cells went into a thermal runaway with the cells that 
initiated the event being expelled from the cell bank. 
 
N2-360-B-4B2-77, 16P Battery, 12V, 24A Overcharge, 19Nov07
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Figure 7. Overcharge Test on a 16P bank with a current of 24A and a voltage limit of 12 V. 
 
The third set of tests included the same 16P configuration of cells that were overcharged with a 
12 A current and 12 V limit.  The CIDs in the cells activated with no catastrophic failures.  
Figure 8 depicts the data indicating CID openings in all the cells with no thermal runaway. 
The voltages on all the cells were measured and although it appeared that the cells had some 
voltage, these values dropped as soon as a load was placed on them.  The AC impedance values 
in Table 3 indicate that the cell impedances were extremely high indicating opening of the CIDs 
as expected. 
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N2-360-B-4B3-93, 16P Battery, 12V, 12A Overcharge, 19Dec07
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Figure 8. Overcharge Test on a 16P bank with a current of 12A and a voltage limit of 12 V. 
 
Table 3:  Voltage and AC impedance values for the cells in the 16P overcharge Test with 12 
A and 12 V limit. 
Post Test OCV (V) Post Test 1kHz ACZ (Ohm)*
N2-360-B-4B3-93 2.192 200000
N2-360-B-4B3-94 1.685 300000
N2-360-B-4B3-95 1.960 230000
N2-360-B-4B3-96 2.156 151000
N2-360-B-4B3-97 2.010 250000
N2-360-B-4B3-98 2.200 240000
N2-360-B-4B3-99 2.065 17300
N2-360-B-4B3-100 2.096 210000
N2-360-B-4B3-101 1.983 5100
N2-360-B-4B3-102 2.237 1300
N2-360-B-4B3-103 1.828 60000
N2-360-B-4B3-104 2.223 8100
N2-360-B-4B3-105 1.701 9100
N2-360-B-4B3-106 1.633 32000
N2-360-B-4B3-107 1.627 7800
N2-360-B-4B3-108 1.936 3000
*rounded to nearest 100 Ohms  
 
Finally, an external short circuit test was carried out on a 16P bank of cells with a load of 2 
mohms.  No catastrophic failures were observed.  The maximum temperature recorded was 89 
°C (Figure 9) and the total peak current observed was 361 A (Figure 10).  The voltage drops to 
1.48 V at short initiation which then falls to around 0.41 V about 3 seconds into the shorting 
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process and it tapers to less than 100 mV after 2 minutes into the whole process.  The voltage 
then settles down to between 50 and 60 mV until the last cell is fully discharged at which point 
the voltage falls to 0 V. 
 
N2-360, Test 3B, Bank External Short, 16P, Full Discharge, 31Jan08
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
0.000 0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
Time (h)
C
ur
re
nt
 (A
)
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
105
120
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 (o
C
)
Curr1 Curr2 Curr3 Curr4 Curr5 Curr6 Curr7 Curr8
Curr9 Curr10 Curr11 Curr12 Curr13 Curr14 Curr15 Curr16
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16
 
 
Figure 9:  External short circuit test on 16P configuration with 2 mohms. 
 
N2-360, Test 3B, Bank External Short, 16P, Peak Current, 31Jan08
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Figure 10.  Peak Currents observed Under the External Short Conditions for the 16P test. 
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For completeness, results of the tests carried out on a test program just before this one will be 
provided below (as mentioned at the beginning of this section).  This set of tests consisted of 
cells in series.  The single cell and 4S (four cells in series) tests under overcharge and external 
short conditions performed as expected.  The results of the 4S external short and overcharge tests 
are given in Figures 11 and 12.  Under the external short test, one cell PTC gets activated and 
remains in that condition until the load is removed.  The maximum temperature recorded was 75 
°C.  When the 4S cells were subjected to the overcharge conditions, one cell CID trips safing the 
string.  The maximum temperature recorded was 83 °C.  The tests carried out on the 16S strings 
were not as benign.  The 16S external short tests (Figure 13) resulted in several cells undergoing 
rapid venting within the first ten seconds with sparks and charring of the header.  Due the 
exposure of the PTC to very high voltages (above its threshold voltage), the results of the test are 
catastrophic.   
 
During the overcharge test on the 16S string (Figure 14), a current spike of 2.5A was observed 
that then lowered to about 1.6A and oscillated between 1.6 and 1.5 A for a period of about 35 
seconds, after which it fell to 0 A. During this period, a second one spiked to about 24 V and fell 
to about 8 V.  For the next 200 seconds, the voltages of at least two cells increased, but remained 
below 10 V, even though the current to the cell string was at 0 A (Figures 15 and 16). After this, 
the current into the string is cutoff, but the cells share current and the voltages undergo so many 
changes until finally two cells go into thermal runaway.  Analysis of the oscilloscope data 
indicated that some cells went into negative voltages indicating PTC failures.  The heat buildup 
in the cells could have caused the PTC to trip in some cells which are then exposed to the high 
voltage string of greater than 50V, causing thermal runaway and catastrophic failures.  Two cells 
were completely ejected from the string and two were dangling from the test table. 
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Figure 11.  External Short Circuit test on 4S set of cells with a load of 50 mohm. 
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Figure 12.  Overcharge Test on 4S set of cells with 1.5A current. 
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Figure 13.  External Short Circuit Test on 14S set of cells with 50 mohm load. 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
181 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Time (seconds)
Vo
lta
ge
 (V
)
Cell 27
Cell 28
Cell 30
Cell 31
Cell 33
Cell 35
Cell 36
Cell 37
Cell 38
Cell 40
Cell 41
Cell 42
Cell 43
Cell 45
Cell 36
Cell 31
Cell 42
Vo
lta
ge
 (V
)
Cells before Test
Cells After Test  
 
Figure 14.  Overcharge Test on 14S set of cells using a current 1.5 A. 
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Figure 15.  Expanded View of the First Half of the Overcharge Test on 14S set of cells using 
a current of 1.5 A 
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Figure 16.  Expanded View of the Second Half of the Overcharge Test on 14S set of cells 
using a current of 1.5 A 
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In conclusion, the internal protective devices such as the PTC and CID found in small cylindrical 
commercial Li-Ion cells do not provide the expected protection in high voltage and high capacity 
battery designs.  If these are to be used as safety controls, their protection in the relevant string or 
bank configuration should be verified by test before used to design and build flight batteries. 
 
Summary of Results: 
The results of the tests on the series cell strings confirmed that the PTC had a voltage limitation 
and this value varied with cell manufacturer.   Both the PTC and CID protect 100 % of the time 
in single cells but do not always protect in multi-cell strings and banks.  In multi-cell banks, the 
reaction of the cells to an overcharge condition depended on the charge current and end-of-
charge voltage.  If the charge current was high enough to cause PTC activation of any cells in the 
bank and the cell/cells with activated or tripped PTCs were exposed to a high voltage setting on 
the power supply (as with the 48 V, 24 A, 16-cell bank), the results were catastrophic and 
protection by CID opening was not observed.  The high-voltage setting on the power supply 
simulates a high voltage battery pack that the cell bank is a part of.  Similarly, the CIDs do not 
protect if the cell bank had cells with their PTCs compromised or activated and the results were 
catastrophic again (as seen with those removed from the Canon battery pack).  It was also 
observed that if the charge currents were high enough to cause unhindered cell heating (as with 
the 12 V, 24 A, 16-cell bank test), even after the charge was terminated, the cells go into a 
thermal runaway condition.  In summary, both the PTC and the CID cannot be completely relied 
on for protection under external short and overcharge conditions respectively due to the 
limitations on these devices.  
 
Recommendations:  
To prevent battery modules from going into a catastrophic hazardous condition, the voltage seen 
by any one PTC in the event of an external short should not be higher than its withstanding 
voltage. Cells should not have their PTCs compromised during the lot testing, qualification or 
battery assembly process.  The current used for charging should not be high enough to cause 
PTC activation in cells especially if they are in a high-voltage module.  If PTCs and CIDs are 
used as a level of control, their safe activation should be confirmed by actual testing and 
reconfirmed on every new flight lot.     
 
Acknowledgment:  
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Appendix K.  Overview of diode scheme 
 
Frank Davies 
 
There are failure modes of a series string of cells which can impose the full string voltage across 
components of the cells.  If the impedance of a cell component in the string increases 
dramatically while the battery is driving a load, the cell component could experience high 
voltages if its impedance exceeds the load impedance.  Commercial Lithium Ion cells often have 
a PTC current limiting device built into the cell.  The PTCs in commercial cells are often not 
rated for more than 40 volts.  If cells with such PTCs are used in a string with a total voltage 
greater than the PTC rating, the PTCs will fail if the string is shorted. 
 
Diode scheme operational description 
If diodes are placed in parallel with groups of cells as shown below, the maximum voltage that 
may appear across a PTC is limited to less than the total string voltage. 
Reverse diodes across substrings help with other high impedance cell conditions (tripped CID, 
shutdown separator, discharged cell) by holding down the maximum voltage that can appear 
across the impedance. 
 
 
1. Battery cell with built-in short circuit 
protection. 
2. Internal short circuit protection device 
(PTC).  May be similar to Raychem 
Polyswitch. 
3. Electrochemical part of cell (provides 
electromotive force) 
4. Substring 
5. Diode 
6. Load. 
 
Notes: 
A. More than two battery cells per substring 
may be used. 
B. More than 3 substrings may be used.   
C. The example battery system presented 
here is of limited size and complexity for 
clarity. 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5
6
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
185 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
Trip sequence example:  Stage 1 
 
 Short circuit appears.  All PTC short circuit protection devices start heating up. 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. No current through diodes yet. 
2. Short circuit current is limited by cell impedances and cold PTC 
impedances. 
3. This stage may last several seconds, depending on PTC 
characteristics. 
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Trip sequence example:  Stage 2 
 
First PTC trips, shunting current through diode. 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
 
1. Small current flows through shorted 
substring, keeping PTC tripped. 
2. Current through short is reduced, but not 
dramatically, since the current is still 
basically limited by the cell impedances.  
Other substrings have not tripped yet. 
3. Maximum voltage across tripped PTC is two 
cells worth plus diode drop. 
4. Diode takes almost maximum short circuit 
current until trip sequence is complete. 
5. Which substring trips first depends on 
device tolerances. 
6. This stage may last 0.1 seconds or so. 
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Trip sequence example:  Stage 3 
 
Second PTC trips, shunting current through diode and reducing current 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
 
1. Small current flows through shorted 
substring, keeping PTC tripped. 
2. Current through short is reduced again, 
but still high. 
3. Maximum voltage across tripped PTC is 
two cells worth plus diode drop. 
4. When one PTC in a substring trips, it 
inhibits the tripping of the other PTCs in 
that substring by reducing the substring 
current. 
5. Which PTC in a substring trips first 
depends on device tolerances. 
6. This stage may last 0.1 seconds or so. 
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Trip sequence example:  Stage 4 
 
Last PTC trips, reducing current through short to low levels. 
 
 
 
. 
Notes: 
 
1. Last diode does not get 
forward biased (conduct 
current). 
2. Last substring to trip still runs 
low level current through the 
diodes of the other substrings 
and the short. 
3. The tripped PTC device in the 
last substring to trip does not 
get quite as large a voltage 
across it as the other tripped 
PTCs. 
4. If the short is removed, then no 
current will flow through the 
PTCs, and they will cool 
down, resetting themselves to 
a low impedance state. 
5. High impedance shorts may 
result in one or more 
substrings not tripping.  In any 
event, current will be limited 
to the PTC trip level or lower. 
6. This stage lasts until the short 
circuit is removed (or the cells 
discharge). 
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PTC Characteristics 
1.1 Overview 
Since the PTCs are an integral part of the cells, there is not much latitude for design decisions.  
However, the characteristics of the PTC selected by the cell manufacturer have a significant 
impact on battery system performance.  Cell manufacturers may provide more detailed technical 
information if asked.   Testing on cells and on PTCs removed from cells (ends of cell cases) may 
be necessary to obtain design data. 
1.2 PTC impedance variations 
PTC impedance changes considerably after the first trip.  Subsequent trips do not cause much 
change.   
For example, Doljack [1] states that the resistance of a PTC 1 hour after its first trip may be 20% 
higher than the initial (pre-trip) resistance.  After 24 hours it may have decreased 5%. 
1.3 Sustaining current 
Under a persistent short, PTCs allow a leakage current to flow that keeps them at their transition 
temperature (the temperature at which the PTC changes rapidly with temperature).  Test data 
shows that a typical 18650 Li ion cell PTC requires about 3W to sustain itself at the tripped 
temperature.  If a substring has 4 cells in it (OCV= 4*3.6V average), then the sustaining current 
would be about 3W/14.4V = 208 mA. 
1.4 Variation of performance. 
Dependence of performance on ambient temperature, trip history, and part-to-part variation 
means that a large margin must be designed between the normal operating currents and the 
expected trip currents.  For example, the Raychem SMD075  (a discrete PTC, not a cell 
component) is rated as follows: 
 
Raychem SMD075 
 0°C 20°C 40°C 60°C 
Hold current 0.84A 0.75A 0.62A 0.49A 
Trip current 1.68A 1.50A 1.24A 0.98A 
 
A battery application that used this PTC over a 0°C to 40°C temperature range would have a 
maximum operating current (hold current) of 0.62A and a minimum trip current of 1.68A.  Wire 
connected protected by this PTC would have to be sized to handle 1.68A, more than 250% of the 
maximum load current.  
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1.5 Peak power limitations.   
The PTCs are present in the cell to limit the energy available from the cell during a short.   As 
such they also limit the peak power from the cell, particularly with hot batteries.  When driving a 
constant power type load, such as a motor controller, the PTCs may cause the battery voltage to 
collapse toward the end of the mission when the battery is hot, the voltage is dropping, and the 
current is rising.  Because of the lack of definition of PTC parameters, this must be determined 
by test.  A suitable test might be to run a scaled worst case mission current profile on a single 
cell in an appropriate thermal environment and monitor for PTC activation.  The test could be 
repeated while increasing the current or temperature until trip occurred to determine the design 
margin. 
1.6 Battery overheating 
Under a persistent short, the PTCs allow a leakage current to flow that keeps them at their 
transition temperature (the temperature at which the PTC changes rapidly with temperature).  
They will hold this temperature and heat will flow into the rest of the battery until the electrical 
energy in the battery is exhausted.  This may result in the battery temperature rising enough to 
cause thermal runaway.  The diode scheme splits the available energy between several PTCs on 
the string, which will spread the heat but not reduce the total amount of thermal energy. 
1.7 Cell seal failure 
The PTC in a cell is a heater at one end of the cell positioned very close to the crimp seal.  Under 
conditions of a persistent short the hot PTC can cause the crimp seal at the end of the cell to fail 
due to PTC heat generation.  This failure mode has been observed in tests.   
Diode selection 
1.8 Reliability 
A discussion of diode reliability is outside of the scope of this guide.  The contract governing the 
design of the battery will have parts reliability guidelines.  This section discusses the failure 
modes of the diode scheme, their effects, and possible design changes to mitigate them.   
1.8.1 Failure mode:  Diode short 
The failed diode shorts the substring.  If the battery has a single string (no parallel strings), then 
the overall battery voltage will drop by the substring voltage.  One PTC in the substring will trip 
and limit the current magnitude after a short time (determined by test).  The energy stored in the 
substring will eventually turn into heat in the tripped PTC.  The thermal design of the battery 
assembly must be able to handle this without propagating the failure.  If the string is in parallel 
with other strings, the string with the shorted cells may end up with overcharged cells.  Placing 
multiple diodes in series will control the failure effects. 
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1.8.2 Failure mode: Diode open. 
The failed diode does not affect the performance of the battery unless there is an external short.  
In that case, a complex series of events takes place which result in one or more PTCs in the 
substring with the failed diode seeing excessive voltage and failing short.  Depending on the 
order in which the PTCs trip, the current in the short will not drop to low levels.   Placing 
multiple diodes in parallel will control the failure effects. 
1.9 Forward current rating 
1.9.1 Peak current 
During normal battery operation, no forward current flows through the diodes.  The diodes must 
be sized to handle the current pulse that flows when the battery is shorted. 
 
In the event of a hard external short circuit on the battery assembly the initial short circuit current 
will be limited by the cell impedances.   After a short time, the first PTC will trip.  This will 
shunt the short circuit current through the diode in parallel with that substring as well as reduce 
the short circuit current slightly.  The second PTC (in another substring) will then trip and shunt 
the short circuit current through its diode and reduce the short circuit current somewhat. As the 
short continues more PTCs trip and the current decreases in a ramp until each substring has a 
tripped PTC.  At this point the short circuit current is equal to the PTC trip sustaining current.   
 
The diode that sees high current first is the one associated with the first PTC to trip.  It does not 
actually see current until that PTC trips.  Since once the first PTC has tripped, the others are 
about to trip and the current is dropping.  This means that the durations of the current seen by 
diodes depend on the spread in trip times of the PTCs. 
 
Because of these factors the exact current waveform that a diode will see can not be determined 
without a statistical model of PTC performance and detailed computer modeling, but it is 
possible to envelope it.  The diode that sees the worst current will not see current higher than the 
hard short current of the cells (current limited by cell impedance and intercell connections).  This 
can easily be determined by testing cells.   
 
Estimating the duration of the diode current pulse is more difficult.  For hard shorts, it is 
reasonable to use the PTC trip time of a cell under hard short.  For lower magnitude shorts, a 
reasonable estimate of worst case diode current would be a rectangular pulse with a magnitude of 
3 times the PTC room temperature “do not trip” current (as measured by test) and a duration of 
the trip time at that level. 
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Standard diode data sheets do not generally have enough data to allow the diode to be well sized 
with this information.  The best approach is to run these current waveforms on diodes with 
flight-like thermal environments and determine the maximum junction temperature. 
 
 
Hard short test:  5P41S 18650 cells test string (5 strings in parallel) 
 
 
1.9.2 Steady state current 
A high resistance “smart” short could be of such a resistance that it would cause some but not all 
of the substrings to trip.  This would mean that the diodes associated with the tripped substrings 
would carry high currents until the battery discharged.  The diodes should be sized to carry the 
largest steady state current that the cells can supply without tripping PTCs. 
1.10 Reverse blocking voltage 
The diode must normally sustain the voltage of the fully charged substring.  In the event of a cell 
in the substring having a jump in impedance during charge (CID opening, shutdown separator, or 
PTC activating), the diode may be called on to tolerate the maximum charger voltage minus the 
voltage of the other substrings. 
1.11 Reverse leakage current 
During normal operations, the reverse leakage current of the diode will act to discharge the 
substring.  A diode should be chosen with a leakage current significantly less than the equivalent 
self discharge current of the cells.  Variations of leakage current from diode to diode can lead to 
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cell imbalance if the leakage current is a significant fraction of the self discharge.  Leakage 
current will produce a small heating effect which should be considered.  Since reverse current is 
strongly temperature sensitive, the leakage current at the maximum storage temperature of the 
battery must be considered.  Diode with leakage current that rises quickly with temperature may 
enter thermal runaway in poor thermal environments (high temperature, vacuum, etc).  For 
example, self-discharge of typical 18650 cell designs at 25°C and 40% state-of-charge is on the 
order of 1.5% per year [2]. If the cell capacity is 2.4Ah, that amount of capacity loss over a year 
equates to a 4 A leak. Therefore, acceptable diode leakage rates must be below this level to 
preclude the diodes from cause cell to cell capacity imbalances during storage. 
Test outline 
1.12  Overview 
Because the design of the battery system and the diode scheme depend on poorly documented 
properties of the diodes (transient thermal performance) and PTCs (maximum voltage, self-
heating rate, trip time, etc.), these properties must be determined by test. 
 
Test outline: 
PTC tests: Peak short 
circuit 
current 
Use sufficient number of cells in series so that circuit 
resistance is less than one tenth of Re of cells. Do not use 
number of cells that will cause overvoltage damage.  
Condition cells with low current trip, then relaxation time 
>1 day.  Run at ambient, worst case cold, and worst case 
hot.  Measure current during trip.  Hold short on cells for 
one hour.  Verify nominal operation after test 
(charge/discharge cycle).  Measure peak current, duration 
of current pulse 
Reverse 
voltage test 
on 
individual 
cells.   
 
Use power supply or stack of cells (without PTC, may be 
another chemistry such as NiCd) in series with a single 
cell.   Increase voltage of power supply or cell stack until 
PTC fails.  Repeat with several cells to characterize reverse 
voltage capabilities of cell PTCs. 
Build cell string with final diode design and full voltage.  
Test with short circuit at worst case temperatures.   
PTC do not 
trip levels 
Trip fresh cells at increasing levels to determine the 
highest current that discharges the cell before PTC trip.  
Perform at high and low temperatures. 
PTC 
thermal 
generation 
Measure thermal power generated by tripped PTCs at 
different voltage levels.  May be combined with other tests.
Diode tests: Diode Characterize diode forward voltage vs temperature with 
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junction 
temp test 
small test current and externally imposed temperature. 
Leakage 
current 
Characterize diode leakage current at proposed mission 
voltage and temperature conditions. Select only diodes 
whose maximum leakage current is lower than cell self-
discharge rate at planned storage and mission conditions. 
 Diode 
thermal 
performance 
test 
Diode mounted as it will be in final design, at worst case 
hot, ambient, and worst case cold.  Using programmable 
power supply, put worst case current waveform at that 
temperature into diode.  Repeat with current waveforms 
interrupted by test current at different intervals to evaluate 
junction temperature.   
System 
thermal 
test: 
Thermal 
model 
validation 
test 
Substring in relevant thermal environment.  Hard short in 
worst case hot at full charge.  Keep hard short on cells 
while monitoring temperatures of cells.  Let test continue 
until temperatures start dropping.  Repeat with fresh 
substring at smart short. 
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Appendix L.  Effects of High Charge Rates of Li-Ion Cells 
 
Problem Description, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment 
Problem description: Lithium-ion batteries operate over wide temperature range, typically -20 to 
+40oC, unlike the aqueous battery systems.  However, there are constraints on their charge rates, 
especially at low temperatures.  Due to hindered kinetics for Li intercalation, lithium tends to 
reduce as metal on the graphite anode.  Such plated lithium may reversibly oxidize during 
discharge, at a lower potential than graphite or 
higher cell voltage, manifesting as a (high) 
voltage plateau, about 100 mV higher than the 
expected discharge voltages, as shown in Fig. 
1.  Even though, the plated lithium is 
reversible or may chemically intercalate into 
graphite over time, its presence at the anode 
surface will mean an accelerated degradation 
of the electrolytes, reduced cycle life, 
reliability and may be even unsafe.  
 
Proposed solution and Risk Assessment:   A 
systematic study has been undertaken to 
determine conditions that ensure safe charging of Li-ion batteries under such extreme conditions 
of charge rate and temperature, specifically at low temperatures. The approach adopted here was 
to evaluate lithium-ion cells, with different electrolytes, electrode capacity ratios and 
configurations form different manufacturers for their ability to support such charge rates without 
any adverse effects, e. g., Li plating at low temperatures.  In this process adequate screening 
methods were developed to identify the lithium plating phenomenon. 
 
The test articles utilized in this study include: i) SAFT DD cells with a low temperature 
electrolyte (2007 pedigree, with 1.0M LiPF6 in EC+EMC (20:80 v/v%)), ii) Yardney 7 Ah cells, 
with chemistry similar to the batteries on the Mars Exploration Rovers, iii) Quallion 18650 cells, 
iv) Quallion pouch cells of 4 Ah with three different electrolytes, v) SKC polymer cells, and vi) 
A123 26650 cells of 2.3 Ah.  In addition, a few laboratory glass cells with carbon anodes and 
nickel cobalt oxide cathodes and Li reference electrodes were employed to understand the role of 
electrolytes on the plating characteristics.  The cells were charged at different charge rates, up to 
C rate, at various temperatures down to -40oC, followed by discharge at the same temperatures 
but at constant current corresponding to C/10.  The discharge profiles were examined to 
determine the on-set of Li plating in the preceding charge.  In short the risk of lithium plating has 
been assessed in several likely prototype cells to identify the charge conditions not conducive to 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
196 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
lithium plating and to establish the conditions permitting such Li plating and hence need to be 
avoided from the performance, reliability and safety standpoint. 
 
Data Analysis 
Lithium plating is a result of relatively slow kinetics for Li intercalation (into graphite) compared 
to Li deposition and is thus governed by all the conditions that affect the interfacial properties at 
the anode.  More specifically, it is dependent on the: i) nature of electrolyte, ii) nature of anode 
composite electrode, and iii) cathode to anode capacity ratio.  Generally, Li-ion cell designs are 
cathode limited.  However, if anode is not sufficiently in excess, it may be polarized heavily 
during charge, which will drive the anode to potentials conducive to Li plating.   Further, the 
cathode to anode ratio may change upon cycling/storage, due to a relatively faster degradation of 
the anode capacity.  Our studies confirm these dependencies as shown below: 
Effect of electrolyte: A low temperature electrolyte provides suitable interfacial conditions that 
would facilitate Li intercalation and hence would not pose the problem of Li plating.  Fig.2 and 3 
give example of two electrolytes: i) Ethylene carbonate-rich formulation (in Fig. 2), and ii) a low 
EC-content blended electrolyte, good for low temperature operations.   
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As may be seen from the above figures, the low temperature electrolyte provides suitable 
interface for (good) Li intercalation kinetics and less so for Li plating.  This is further 
substantiated by the Tafel polarization data, which show the relative kinetics at the individual 
electrodes, as shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Report 
Document #: 
RP-08-75 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Program 
Page #: 
198 of 206 
 
 
 
NESC Request No.: 06-069-I 
Part I – Volume II 
It is clear from the above figure that the anode kinetics are slower compared to the cathode 
kinetics in the EC-rich electrolyte, which would have subjected the anode to a heavier 
polarization and subsequently to lithium plating, as observed (cf. Fig. 2).  
Effect of anode to cathode ratio:  High anode to cathode (capacities) ratio will minimize 
polarization at the anode during charge, which in turn precludes Li plating on the anode.  Figs 5 
and 6 provide a comparison of the two prototypes, which differ more prominently in the anode to 
cathode ratio among other design variations. 
 
 
The cells shown in Fig. 5 were fabricated by Quallion in pouch configuration and have capacities 
of 4 Ah.  Based on their specific energies of about 190 Wh/kg (and also our personal 
discussions), we conclude that these cells have a lower anode to cathode ratios.  This may be a 
significant factor behind the tendency towards lithium plating at -20oC, with baseline as well as 
with low temperature electrolytes.  The cells shown in Fig. 6, made by Yardney, on the other 
hand have higher anode to cathode ratio inferred from their modest specific energies and are 
immune to lithium plating even at -40oC.  
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Intercalation vs. Plating Kinetics 
To express the effect of kinetics 
rather quantitatively, we estimated 
the currents going towards Li 
plating and Li intercalation at a 
given potential.  These estimates 
were made with the assumption 
that both Li processes are in the 
Tafel mode at the selected 
voltages. The value of reversible 
potential for Li intercalation used 
for this calculation is 85 mV vs Li, 
while the potential for Li plating: 0 
V vs. Li.   As may be seen from the 
figure, proportion of plating 
current starts climbing up from ~ 
2% to > 10%, if the ratio of exchange currents for intercalation to plating goes below 20.  In 
other words, if the intercalation kinetics are only 20 times faster than plating (which is the case at 
low temperatures), lithium plating current starts being substantial. 
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Summary of the Test Data 
Table-1 summarizes the findings from different prototype cells tested in this program.  It lists the 
charge rates (in terms of C rate) of these different cells, that are acceptable (without Li plating) at 
different temperatures.   
 
As may be seen from the above table, the propensity for Li plating as a function of charge rate 
and temperature varies significantly from one manufacturer to another.  These variations may be 
related to the difference in materials, electrode and electrolytes, and in the cell designs, more 
importantly the amount of anode reserve. 
Yardney 7 Ah Cells 
As mentioned previously, a number of 7 Ah Li-ion manufactured by Yardney Technical Products 
were subjected to charge characterization testing at a number of temperatures (i.e., 20, 10, 0, -10, 
-20, -30, and -40oC) and using a number of charge rates (C/20, C/10, C/5, C/2, C/1.33, C/1.0).    
As shown in Table 1, when the cells were evaluated at 20oC, comparable capacity can be 
obtained in all cases, regardless of charge rate.  This is due to the charging methodology 
consisting of implementing a constant current-constant potential (CC-CV) protocol, which 
allows the current to taper to a fixed value (i.e., C/50, or 0.140A) in the constant potential mode 
(e.g., 4.10V).   Although the final charge capacity is comparable regardless of charge rate, 
proportionately more charge time is spent in the constant potential mode when high inrush 
charge currents are used, and lower watt-hour efficiencies are observed due to increased 
polarization.   These differences are illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9, in which the charge 
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characteristics are displayed for one of the cells at 20oC using C/5 and C charge rates, 
respectively. As shown in Fig. 8, when a C/5 charge rate is used the cell is in the constant current 
mode for 5.48 hours of the total 6.54 hour charge time, or ~ 85% of the total charge time.  In 
addition, 7.697 Ah is charge capacity is accepted by the cell in the constant current mode, 
representing 95.6% of the total charge capacity.   
Table 2: Summary of the charge characteristics of a Yardney 7 Ah cell at 20oC. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Charge characteristics of a Yardney 7 Ah cell at 20oC using a C/5 rate to 4.10V 
In contrast, when using a C rate charge, the cell is in the constant current mode for 0.95 hours of 
the total 2.41 hour charge time, or ~ 39% of the total charge time.  In addition, 7.697 Ah is 
charge capacity is accepted by the cell in the constant current mode, representing only 82.6% of 
the total charge capacity.   Generally speaking, due to decreased cell resistance, high power cell 
designs typically have improved charge acceptance characteristics at high rates, and 
proportionately more charge capacity is obtained in the constant current mode as opposed to the 
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constant potential mode.   In contrast, cells with poor rate capability and/or cells that have 
impedance growth due to aging effects will typically have a larger proportion of the charge 
capacity being accepted during the constant potential mode.    
 
Fig. 9: Charge characteristics of a Yardney 7 Ah cell at 20oC using a 1.0 C rate to 4.10V 
 This trend is also seen at lower temperatures, where more of the charge capacity is accepted 
during the constant potential mode rather than in the constant current mode, due to higher cell 
resistance.  This results in correspondingly higher charge times to obtain “full” capacity.  It 
should also be noted that lower charge capacities are obtained at lower temperatures, resulting in 
~ 96 %, 90%, 83%, 75%, 61%, and 32% of the room temperature capacity being charged at 10o, 
0o, -10o, -20o, -30o, and -40o, respectively.  For example, when a cell was characterized at -20oC, 
as summarized in Table 2, only 74-75% of the room temperature capacity could be charge into 
the cell, regardless of charge rate employed.  In addition, the charge times required to charge the 
cell is much longer, with the C rate charged taking over 7 hours to reach full capacity.   This is 
illustrated in Fig. 10, in which the charge characteristics of a 7 Ah cell are shown at -20oC using 
a C rate charge.   As shown, only negligible charge capacity is accepted by the cell during the 
constant current mode, the cell being unable to support such high charge currents at these 
temperatures without being polarized above the set charge voltage of 4.10V. Thus, nearly all of 
the capacity is obtained during the constant potential mode, with over half of the capacity being 
accepted when the current has taper to values below 3A. 
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Table 2: Summary of the charge characteristics of a Yardney 7 Ah cell at - 20oC. 
 
 
Fig. 10: Charge characteristics of a Yardney 7 Ah cell at - 20oC using a 1.0 C rate to 4.10V 
In terms of harmful lithium plating processes, the conditions that possess the greatest propensity 
for this occurring is when the charge current and the charge potential are the highest.  Thus, in 
the case of the cell above under the described conditions (C rate charge at -20oC), the likelihood 
of lithium plating is greatest at the very beginning of the charging process, i.e., when the charge 
current is the highest (e.g. above 3.0A) and the charge voltage is the highest (e.g., 4.10V).   
When the subsequent discharge profiles are observed following high rate charge at -20oC, as 
shown in Fig. 11, no clear evidence of the corresponding lithium stripping phenomena is 
observed, indirectly suggesting that no significant lithium plating occurred or that any lithium 
that was plated at the higher currents intercalated into the graphitic anode over time when the cell 
was charging at the lower currents.  For that matter, no evidence of lithium plating was observed 
(as ascertained by the subsequent discharge profiles) with the Yardney 7 Ah cells when 
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characterized down to -40oC, and using charge rates of up to C rate.   The summary of all the 
characterization tests performed on the baseline cell, which contained the ternary carbonate 
electrolyte (e.g., 1.0M LiPF6 in EC+DEC+DMC (1:1:1 v/v %), is shown in Table. 2. 
 
Fig. 11: Discharge profiles of a 7 Ah cell after charging at various rates at low temperature (- 20oC).   
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Table 2: Summary of the charge characteristics of a Yardney 7 Ah cell, containing the baseline electrolyte 1.0M 
LiPF6 in EC+DEC+DMC (1:1:1 v/v %)  at various temperatures . 
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Findings, Observations, and Recommendations 
 
Li-ion cells upon charge at high rates and/or low temperatures can exhibit a tendency to have 
metallic lithium deposited on the carbon anode – a deviation from the intercalation process that 
the Li-ion chemistry was designed to accomplish (in contrast to Li metal systems).  Such Li 
plating will have deleterious impact on the performance, reliability and maybe even safety.  This 
characteristic is dictated by several parameters including the nature of electrode and electrolyte 
materials and the cell design parameters, especially the relative electrode capacities.   
 
It is recommended that Li-ion cells and batteries be tested in the expected charge regime and 
temperature range before hand, before putting them for use.  As a diagnostics, the cells may be 
charged at the relevant charge rate and temperature and one may look for the evidence for Li 
plating in a subsequent discharge, which will be in the form of a voltage plateau about 100 mV 
higher than normal in the early stages of discharge.  It is recommended that some margin is 
allowed in the charge rates, since the relative electrode capacity ratios may get worse upon 
cycling, due to a relative faster degradation from the anode. 
 
The plated lithium may partly be intercalated, either during the tapered charge mode or in the 
open-circuit stand, which we need to study further.  Likewise, the long-term impact of such Li 
plating, though known to be harmful, needs to be understood.  
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